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Note on the cover page picture: 
A signboard issued by Natural Resource Management Agency (Badan 
Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup – Bapelda) of Berau located in the main square 
of Tanjung Redeb City, Berau. The sign is in Indonesian and in English it 
means ‘Take only what you need from nature’. 
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1.1 Global Intervention in Coastal Governance in Indonesia 
 
Decentralization in Indonesia has provided new opportunities for provincial 
and regency government, as well as private sector actors to access and exploit 
marine and coastal natural resources (Patlis 2008; Patlis 2005; Satria and 
Matsuda 2004; Aspinal and Fealy 2003). The implementation of 
decentralization and subsequent emergence of regional autonomy has invited 
government to formulate locally oriented and relevant laws and regulations 
related to the management of natural resources (Resosudarmo 2005). However, 
despite the importance of coastal areas for national and local economies in 
Indonesia (Visser 2004; Laksono 2007) the social and regulatory consequences 
of marine resource exploitation remain poorly understood. Moreover, 
inconsistency and overlap of laws and regulations between sectors (Patlis 2005; 
Resosudarmo 2005) and the lack of coordination between multiple levels of 
government are aggravated by a general lack of clarity and insecurity for 
legislative enforcement (Patlis 2005). Despite the promise of decentralization, 
the framework for governing the coastal resources is full of legal disconnects in 
defining, regulating and enforcing the regulations (Patlis 2008). This legal 
disconnects lead to the ineffectiveness of state governance of coastal resources 
in Indonesia. 
International environmental non-government organizations (NGOs) 
have taken the perceived failure of the Indonesian state as an opportunity to 
intervene in coastal resources and conservation governance. They have done so 
by bypassing the central government and building domestic networks with a 
broader range of public and private actors. NGOs like The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) have been especially 
instrumental in introducing internationally developed marine governance tools 
and arrangements, based on global narratives of environmental crisis in 
fisheries and aquaculture (Fox et al. 2012; Padiyar et al. 2012; Mohan and De 
Silva 2010; Djohani 2009; Halim et al. 2008). These NGO inspired tools and 
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arrangements are diverse (Bush 2010; Parkes et al. 2010; Jacquet et al. 2009; 
Rohiem 2009). In the coastal areas of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, two 
have become prominent: spatial planning for marine conservation areas and 
standards for better management practices in extensive shrimp aquaculture. 
Conservation has been associated with the protection of habitats and 
species and is characterized by a territorial and centralized approach to 
management (Robbins 2004; Satria et al. 2006; Vaccaro et al. 2013). More 
recently, conservation has also been framed in productivity terms, and 
translated by NGOs, often through their partnerships with private sector actors 
as a strategy “aiming to make production, extraction or trade in resource 
commodities more environmentally sensitive and sustainable” (Peluso 2012: 
86). This productive turn has led to new approaches in conservation that 
demand the participatory inclusion of local needs; considering local 
livelihoods, and acknowledges the role of power in creating undesirable 
conservation outcomes (Vaccaro et al. 2013; Goldman and Turner 2011; Peet et 
al. 2011). Consequently, this new approach reinforces demands for 
decentralized forms of natural resource governance (Vaccaro et al. 2013; 
Goldman and Turner 2011).  
The productive turn in conservation in Indonesia, with its inclusion of a 
wider group of actors and knowledge claims, can also be understood in terms 
of a ‘governance-turn’. In contemporary governance studies the act to govern is 
not merely in the hands of the government (Bulkeley 2005; Kooiman and 
Bavinck 2005; Cashore 2002). Instead, a wide range of public and private 
actors participates in varying forms of partnership to formulate societal 
problems and solutions, within which the government becomes one of the 
interest groups (Falkner 2003; Cashore 2002). The government continues to 
maintain considerable power by controlling legislation and procedures, as well 
as financial resources and human resources. However, it is through the 
interaction of actors from different positions and levels in society that 
prevailing social and political obstacles are removed and new institutions 
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emerge that structure and direct actors’ behaviour (Kooiman and Bavinck 
2005). In Southeast Asia, through the implementation of co-management, 
central governments have fostered the development of institutions and 
arrangements for devolving decision-making power to resource users (Carlsson 
and Berkes 2005; Persoon et al. 2003; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Sen and 
Nielsen 1996). In Indonesia, following the implementation of political-
administrative decentralization in resource management, global environmental 
NGOs have taken the lead in introducing and organizing conservation 
activities; often, but not always in partnership with the decentralized 
government and private sector. Two strategies studied in this thesis include the 
attempts to coordinate and implement of marine conservation areas (MCAs) 
and better management standards for fisheries and aquaculture. In both 
approaches NGOs have built networks of decentralized government, 
international organizations, industries, consumers, and resource users. The 
actors in these networks have converging and/or conflicting motives and 
interests that underlie their strategies for engaging with or resisting the 
conservation activities.  
The increasing number of actors involved in marine conservation 
activities has opened up a range of questions around who is included, how, and 
with what result. More fundamentally, a series of questions exists around how 
conservation is framed, including or excluding whose knowledge and by 
whom. This politics of knowledge (Goldman and Turner 2011; Jasanoff 2004) 
focuses attention on the dynamics of knowledge co-production and transfer; 
processes which stretch beyond the local and link to global places and 
historical events (Goldman 2010). Co-production implies a collaborative 
process to define and develop shared understanding of environmental problems 
(Armitage et al. 2011), implies the inclusion or exclusion of certain actors as 
well as different knowledges during the process (Konefal and Hatanaka 2011; 
Ponte and Cheyns 2011; Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
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The global-local networks built by NGOs become mechanisms or tools 
in the process of transferring global knowledge to local actors (Tsing 2004). 
These networks act as an interface through which knowledge must pass before 
being actively translated and negotiated into practice. The global environmental 
knowledge is a product of scientific knowledge that is produced by scientists 
who have access to selecting the relevant theory and interpreting the data 
(Kontinen 2004). The knowledge of the local actors is shaped by a different 
ontological basis originating from the historical practices and experiences of 
the local people. Often this local knowledge conflicts with, or is opposed to the 
global knowledge that was brought in by the NGOs networks.  
In the process of knowledge transfer and co-production, knowledge is 
transformed and re-inscribed into other knowledge-power constellations 
(Escobar 1998). International environmental NGOs transfer global knowledge 
to local governmental actors, private sector, and resource users through tools 
and activities such as MCAs and production standards. However, the local 
actors are not merely the objects of the global conservation activities. Instead 
of employing absolute power and a blueprint transfer of conservation ideas, 
global actors are caught in what Tsing (2004) has described as friction, where 
global actors are entangled with local actors in awkward, unequal and unstable 
interconnections. Applying this concept of friction instead of focusing on the 
possible conflicts in the process of the global-local knowledge interface, allows 
me to look at its positive outcomes. Two case studies, on the development and 
implementation of the Berau marine conservation area (MCA) and on the 
emergence of standards for best management practices (BMPs) in Sesayap 
Delta were chosen to illustrate the dynamics of the global-local interface.  
The Berau coastal waters, despite being known as rich in marine 
species, coral reefs, migration routes and nesting ground of sea turtles suffer 
from destructive and illegal fishing activities (Gunawan and Visser 2012). 
Recently, they have become a national, regional and international target area 
for inclusion in marine protected area networks (Kusumawati and Visser 2014). 
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Together, concerned international, national and local environmental NGOs 
proposed the district government to collaborate in developing the Berau MCA. 
It was established in 2005 and acknowledged by the central government.  
North of  Berau District, Tarakan District is known as the main regional 
processing and export area for farmed shrimp in East Kalimantan. Locally 
based processing companies are supplied with shrimp from traditional 
extensive aquaculture systems located on the small islands scattered throughout 
the estuary of the Sesayap River that extends beyond Tarakan to include 
Bulungan, Tana Tidung and Nunukan districts (Kusumawati et al. 2013). 
Invited by one of the processing companies to assist them in mangrove 
replantation programs, WWF-Indonesia introduced better management 
practices (BMPs) in shrimp farming and initiated a process of developing 
BMPs that would fit the region. However, in both cases these global attempts 
to introduce and implement coastal conservation and management practices 
were hampered by local political-economic and cultural-historical forces. 
 
 
1.2 Research problem, objective and questions 
 
In this thesis I analyse the motives and rationales based on the political-
economic, social and historical contexts of the different actors and the ways in 
which they construct, interpret, claim and contest global environmental 
discourses around marine and coastal conservation in Indonesia. This thesis is 
not about local resistance to global influences. Instead, it explores the social 
dynamics that structure the global-local interface in which the global and local 
actors form networks, co-produce and contest environmental knowledge.  
This thesis presents ethnographic case studies of the interface of global 
and local actors in governing the conservation of natural resources of the 
coastal waters of East Kalimantan. The research is based on two case studies of 
NGO-led implementation of an MCA-based habitat and species conservation in 
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the Berau Delta and of the promotion of sustainable shrimp aquaculture 
through better management practices (BMPs) standards in the Sesayap Delta. 
Both research sites were selected in the framework of the interdisciplinary 
RESCOPAR program of Wageningen University on human and natural 
resilience in the coastal zones of East Kalimantan, Indonesia and Ca Mau, 
Vietnam. Each case study describes the interaction between global and local 
actors in the process of co-production of knowledge. Combining the formation 
of the global-local networks with processes of translation and negotiation of 
knowledge will provide an improved understanding of the dynamics of their 
interactions in attempts to govern the coastal resources of East Kalimantan.  
The first focus is on the encounters of global environmental actors in 
introducing and sharing global, scientific knowledge on conservation with local 
actors. In this process of intervention, the global NGOs create networks with 
the local actors to secure the process of knowledge transfer for the 
implementation of new governance arrangements such as marine conservation 
areas and better management standards for shrimp aquaculture. The 
implementation of these NGO-led governance arrangements that enrol local 
actors embedded in coastal environments are not only shaped by global 
processes and historically shaped experiences and values, but also by the local 
politicization of network formation and the co-production of knowledge.  
 Despite intentions of inclusion and participation, networks are uneven 
and contested. My understanding of the term network refers to the concept of 
environmental regulatory networks developed by Vandergeest (2007) that 
denotes a broad range of actors who are driven by different motives and goals 
in governing the coastal resources. The interactions in the conservation 
endeavour are not only shaped by history and place, but also by the process of 
generating social-economic and political networks that facilitate the co-
production of knowledge. These networks thus stretch beyond the local and 
link to global places and historical moments (Goldman 2010). Whether they 
can serve as channels for knowledge transfer depends on the interests of the 
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actors involved. Those building the networks may wish to create a common 
awareness of those enrolled (Jentoft et al. 1999; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). 
But the outcome is often more qualified. The outcome could be either conflict, 
resistance or a negotiated middle-ground where the different perceptions and 
practices can be merging. The outcome is also tempered by the political and 
legal context in which they operate. In the case of Indonesia the 
implementation of the decentralization of resource management since 1999 
(Satria and Matsuda 2004) shapes legal disconnects (Patlis 2008) that lead to 
further institutional disconnects (Kusumawati and Visser 2014) and friction 
(Tsing 2005) between the actors involved around knowledge and power.  
The ontological differences between the knowledge of global and local 
actors lead to the second focus of this thesis, namely the process of the transfer 
of the global environmental knowledge to local actors and how these actors co-
produce environmental knowledge. My analysis focuses on how global 
knowledge is translated and conveyed to local actors by the networks of 
environmental NGOs, and how these local actors (district government, 
entrepreneurs, shrimp farmers) translate and negotiate the global environmental 
knowledge to fit their own interests and power positions. Both the global and 
the local actors construct their own discourses - whether around the importance 
of marine conservation areas or better management standards - on the basis of 
different bodies of knowledge. 
The general objective of this thesis is to explore, describe and analyse 
the interface between global and local actors in governing the conservation and 
sustainable use of the coastal and marine environment in decentralized 
Indonesia. The research is organized around two main research questions. The 
first research question is: How do global actors form networks in order to 
secure the process of global environmental knowledge transfer? How do these 
networks of actors produce power and knowledge disconnects and friction? In 
answering this question the thesis contributes to an understanding of the role of 
global environmental NGOs in Southeast Asia in their endeavour to transfer 
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global environmental knowledge on conservation to the district government 
and the local political-economic leaders, and the outcome.  
The question is addressed more specifically in two case studies. First, by 
investigating the process of the establishment of the Berau MCA, I explore 
how the environmental collaboration is constructed, and how collaboration 
produces knowledge and power disconnects. By addressing this question I 
demonstrate that it is important to understand how the collaboration and 
contention are not only constructed, but also themselves construct the actors’ 
perceptions and perspectives on marine conservation and resource extraction in 
decentralized marine governance in Berau. Second, by investigating the 
emergence of the standardization of best management practices in shrimp 
farming in Tarakan, I explore three different environmental regulatory 
networks in shrimp aquaculture and trade to analyse how they interact in 
influencing the externally introduced forms of governance. In this case I intend 
to demonstrate how the government and the NGO regulatory networks 
systematically ignore the role of local patrons (ponggawa) who control the 
artisanal trade networks in the process of developing standards.  
The second main research question focuses on the process of knowledge 
transfer and co-production: How do actors co-produce environmental 
knowledge in defining and practicing sustainable coastal resource governance 
given the different ontologies of knowledge and values owned by the global 
and local actors? This question aims to contribute to an understanding of the 
role of the global environmental NGOs, district government agencies and local 
political-economic leaders (ponggawa) in framing the knowledge they use for 
defining the use of coastal resources.  
The second research question will be addressed in another two studies. 
First, I examine the interaction in terms of different types of knowledge and the 
role of the local political-economic networks by exploring the political battle of 
values, knowledge and discourses between the actors involved in the 
management of the Berau MCA. This case explores how the different 
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ontologies of knowledge on coastal resource management and marine 
conservation shape different discourses. Second, I examine the development of 
BMP standards for shrimp aquaculture in the Sesayap Delta, analysing the 
accommodation of the local technical and social conditions of shrimp 
aquaculture and the friction between the standards and the local aquaculture 
practices. By addressing these issues I explain how global standards are 
translated into local contexts through a series of meetings and pilot projects in 
shrimp ponds, and how local political-economic leaders and patrons 
(ponggawa) involved respond to the process of implementation of the 
standards.    
 
 
1.3 Political ecology and environmental anthropology 
 
There are various approaches to study the relation of humans with their 
environment, such as environmental sociology (Buttel 1987), environmental 
anthropology (Brosius 1999; Kalland and Persoon 1998; Milton 1997), and 
political ecology (Peet et al. 2011; Robbins 2004; Bryant and Bailey 1997) just 
to name a few. Even so, there seems to be a set of common elements of 
discussion: environmental movements, environmental problems, how human 
behaviour contributes to environmental changes and how environmental 
changes affect human behaviour. In order to position my thesis in these 
debates, in this section I will mainly review how political ecology as well as 
environmental anthropology approach human interaction with the environment. 
Political ecology focuses broadly on the political dynamics surrounding 
material and discursive struggles over the environment (Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987; Bryant 1998). In this approach, the environment serves as an arena where 
different social actors with different powers of control and exclusion are 
competing for access to the natural resources and ways of using or conserving 
those resources (Vaccaro et al. 2013; Robbins 2004). Building on the notion of 
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‘second nature’ which emphasizes the social and material (re)construction and 
co-option of environments as subjects of human control, political ecology is 
interested in how environments become socialized and politicized (Escobar 
1999; Lefebvre 1991).  
By putting politics first (Bryant 1991), political ecology highlights the 
specific dynamics and characteristics of how the environment is politicized; 
either by examining unequal power relations over the access to and the use of 
environmental resources (Robbins 2004) or by including knowledge and 
practice in the analysis of the environment as a biophysical phenomenon 
(Paulson et al. 2003). Combining both approaches returns the political to its 
integrative core focusing on both the material and discursive dimensions 
represented by the multiple ways in which power over the environment is 
contested and negotiated in diverse arenas at multiple scales, and infused with 
cultural knowledge and value. 
Political ecology scholarship is divided into four general domains: 
degradation and marginalization; environmental conflict; conservation and 
control; and environmental identity and social movement (Robbins 2004). The 
political ecology of conservation and control over natural resources starts from 
the assumption that “control of resources and landscapes has been wrested 
from local producers or producer groups through the implementation of efforts 
to preserve ‘sustainability’, ‘community’, or ‘nature’ ” (Robbins 2004: 14). 
Central to this control is the formulation and implementation of conservation 
policy by state and non-state actors, who may be more powerful. Also, external 
actors have often disabled local systems of livelihood, production and socio-
political organization (Vaccaro et al. 2013; Robbins 2004; Peet et al. 2011). 
The ‘productivity turn’ in conservation scholarship means that scholars have 
started to analyse these wider processes of control in the context of governance 
arrangements that attempt to steer the production, extraction and trade of 
natural resources to more environmentally friendly and more sustainable 
practices (Peluso 2012). This shift in the scope of conservation leads to a 
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change in the approach of conservation toward being more sensitive to 
including local needs, local livelihood, and the role of local political economic 
forces. 
Research on the politics of conservation has focused predominantly on 
the power of state governance and policies that contribute to environmental and 
social change (Peluso 2012; Robbins 2004). As Peet et al. (2011: 31-2) argue, 
the earlier focus of political ecology research has been on the “capacity of a 
polity or state to control the actions of people within its jurisdiction… to the 
promulgation of environmental problems as well as to the control of 
environmental degradation through regulation”.  However, as private forms of 
conservation have increased, the scope of political ecology research and its 
narrow focus on power has broadened away from the state. NGO involvement 
with environmental conservation is now seen as an equally valid form of 
control as the state (Peet et al. 2011: 28). In this sense, the discussion on the 
identification and prospective solutions to conservation problems directly 
implicates a wider conceptualization of governance and power. Conservation 
also allows the network of global environmental NGOs to take over the role of 
the state in the control over the actions of the people in using the natural 
resources. To reach the local people, this global environmental NGOs network 
creates collaboration or builds new networks with the district government 
and/or the private sector.  
In this thesis, I will apply an anthropological perspective to political 
ecology to provide further insights into how the actors perceive coastal 
conservation, use discourses, and how they are involved in the implementation 
of conservation activities. Brosius (1999: 277) suggests that anthropology 
should engage with environmentalism to extend the critical role of 
anthropology in contributing to the understanding of the impact of the social 
actors on the physical and biotic environment and also in showing how 
“environment is constructed, represented, claimed, and contested”. 
Environmental anthropology evolved from an ecological anthropology that 
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received contributions from post-structuralist social and cultural theory, 
political economy, and the exploration of transnationalism and globalization 
(idem). Environmental anthropology address issues of “power and inequality, 
the contingency of cultural and historical formations, to the significance of 
regimes of knowledge production, and to the importance of the acceleration of 
trans-local processes” (ibid: 278). One of the domains where Brosius sees that 
anthropologists could engage with environmentalism is through the study of the 
relationship between emerging forms of political agency and the process of 
environmental institutionalization. As global actors, the environmental NGOs 
build networks with powerful local actors, such as district governments, 
industries, and multilateral agencies to discursively and materially transform 
local environmentalism (ibid: 288). 
However, the local actors who deal directly with resource management 
does not accept off-hand that all the global knowledge is introduced to and 
imposed on them (Tsing 2005). Instead, they interpret and negotiate the global 
knowledge in accordance with their local needs. By using the concept of 
‘friction’ in the global-local interaction, Tsing challenges the notion that global 
ideas are passively accepted and adopted by actors at the local level. She argues 
that the friction that follows from the global-local knowledge interface creates 
“new arrangements of culture and power” (Tsing 2004: 5). Her position in the 
debate contrasts with many others. For example, Long states that the aspects of 
power, authority, and legitimization implied in the knowledge process will lead 
to “the establishment of common perceptions and interests” (Long 2001: 183). 
Both authors, however, underscore that the global-local knowledge interface 
becomes more important to study, particularly in the context of administrative 
decentralization, making the local or district-based actors the principal 
decision- makers rather than the central government.  
Long defines knowledge as “something that everybody possesses, even 
though the grounds for belief and the procedures for validation of knowledge-
claims will vary” (ibid: 189). Consequently, global environmental knowledge 
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is already a collection of different motives, power, goals, and objectives. At the 
local level it also encounters different knowledge depending on the local 
actor’s motives, power, goals, and objectives. Knowledge, like power, should 
be looked at relationally, as “knowledge encounters involve the struggle 
between actors where certain of them attempt to enrol others in their ‘projects’, 
getting them to accept particular frames of meaning and winning them over to 
their point of view” (ibid: 184). Our study of how the worlds of these global 
and local actors are brought “into relation” (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 153) 
through the processes of knowledge transfer and co-production makes it 
possible to understand the social and environmental outcomes when different 
motives, power, goals and objectives meet or confront each other during the 
process of designing and implementing conservation activities in the coastal 
areas.  
Knowledge production as well as socio-economic and political networks 
affects the relation between humans and their environment as well as their 
environmental knowledge. When it comes to how knowledge is produced or 
co-produced it appears to depend on how the social actors understand the value 
and the practice of ecological knowledge (Turner 2011). Essentially, the 
networks created by the global NGOs serve as a tool to secure the transfer of 
knowledge through the process of co-production. Dealing with knowledge 
production with a political ecological focus on power relations may shed light 
on the political-economic process of how actors impose or contest knowledge 
about access to and control over natural resources (Goldman and Turner 2011).  
However, in this thesis the study of natural resources governance and 
the transfer and co-production of knowledge moves beyond the politics of 
access and control over natural resources. I want to show that co-production of 
environmental knowledge does not automatically bring the global and local 
actors together since the scientific environmental knowledge of the NGOs is 
confronted with local cultural-historical knowledge and political-economic 
values. I have chosen to combine political ecology and environmental 
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anthropology because it enables an improved understanding of how 
contemporary global governance arrangements over the coastal environment 
are dialectically embedded in a wider set of local political-economic, social, 
and cultural-historical relations.  
An anthropological approach using extensive ethnographic data has 
helped to paying critical attention to the conditions under which local actors are 
enrolled in conservation activities through a form of collaboration that was 
initiated by the global environmentalist NGOs.  
Applying an anthropological approach to the political ecology of coastal 
resources governance proves to be a fruitful approach. First, to explain the 
social dynamics of development in East Kalimantan, particularly in the case of 
the implementation of the Berau marine conservation area and the emergence 
and development of standards for best management practices in shrimp 
aquaculture in Tarakan. Second, by applying this approach in studying the 
knowledge transfer and co-production, I better understand how the different 
actors discursively transform the discourse on sustainable coastal resource 
governance and on how they co-produce and validate global knowledge 
(Jasanoff 2004). My methodology is further explained below. 
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
This thesis brings together two case studies. The first case study is about the 
development and implementation of a marine conservation area (MCA) in the 
Berau district. The second case study is about the emergence and the 
development of better management practices (BMPs) in shrimp farming in the 
Sesayap Delta. An ethnographic research method is applied. Importantly, this 
thesis is based on a modern application of the ethnographic method that 
involves a multi-locale and multi-level approach (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). 
Instead of staying in one particular place, I followed the networks of the global 
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actors and the flow of their knowledge on conservation and shrimp aquaculture 
in their encounters with local actors and their networks and knowledge. 
 
Figure 1.1 Map showing study sites in East Kalimantan, Indonesia  
 
 
I started my fieldwork in Indonesia (Figure 1.1), in the Berau district of 
East Kalimantan, the region selected in the framework of the RESCOPAR 
program in Indonesia. In Berau I encountered the global knowledge on habitat 
and species conservation and the struggle, particularly, of the two 
environmental agencies: The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF). There was also a struggle of the local political-
economic leaders and entrepreneurs (ponggawa) in interpreting and claiming 
their ways of conserving and defending the economic interests of ‘their’ coastal 
resources. To study a different conservation model, I went north to the District 
of Tarakan where I encountered the emergence of better management practices 
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in shrimp aquaculture. From these two districts in East Kalimantan, I travelled 
to Samarinda, Bogor, Jakarta, the Netherlands and Germany to interview the 
global actors involved in order to trace back the process of how the global 
conservation knowledge arrived in these two places in East Kalimantan, 
Indonesia.  
Field research was conducted from 2008 to 2011; with some additional 
interviews held in 2012 and 2013. Primary data were collected through 
qualitative methods. I conducted in-depth interviews with actors involved in 
the development process of the marine conservation area in Berau and actors 
involved in the development process of better management standards took 
place in Tarakan. They included national and regional government officials, 
regional entrepreneurs and international, national and local NGO staff. For the 
Berau case study my discussions and semi-structured interviews focused on the 
management of the coastal area of Berau, the development process of the Berau 
MCA and on the history of sea turtle management in Berau. In the Sesayap 
Delta case study the discussions and interviews served to gather information 
about the development of the standards in shrimp production. I also 
interviewed the directors of locally based processor companies, shrimp 
collectors, shrimp workers, shrimp pond owners and their families.  
Additionally, I engaged in participant observation. This included 
attendance at meetings and workshops organized by the agencies at district, 
national and international levels, and visiting shrimp farms in Bulungan and 
Tarakan. In both cases I gathered secondary data by reviewing and examining 
scientific publications and other sources from libraries, websites, newsletters, 
newspaper articles and reports to complement my field data. 
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1.5 Organization of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of six chapters. There are four empirical chapters covering 
the two case studies. Chapters 2 and 3 are about the development and 
implementation of the marine conservation area in Berau. Chapters 4 and 5 are 
about the emergence and development of best management practices in the 
shrimp farming in Tarakan. Below is the outline of the thesis: 
 
Chapter 2 presents a case study on the collaborative network of the Steering 
Committee (SC) between the international environmental NGOs (TNC-WWF) 
and the Berau district government in developing the Berau marine conservation 
area. Introduced by the collaborative effort of these global environmental 
NGOs, the collaboration in developing the MCA in this area was claimed by 
TNC-WWF as a new concept of partnership with the decentralized 
government. But their governance framework appeared to be full of 
disconnects (Patlis 2008) and friction (Tsing 2005), as the MCA 
implementation faced the real-life challenges of the political-economic 
conditions of decentralization. Following the historical process of the 
establishment of the Berau MCA in 2005, this chapter shows that it is 
necessary to understand how collaboration and contention are constructed and 
in turn construct actor’s perceptions and perspectives of marine conservation 
and resource extraction. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a case study on the knowledge interface between the global 
actors represented by TNC-WWF, and the local actors represented by the 
district head, the government agencies, and the sea turtle eggs concession 
holder who are the key actors in defining the cultural-historical, economic, and 
political values of the sea turtle and the marine conservation area of Berau. 
This chapter discusses the political battle of values, knowledge and discourses 
between TNC-WWF, the district government, and the concession holder of sea 
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turtle eggs. I argue that the different epistemologies and ontologies of 
knowledge on marine conservation and sea turtle management shape the 
knowledge that was mobilized by the actors to develop different discourses and 
power positions regarding sea turtle management and marine conservation.  
 
Chapter 4 is a case study on the emergence of shrimp farming certification in 
Tarakan. This chapter describes the interaction of three regulatory networks 
and their influence on regulating sustainable shrimp aquaculture in East 
Kalimantan. The results show that while government and NGO regulatory 
networks have focused on standardization of best management practices, it is 
the artisanal trade network, controlled by the pond owner or middlemen-trader 
(ponggawa) that holds most influence over shrimp aquaculture. In 
demonstrating the influence of these ponggawa’s over production and trade I 
demonstrate how patronage is key to regulating the conduct of farmers and 
constitutes a vital, but poorly understood element in the shrimp value chain. 
 
Chapter 5 is about the co-production of knowledge in the development of 
standards for better management practices in shrimp aquaculture in Tarakan. 
Better management practices (BMPs) have emerged as an increasingly 
dominant governance arrangement designed to standardize on-farm practices 
and in turn reduce risks associated with disease and environmental degradation. 
The BMPs developed by the World Wide Fund for Nature-Indonesia (WWF-
Indonesia) intend to guide the farmers to apply more environmentally friendly 
farming techniques. The BMPs are advertised as having been developed 
through a multi-stakeholder dialogue. This chapter presents the analysis of co-
production and negotiation of standardization in shrimp farming in East 
Kalimantan by focusing particularly on the role of WWF-Indonesia in creating 
alliances for designing, implementing and negotiating the BMPs.  
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Chapter 6 presents the general discussion and conclusion. I argue that the 
global-local interface in Indonesia is strongly conditioned by the recent 
political- administrative decentralization of resource management, and by 
patronage interdependencies. I conclude that by ignoring the political-
economic power of local actors, particularly the pond owners and entrepreneurs 
(ponggawa) and their cultural historical values and perception of marine 
resources conservation hampers global-local collaboration in the governance of 
sustainable natural resource use. The second argument is developed around the 
process of knowledge transfer and co-production. The process of knowledge 
transfer should be seen as an interface that is affected by specific local 
historical-economic values and empirical environmental practices that remain 
highly influential in creating the necessary social conditions for successful 
environmental networks. 
 
 
 

   
Chapter Two 
Global-Local Collaboration in  
Decentralized Marine Governance in Berau 
This chapter is based on the publication of: Kusumawati, R and L.E. Visser. 2014. 
Collaboration or Contention? Decentralised Marine Governance in Berau. Anthro-
pological Forum 24 (1): 21-46 
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Note on the cover page picture: 
 
This picture shows the coastal area activities in northern part of East Kaliman-
tan. In the background there is a barge transporting coal from the mainland to 
ocean faring cargo ships. In the forefront there is a ketinting, a small motor-
boat that is the most common form of water transport by the locals in the area. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The tendency in marine and coastal resources management in Indonesia has 
been to look at ‘marine fisheries as a new resource frontier’ (Laksono 2007, 
39). This view is supported by the general opinion that the sea is an open ac-
cess resource for exploration and exploitation for corporate or national pur-
poses. Also, authority over marine resources serves to extend territorial claims 
by the state, particularly in the context of recent decentralization of natural 
resources management in Indonesia (Patlis 2005a; Visser and Adhuri 2010). 
Despite the trend towards greater commercialization, the international concern 
over coastal and marine resource degradation has led to the institutionalization 
of marine protected areas to conserve or restore species, habitats, coastal and 
marine ecosystems and ecological functions (Fox et al. 2012; Majors 2008; 
Satria et al. 2006; Visser 2004). In Indonesia, several marine conservation ini-
tiatives have been undertaken over the past few decades. However, resource 
conservation is usually initiated following technical designs based on ecologi-
cal and biological data and motivations (Halim 2008; Patlis 2008; Darmawan 
and Suraji 2006; Van Helden 2004).  
One of the effects of the implementation of decentralization in Indone-
sia is the multiplicity of laws and regulations that are issued by different na-
tional and sub-national governmental agencies (Barr et al. 2006; Satria and 
Matsuda 2004; Laksono 2007). Together with the international marine pro-
tected areas governance framework (FAO 2011) the overlapping and some-
times contradictory marine governance schemes create confusion and ambi-
guity for the actors involved in the establishment and implementation of a ma-
rine conservation area, as in the case of the Berau marine conservation area. 
26 Chapter Two 
 
 
Originally, the Ministry of Forestry’s Directorate General of Forest 
Protection and Nature Conservation (PHKA) was in charge of the establish-
ment of marine park areas (Patlis 2008; Bennet 2005, 82;). In 2002, the newly 
instituted Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) introduced the 
concept of district marine conservation area (Satria et al. 2006), allowing a 
district to propose a new marine conservation area to the central government. 
MMAF together with Coremap II1 proposed a target of 10 million ha of ma-
rine conservation areas (MCAs)2 in Indonesia by 2010 (Darmawan and Suraji 
2006). This target was eventually approved as the national goal for marine 
conservation. With the establishment of the 3.9 million ha of the Sawu Na-
tional Marine Park in 2009, the latest estimate of marine conservation is 13.4 
million ha (Republika, 13 May 2009). It implies an impressive growth in geo-
graphical space, but the mere size of these conservation areas begs the ques-
tion of districts’ capacity to govern the coastal and marine environment under 
their responsibility. 
 The Berau Marine Conservation Area was developed under this regime. 
Known to be rich in marine species, coral reefs, migration routes and nesting 
grounds of sea turtles, the Berau waters also suffer from destructive and illegal 
fishing activities by local fishers as well as outsiders (Gunawan and Visser 
2012). International, national and local non-governmental organizations 
                                                
1 The Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program is a long-term program 
initiated by the Government of Indonesia. The program started in 1998 and was 
funded by the Government of Indonesia with support from such donors as the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank and AusAid during the first phase. The objectives of 
this program are to protect, rehabilitate, and achieve sustainable use of Indonesian 
coral reefs and their associated ecosystem which, in turn, enhance the welfare of the 
coastal communities (http://www.coremap.or.id /tentang coremap) 
2 In Indonesia, NGOs and donors use different terms to address marine conservation 
activities. TNC uses the term Marine Protected Area (MPA), while the World Bank 
prefers the term Marine Management Area (MMA) (Satria 2009: 71). Nationally, the 
term Marine Conservation Area (MCA) is used by the central and regional govern-
ments to address conservation activities in marine areas. This term is used to avoid 
the conflict with the fishers since the word ‘protected’ implies a ‘no take zone’ (Sa-
tria et al. 2006; Bennett et al. 2005). In line with this choice we use the term conser-
vation (konservasi) and marine conservation area (MCA). 
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(NGOs) established collaboration with the district government to promote a 
marine conservation area in Berau, established in 2005. Globally, the Berau 
waters would become part of several larger Marine Protected Area networks, 
particularly the nationally managed East Borneo Seascape (EBS) as well as 
the international Sulu Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion (SSME), and the Coral Tri-
angle Initiative (Tim Pengarah 2008), thereby adopting the The Nature Con-
servancy approach to partnerships between actors across several organization-
al layers (Djohani 2009, 161; Acciaioli 2008) 
Decentralization in Indonesia since 1999 (Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999) 
and especially since Law No. 32/2004 has been well addressed in the literature 
(Satria et al. 2006; Hidayat 2005; Hadiz 2004;) from historical, legal, and po-
litical-administrative perspectives. Ample empirical examples are provided 
from land-based projects, particularly on forestry (McCarthy 2006; Wadley 
2005; Casson and Obidzinski 2002; Padoch and Peluso 1996). The laws man-
dated that up to 80% of natural resource revenues be re-directed to regional 
governments, rather than the 20% prior to 1999 (Patlis 2008, 2005a). The 
framework governing protected areas is mainly sectoral. This has led to a 
framework that is ‘replete with gaps, inconsistencies, redundancies and, gen-
erally, what can be termed “disconnects”’ in a number of basic components of 
law, such as definitions, administrative and institutional provisions, and en-
forcement, monitoring and sanctions (Simarmata 2012, Patlis 2008: 411). 
However, legal pluralism by itself does not provide us with insight into how 
such legal disconnects influence the very practice of resource governance and 
the construction of power and environmental knowledge of the actors involved 
in conservation in particular cases. Much less is known about the everyday 
practice of dealing with such overlapping, contradicting and contentious 
frames in the development and management of a marine conservation area.  
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In the case of the Berau marine conservation area establishment The 
Nature Concervancy marine program (TNC-Marine) and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature Indonesia (WWF-Indonesia) developed what they saw as a 
new management model of partnering directly with local, decentralized gov-
ernment and local NGOs, bypassing the central state and virtually excluding 
coastal communities (Halim et al. 2008). Institutional approaches to co-
management often look for a technical solution demanding that stakeholders 
search for a middle ground, ‘believe’ in conservation, and have a common 
awareness of the subject  (Acciaioli and Erb 2008; Majors 2008; Natcher et al. 
2005; Jentoft et al. 1998; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Marine conservation 
management in Berau, in fact, addresses a variety of subjects at the same time, 
including turtle conservation at species level, coral reef conservation at habitat 
level, and action against illegal fisheries. 
My empirical research carried out in Berau between 2008 and 2011, us-
ing an actor-oriented approach (Long 2001), supports the argument that the 
local management model applied by environmental NGOs does not provide 
the middle ground due to political-economic and cultural-historical differences 
in perceiving the value and meaning of marine conservation and shifting pow-
er positions among the actors as principal stakeholders3 in MCA management. 
The scientific knowledge and power of the international NGOs conflicted with 
the historical and political-economic position and knowledge of local actors 
like the district head, the technical agencies, and the turtle concession holder.  
These ontological differences are causing disconnects in environmental 
knowledge and power of the principal actors in MCA management that need 
to be taken seriously to understand the dynamics of collaboration and conten-
tion in the governance of a marine conservation area.  
                                                
3 Halim et al. ((Halim et al. 2008: 129) describe TNC’s ‘conservation by design’ ap-
proach to conservation, using a stakeholder hierarchy based on 3 criteria: legitimacy, 
power, and urgency. In the case of Berau (Derawan), the district government, Steer-
ing Committee, and the turtle concession holder are ranking ‘high’ on all 3 criteria, 
while the turtle concession holder is ranked ‘medium’ on urgency.  
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Recently, the need for ethnographic fieldwork was underscored to high-
light the local processes that shape and influence the outcomes of coastal re-
source management (Fabinyi et al. 2010). This chapter presents an ethno-
graphic case study of the implementation process of a marine conservation 
area by an empirical account of the interface between the main institutional 
actors. I draw upon Patlis’ notion of disconnects (Patlis 2005a; 2008: 411) by 
expanding its legal qualification to include the institutional disconnects creat-
ing confusion and contention where collaboration and synergy were the objec-
tive. I aim to contribute to the debate on resource governance, particularly ma-
rine conservation management. 
The chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the 
development phases of the Berau MCA and continues with the description of 
co-management in decentralized marine conservation in section 3. Sections 4 
and 5 analyse the role and position of each institutional actor in the proposed 
co-management structure of the MCA, resulting in overlapping fields of pow-
er. Section 6 analyses how the collaboration model to govern the MCA is af-
fected by decentralization. The implementation of decentralization assigns 
more power to the district government to manage its natural resources. Hence, 
conservation is translated by the district into the political-economic issue of 
boundaries and access to marine resources. In section 7 I discuss and conclude 
that power and knowledge disconnects as much as legal disconnects between 
individual and institutional actors create confusion and contention about defi-
nitions, institutional provisions and governing practices of the decentralized 
marine conservation area. The actor-oriented approach brings to light the con-
fusion and contention between decentralized government and the other actors 
in terms of partnership (kemitraan) for the purpose of conservation and, par-
ticularly, the power game between the district government and those whom 
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they have come to regard, on the basis of a newly obtained subjectivity (Ac-
ciaioli 2008) as outsiders: international environmentalist NGOs. 
 
2.2 The life history of Berau MCA development 
 
So, 1.2 million ha is the seaward administrative authority area [of 
Berau].  Berau declared all marine space under their administratrive 
authority as a marine conservation area, which makes Berau unique. 
No other district claimed all their [coastal and marine] space for ma-
rine conservation. In  2005 Berau dared to declare this 1.2 million ha 
as an MCA because of the marine biota living in the Berau marine 
area, such as crustaceas, sea turtle, corals, etc. [We] did not [pro-
pose] species conservation, [We proposed] habitat conservation in-
stead. So, in this case, the whole Berau marine area should be con-
served. [We] also need to secure the migration corridor [of those 
species]. That was our consideration [to persuade the Berau district 
government] to declare 1.2 million hectares as a marine conservation 
area. (Policy coordinator of Joint Program, Berau, October 2011) 
 
The process of establishing the Berau MCA had already been initiated in 
1979. At that time the man who later became the project leader of the Joint 
Program (2005-2007) was already involved through the Directorate of Forest 
Protection and Nature Conservation4 in a survey on sea turtle nesting sites on 
the islands of Derawan, Sangalaki and Semama, and on the coast of Tanjung 
Batu on mainland Berau (Tim Pengarah 2006). Based on this survey, in 1982 
two national parks Ire established in the district: the Sangalaki Marine Tour-
ism Park to conserve the coral reefs and the sea turtle nesting area, and the 
Semama Wildlife Conservation Area which serves as a sea turtle and sea birds 
                                                
4 Perlindungan Hutan Dan Konservasi Alam (PHKA) which back then was under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
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habitat. These conservation areas are based on Ministry of Agriculture Decree 
No. 604/kpts/um/8/1982.  
Only in 1998 did international and national NGOs become interested in 
Berau marine natural resources, as they tried to introduce the concept of sus-
tainability to manage marine resources. In response to this increased attention 
the district government issued several important policies on the management 
of marine biodiversity, including sea turtles and sea turtle eggs, including Dis-
trict Head Decree No. 66/1998 on the formation of a preservation team of 
aquatic biological resources, District Head Decree No. 35/2001 on the for-
mation of a monitoring and research team for sea turtles, and District Head 
Decree No. 44/2001 on sea turtle monitoring collaboration that gave a man-
date to the national Natural Biodiversity Foundation or Yayasan Keane-
karagaman Hayati (KEHATI Foundation), the World Wide Fund for Nature 
Wallacea bioregion program (WWF Wallacea), and The Turtle Foundation5 
(TF) as key actors in sea turtle conservation in the Derawan Islands, especially 
on Sangalaki Island. Following these decrees was the District Head Instruction 
No. 660/20016 that terminated the historical right of local families to tender 
for a sea turtle eggs concession. The 2001 decree that allowed the NGOs to 
monitor Derawan Islands in fact overlapped with the national decree by the 
Ministry of Agriculture that gave a mandate to the Natural Resources Conser-
vation Agency or Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam (BKSDA) over Sanga-
laki Island as a conservation area. Consequently, the national conservation 
area (Sangalaki) has geographically – though not politically – been made part 
                                                
5 The Turtle Foundation (TF) is a German NGO formed in 1999 by some filmmakers 
and divers (Bennet 2005). It is funded by donations from various international do-
nors and sponsors (www.turtle-foundation.org). 
6 The difference between a decree and an instruction is temporal and hierarchical: a 
decree is a decision by the district head and it is one level higher than the instruction, 
while an instruction is the request to implement the decree. 
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of and included in the district decrees that have given the mandates to non-
government agencies at multiple international, national, and local scales.   
In 2002 the district government established the collaborative institution 
known as Team 16 (Tim 16, see next section). The team was legalized under 
the District Head Decree No. 179/2003 on the formation of a monitoring and 
surveillance team for sea turtle conservation. This institution acts as a forum to 
spread the concept of marine conservation. In 2004 the Joint Marine Program 
or Sekretariat Bersama Kelautan (Joint Program) was established. It consists 
of the national and international NGOs such as the Natural Environment and 
Cultural Conservation Foundation or Yayasan Konservasi Alam Lingkungan 
dan Kebudayaan (Kalbu Foundation), Sustainable Berau Foundation or 
Yayasan Berau Lestari (BESTARI), WWF-Indonesia, Yayasan KEHATI, Mi-
tra Pesisir/Coastal Resource Management Program II (CRMP II), and the ma-
rine program of The Nature Conservancy  (TNC-Marine). Their activities in 
Berau are acknowledged as based on the MoU signed between the NGOs and 
Berau district government. In 2004 decentralized district governments ob-
tained the legal right to establish local marine conservation areas (Satria et al. 
2006: 247). The Berau government thus acknowledged the JP initiative by 
declaring Kakaban Island as an MCA based on the District Head Regulation 
No. 70/2004.  
Finally, in 2005 the Berau MCA of 1.27 million hectares was estab-
lished, initiating what has been called the Berau MCA era. The District Head 
Regulation No. 31/2005 aimed to conserve Berau marine biodiversity and to 
guarantee the sustainable use of marine resources by the community (Tim 
Pengarah 2006).  The establishment of this more inclusive MCA, known as 
the Berau MCA, now incorporates the previously decreed Kakaban MCA and 
the BKSDA-monitored Sangalaki and Semama Islands (Figure 2.1), material-
ising the multi-scalar disconnects (Patlis 2008) between sectors (forestry and 
fisheries) and governance scales (international, national and local NGOs, na-
tional and district government agencies). 
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Table 2.1 The historical process of Marine Conservation Areas in Berau 
 
Year Realizations Administrative Level 
1960 To regulate the trade of wild animals and plants cross-
ing the borders between countries, CITES was drafted 
at the meeting of members of IUCN 
(http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php; accessed on 
7th August, 2013) 
International  
1979 Indonesia becomes one of the CITES parties 
(http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php; 
accessed on 7th August, 2013) 
International  
1979 Survey on sea turtle nesting sites on the islands of 
Derawan, Sangalaki, Semama and the coast of Tan-
jung Batu of Berau by the Directorate of PHKA (Tim 
Pengarah, 2006) 
National 
1981 Formation of Directorate of Marine Conservation in 
PHKA (Alder, J. et al. 1994a) 
National  
1982 Issuance of Law No. 4/1982 on Basic Provisions for 
the Management of the Environment concerning the 
sustainable management of the environment for im-
proved human welfare and the legal basis for envi-
ronmental assessment (Alder, J. et al. 1994b) 
National 
1982 The establishment of Semama and Sangalaki MPAs in 
Berau (based on Ministry of Agriculture decree no. 
604/1982) 
National 
1990 Issuance of Law No. 5/1990 on Conservation of Natu-
ral Resources and its Ecosystem that is used by the 
conservation institutions to authorise their ideas on 
conservation activities, particularly marine conserva-
tion. 
National 
1994 In the Fifth Five Years National Development Plan or 
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun V (REPELITA 
V) the central government recognises the role of 
MPAs in the management of marine resources and 
sets a target of 10 million ha of MPAs (Alder, J. et al. 
1994b) 
National 
1998 National government decree No 68/1998 gives a man-
date to the Ministry of Forestry to take responsibility 
to manage natural conservation areas including upland 
and marine areas (Satria et al. 2006) 
National 
1998 Environmental NGOs start the process of establishing 
the Berau MCA (Halim et al. 2008) 
National 
1998 KEHATI Foundation starts a program on conservation 
and sustainable use of natural resources; BESTARI 
District 
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and KALBU start a program on conservation and 
community empowerment (Al Giffari and Harianto 
2010)  
1999 Establishment of Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fish-
eries 
National 
2000 Sea turtle conservation becomes part of the Sulu Su-
lawesi Marine Ecoregion of WWF-Indonesia (Al 
Giffari and Harianto 2010) 
District 
2001 Formation of sea turtle research and monitoring team 
(District head decree No. 35/2001); District of Berau 
gives mandate to KEHATI Foundation, WWF-
Wallacea and Turtle Foundation to act as key actors in 
sea turtle conservation in Derawan Islands, especially 
on Sangalaki Island (District Head Decree No. 
44/2001; District head instruction to stop the sea turtle 
eggs extraction in Derawan and Sangalaki islands. 
District 
2002 Introduction of the Regional Marine Conservation 
Area (KKLD) by the MMAF (Satria 2006). MMAF 
together with COREMAP II set a target of 10 million 
ha of KKLD by 2010 (Darmawan and Suraji 2006) 
National 
2002 Establishment of Team 16   District 
2004 Issuance of Law No. 31/2004 on Fisheries. This law 
gives a mandate to MMAF to manage the marine con-
servation area (Satria et al. 2006) 
National 
2004 TNC, WWF-Indonesia, KEHATI and Mitra Pesisir 
sign an MoU on the development of the Berau MCA. 
Establishment of the Joint Program of national and 
international NGOs, who also invited Bestari and Kal-
bu (the locally based NGOs) to join them 
District 
2004 MoU between Berau district government and Joint 
Program on the planning and collaboration of the de-
velopment of the Berau MCA  
District 
2004 The declaration of Kakaban island as a district marine 
conservation area 
District 
2004 MMAF and WWF International award the district 
head of Berau for his dedication to marine conserva-
tion (Al Giffari and Harianto 2010) 
International and Na-
tional  
2004 The formation of a Steering Committee  District 
2005 The establishment of the 1.27 million ha Berau Marine 
Conservation Area. 
District 
2005 Election of the district head.  District 
2006 The President of Indonesia gives a speech on the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity Forum and give a 
commitment to develop 10 million ha of MCA by 
2010 (Al Giffari and Harianto 2010) 
National and Interna-
tional 
2009 Award to District Head from MMAF for his dedica-
tion in managing the Berau MCA 
National 
 
Source: This research 
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 However, the establishment of the Berau MCA was the last act of the 
District Head. He was succeeded by a district head who assumed some dis-
tance to the position of the MCA (Table 2.1). The change of the district head 
also affected district policy and the collaboration between district and NGOs 
in governing the Berau MCA. 
  
Figure 2.1 The boundary of the Berau marine conservation area as proposed 
by the Joint Program 
 
 
Source: Joint Program  
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2.3 Co-management in decentralized marine conservation  
 
The concept of co-management was developed to be applied in mono-sector 
fields of forestry or fisheries management, including exploitation and conser-
vation. It is usually understood as the sharing of responsibility, decision-
making and power between the government and individual or collective re-
source users to manage certain natural resources or areas (Carlsson and Berkes 
2005; Persoon et al. 2003; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Sen and Nielsen 1996). 
Even though that implicitly demands an equal partnership, co-management is 
characterized by vertical linkages between the government and user groups, 
and often involves a diversity of players, including public and private actors 
(Berkes 2009).  
 In the formation process of conservation areas the idea of co-
management has mostly come from outsiders, particularly international envi-
ronmental organizations such as TNC and WWF (Djohani 2009), while local 
NGOs that they support financially adopt their conceptual position. In this 
kind of arrangement, co-management is not merely a sharing of responsibility 
or of power between the state and resource users, but it often becomes a shar-
ing of responsibility and decision-making power between international NGOs 
and resource appropriators mediated by local NGOs, as in community-based 
forest management (Wiersum 2009). 
 The Berau case does not differ from other conservation plans where 
environmental and biological experts design large conservation areas as a 
technical rather than a social matter (Van Helden 2004). The targeted conser-
vation area in Berau was decided on in a workshop organized in 2003 that in-
volved marine experts from WWF, TNC, MMAF, the Oceanographic Re-
search Center of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and Naturalis from 
Leiden, the Netherlands (Wiryawan et al. 2005). The first collaboration be-
tween the international NGOs, national and local NGOs, district government 
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and representatives of five villages on Derawan and Maratua Islands was es-
tablished in 2002.  
This collaborative body was known as Team-16 and was comprised of 
several district government services7 and the BKSDA as the national govern-
ment institution. Further, TNC-Marine as an international environmental 
NGO, WWF-Indonesia, KEHATI Foundation as national NGOs, and Bestari 
and Kalbu as local NGOs were involved together with the Navy, and the San-
galaki Dive Lodge as a representative of the private sector. In 2004 the Team-
16 changed its name into the Steering Committee formalized by a decree of 
the district head. In 2008, the Steering Committee was again renamed as the 
Collaborative Board (CB). 
 These are interesting changes of name and corresponding image con-
cerning collaboration. Even though in their reports, the collaborative body is 
presented as one single body, my observations and interviews make clear that 
in fact separate networks of collaboration were formed with the goal of devel-
oping and managing the Berau MCA. The first collaborative network consist-
ed of the international, national and local NGOs that were already known as 
the Joint Program. This was a horizontal collaboration of departmental ser-
vices focussing on nature conservation. The second network consisted of the 
collaboration between the Joint Program and the sectoral agencies in the dis-
trict. The initiator, the Joint Program, expected the members of these two net-
works to work together as partners in the development and implementation of 
marine conservation in Berau. The first objective was achieved by the decree 
                                                
7 Such as the Fisheries and Marine Service (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan - DPK), 
the Cultural and Tourism Service (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, or just Pari-
wisata), the Regional Development Planning Office (Badan Perencana Pem-
bangunan Daerah – BAPPEDA), the Regional Environmental Agency (Badan Ling-
kungan Hidup – BLH), the Forestry Service (Dinas Kehutanan). 
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of the district head on the establishment of the Berau Marine Conservation 
Area in 2005.  
Included in the collaboration was the expectation of a sharing of 
knowledge, budget and responsibility in the management of the Berau MCA. 
Since the collaboration was constructed through an imposed partnership by the 
Joint Program, it did not develop into a robust collaboration. The following 
section will describe and analyse why the collaborative networks established 
to manage the Berau MCA did not work as expected.  
 
 
2.4 The Joint Program as an NGO network  
 
The Joint Program is a collaborative network of international and local Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs). Starting from the conservation concept of 
TNC to develop ‘ridge to reef’ conservation in Berau, TNC came up with the 
idea to develop a joint program to share budget and management responsibili-
ties for marine conservation with other international and local NGOs. In theo-
ry, the Joint Program wanted to convert the coastal and marine area of Berau 
into a Common Pool Resource (Ostrom 1990) by giving it the title of a marine 
conservation area. But in the implementation process, they merely paid lip 
service to including all appropriators (fishers and the sea turtle egg collectors) 
in the development process of this marine conservation area, by only inviting 
the fishers’ networks organization (see next section). Based on personal net-
works, TNC invited representatives of WWF-Indonesia, Mitra Pesisir/ CRMP 
II and KEHATI foundation to join this initiative, as by 2002 these three NGOs 
all had projects running in East Kalimantan. WWF-Indonesia was already ac-
tive in Berau with their WWF-Wallacea project to promote sea turtle conser-
vation; Mitra Pesisir had a project to develop a conservation program for Te-
luk Balikpapan, and Jakarta-based KEHATI foundation was partnering with 
the Berau-based NGOs Kalbu and Bestari for the program of biodiversity 
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preservation and utilization. Except KEHATI, they agreed to share budgets in 
developing a marine conservation project in Berau.  
The collaboration between these NGOs of different governance levels 
was formalized in May 2004 through a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the District Head of Berau. Mitra Pesisir, Kehati and Kalbu be-
came involved only during the first two years. Later, they were not involved 
anymore because their projects in Berau terminated. In 2008 the locally based 
Turtle Foundation became part of the Joint Program. Although officially the 
members of the Joint Program comprised local, national and international 
NGOs, my interviews with members of NGOs and technical agencies in Be-
rau, as well as their own reports, identified the Joint Program primarily with 
international NGOs collaboration. The successive project leaders of the Joint 
Program came mostly from TNC based on their agreement about funding, that 
TNC would act as the ‘partner’ coordinating the expenses in relation to third 
parties, particularly the Berau district government, and WWF-Indonesia would 
‘internally’ refund 50% of these expenses to TNC. 
The aim of the Joint Program was to promote an institutional partner-
ship between government agencies and NGOs that would share administrative 
responsibilities, develop a joint work plan, and coordinate conservation activi-
ties in Berau (Wiryawan et al. 2005). The Joint Program sponsored many ac-
tivities, including workshops, research, seminars, meetings, as well as recipro-
cal visits to other marine parks and conservation areas throughout Indonesia. 
These kinds of activities were undertaken in the expectation of raising the un-
derstanding of government agencies, user groups and local conservation or-
ganizations of the concept of marine conservation. According to an interview 
with the ex-policy coordinator of the Joint Program during the period of 2003-
2006 (Bogor, 18 November 2011) the Join Program claimed that the collabo-
ration it tried to develop in initiating marine conservation in Berau was a new 
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concept of co-management. Through this approach the Joint Program wanted 
to ensure that the Berau MCA was different from the old paradigm of a cen-
tralized national park by firmly establishing the ‘ownership’ of the co-
management in the collaboration between locally based NGOs and the district 
government (Wiryawan et al. 2005).  
 The Joint Program partnership presupposed equal positions of the dis-
trict government and the Joint Program. Consequently, the Joint Program ex-
pected that the district government would be willing to share budget responsi-
bility in funding the activities related to the management of the marine con-
servation area. The Joint Program also expected that through this partnership 
their – externally initiated - programs would have a greater impact in the dis-
trict to the extent that the district government would acknowledge its exist-
ence, even if the international partners were formally ‘guests’ or ‘outsiders’.  
 
As an international NGO, it [TNC] could not work alone; it 
needed to build a strong basis. That is why it needed support 
from the local government. (Policy coordinator Joint Program 
2003-2006, Bogor, November 2011) 
 
The policy coordinator invested most of his time to meet the heads of the sec-
tor agencies that were responsible for the working programs in the coastal and 
marine area of Berau. He also used these meetings to discuss and try to ex-
plain the idea of marine conservation to them, hoping that the district govern-
ment agencies would become better aware of the need for environmentally 
sustainable development. He continued: ‘Even though it is the NGOs who 
need the conservation area, there will be time [for us] to ‘educate’ the gov-
ernment about the concept of marine conservation’ (Policy coordinator Joint 
Program 2003-2006, Bogor, November 2011). NGOs need the conservation 
area in terms of being acknowledged as responsible for the success of projects 
to their global donors. And also, for the sake of science and biodiversity, 
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NGOs need to conserve something. Since the idea to conserve the Berau wa-
ters was not high on the agenda of the district, the NGOs saw the need to cre-
ate synergy by ‘educating’ the district government through their collaboration 
with Joint Program. 
 
 
2.5 The Steering Committee and collaborative management board 
 
By involving the Regional Development Planning Agency 
(BAPPEDA) in this development process, we expected that it would 
help us in program development and deal with the district budget. 
The Marine Fisheries Agency (DPK), we expected that they would 
know marine problems better than the rest of us. Forestry was in-
volved because of history. They always contested DPK’s authority 
[over the mangrove area]. So, instead of having a dispute it is better 
that they collaborate. The Natural Resource Conservation Agency 
(BKSDA) certainly should be involved because its work covers con-
servation; they are knowledgeable about marine and land species. 
The NGOs, such as WWF, TNC Marine, and Bestari were involved 
because their domain covers coastal and marine issues. The district 
government was expected to work with us as partners to develop the 
MCA. Between 2004 and 2007, the district government indeed sup-
ported us. We, as Steering Committee, did the communication [so-
sialisasi] to the People’s Representative Council (DPRD). They said 
that they supported our activities. (Ex-member of Steering Commit-
tee, Berau, October 2010) 
 
To implement the collaboration concept based on the District Head’s Decree 
No. 225/2004, a Steering Committee for Berau coastal and marine resources 
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management was established. This committee was a copy of the TNC co-
management model and was expected to negotiate and merge the needs of the 
relevant institutional actors involved in the process of developing the Berau 
MCA. One of the first initiators of this marine conservation stated that during 
its first four to five years, the Steering Committee was robust, and it had regu-
lar meetings to discuss the concept of the MCA and how to improve the liveli-
hood of the coastal communities (Ex-member of Steering Committee, Berau, 
October 2010). Besides having seminars and regular meetings, during the first 
five years after its initiation, the Steering Committee did a comparative study 
(funded by the Joint Program) of other marine conservation areas in Indonesia 
(in Bali, Bunaken and Nusa Tenggara Timur) that were already developed. 
These activities were seen as a way for the Joint Program to generate the dis-
trict government’s interest to join and support their marine conservation idea.   
The Steering Committee is a multi-layered and multi-stakeholder or-
ganization, consisting of different district sector agencies, the national BKS-
DA, and the NGOs (Figure 2.2). In 2008 the Steering Committee was trans-
formed into the Collaborative Management Board (CB) of Berau MCA, based 
on the District Head Decree No. 460/2008. The members of this board stayed 
the same as the Steering Committee, except that the Joint Program included 
more organizations: TNC, WWF-Indonesia, Bestari, the Turtle Foundation 
(Yayasan Penyu Berau), Fishers’ Communities Network (Jaringan Masyara-
kat Nelayan)8 and One Thought (Dakkayu Akkal))9. The main tasks of Steering 
Committee were to facilitate and socialise the draft of coastal and marine 
management, to facilitate the establishment of the joint committee on coastal 
and marine management and to facilitate communication, consultation and 
                                                
8 The Fishers Community Network (Jaringan Masyarakat Nelayan - JAMAN) is the 
district level form of the Forum Masyarakat Nelayan (Fishers Community Forum - 
Formal) initiated by TNC-WWF as an institution to coordinate and to transmit in-
formation among fishers and between fishers and government. 
9 The name Dakkayu Akkal - Satu Pemikiran (One Thought) originated from the lan-
guage of the Bajau inhabitants of Maratua Island. It is a local institution initiated by 
Bestari with a concern to manage marine resources. 
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coordination in coastal and marine management. The main task of the CB was 
to produce a five-year management plan for the Berau MCA that included var-
ious activities of planning, implementation and surveillance of the Berau 
MCA.  
Figure 2.2 Organizational Chart of the Steering Committee 
 
Source: District Head Decree No. 224/2004 
 
The agencies involved in the Steering Committee and the Collaborative 
Board were mostly the same, but not the persons who represented them, as a 
Advisory Team 
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District Secretary 
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(DPK) 
DPK 
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Agency (BAPPEDA) Secretary Head of Section of Marine 
and Fisheries of DPK 
Tourism BLH Forestry BKSDA Joint Program BAPPEDA 
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consequence of the constant mutations within the district government. The 
former project manager of the Joint Program complained: 
 
We wanted to empower the district government. We invested in the 
persons representing the [district] government. We trusted them, but 
then they were transferred to another sector agency, so we had to 
start all over again. It was tiring. (Joint Program project manager pe-
riod 2009, Bogor, August 2010) 
 
Commenting on this problem in 2010, the policy coordinator mentioned that 
the Joint Program had a plan to review the regulation on the nomination of 
Steering Committee/Board membership. They planned to improve it by as-
signing a fixed person for each sector agency in the district who would be a 
member of the Collaborative Board. They proposed two options for improve-
ment. Firstly, the nomination of the person in charge would mean appointing 
the person as a member of their institution (CB). Secondly, this appointment 
would give a structural position to the sector agency.  The Joint Program ex-
pected that by changing the system there would be no more ‘personnel’ shifts 
in the Board so that knowledge transfer would be smooth and continuous, 
which would improve the commitment from each member of the Collabora-
tive Management Board. 
 
 
2.6 Decentralization as an arena of contention between district and 
outsiders  
 
Unfortunately, decentralization is not a one-time definition of a legal shift of 
authority and responsibility to an autonomous region; it is an ongoing admin-
istrative and political-economic re-organization of resources, management and 
financial arrangements (Tacconi 2007; Hadiz 2004; Satria and Matsuda 2004). 
Consequently, the process of implementation often comes with unclear and 
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overlapping fields of power between central and decentral governments (Gun-
awan and Visser 2012; Patlis 2005b). Hence, decentralization materialized in 
overlapping and confusing regulations that were used to their benefit by the 
different actors involved in the co-management of the Berau MCA to author-
ise their claim on the development process, zoning, or the size of the Berau 
MCA. According to the first project leader of Joint Program (interview, Bo-
gor, June 2012), the Berau MCA was established based on the Law No. 
32/2004 on regional government, especially with regard to the management 
boundary of the district’s coastal area.  
Both the environmental NGOs of the Joint Program and the Berau dis-
trict government apply Law 32/2004 on the nautical miles limits to set up the 
boundary of Berau MCA. But there is confusion and contention about their 
interpretation from where to start measuring. The Joint Program policy coor-
dinator (2003-2006) who was involved in establishing the boundaries of the 
marine conservation area stated (interview, Bogor, November 2011) that the 
mangrove forest would be its landward boundary. The nautical-miles-seaward 
boundary of the Berau MCA, according to the Joint Program, should be start-
ed from the shore lines of Berau’s outer islands10. Treating Berau as an archi-
pelagic district, the Joint Program uses the Djuanda Declaration11 to set up the 
4 miles boundary as the outer boundary of the Berau marine administrative 
area. In this view the whole of the marine space including the sea around and 
                                                
10 A straight line drawn started from the 4 miles of the northest of Berau to the east 
toward the 4 nautical miles of Maratua islands. From this point, a straight line pulled 
to the south toward the 4 nautical miles of Sambit Island. From Sambit, a straight 
line pulled to the 4 miles of the most southern point of Berau. Those lines fenced in 
the Berau marine administrative area (see Figure 2.1).   
11 The Djuanda Declaration (1957) is the Indonesian government declaration that 
Indonesia is an archipelagic state and that the Indonesian marine area including the 
sea around and between the islands is under the Republic of Indonesia’s authorithy. 
The outer boundaries of Indonesia are 12 nautical miles from Indonesia’s most sea-
ward islands according to this declaration. 
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between the islands is included in the Berau MCA. Based on this calculation, 
the MCA in Berau would extend over 1.27 million ha covering the whole of 
the district’s maritime administrative area. This measurement was formally 
acknowledged through the District Head’s Decree No. 31/2005 on the estab-
lishment of the Berau MCA.  
The district’s marine and fishery agency (DPK) disagreed with the Joint 
Program using the administrative area as the criterion to declare the MCA 
boundary. DPK reasoned that the district authority to manage the coastal and 
marine natural resources only covers 4 miles seawards from the shore line. 
Based on this, the conservation area of the district would only cover 350,000 
ha rather than the formally declared 1.27 million ha. DPK’s interpretation of 
the law is legally correct, as Berau is not a so-called archipelagic district (ka-
bupaten kepulauan) but a coastal district (kabupaten pesisir). Therefore, the 
starting point to measure their resource management authority of the 4 nautical 
miles should be at the shore line on the mainland and from the shore line of 
each of the small islands scattered through the Berau waters. The district head 
thus cannot claim authority over the marine space between 4 and 12 nautical 
miles because the remaining 8 nautical miles are under provincial authority 
(the doughnut model of Figure 2.5). This creates a considerable ‘spatial gap’ 
in the legal basis for governing the MCA by the district, which amounts to 
almost 1 million ha12. While these coastal waters are legally under provincial 
and national authority, the international NGO management model took the 
district government as its partner, not the provincial and national government.  
In 2007 a coastal management law (Law No. 27/2007) was issued as a 
general guide to plan the use, monitoring and control of the coastal and small 
islands’ natural resources. By the enactment of this law, the district govern-
ment (DPK) was expecting that the state of the Berau MCA would be re-
viewed in order to conform to this new law. Based on this law, a conservation 
area is part of the coastal area zoning plan that needs to be designed by the 
                                                
12 1,270,000 ha minus 350,000 ha is 920,00 ha.  
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district, and the law decrees certain steps that should be taken in the planning 
(Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The sequence of planning steps  
 
 
Source: Law No. 27/2007, Section 7 
 
The implementation of the Berau MCA thus created considerable confusion 
for DPK Berau. According to the DPK officer, if an area was declared a ma-
rine conservation or protected area based on Law No. 27/2007, there should 
not be any extractive activities in that area. But the Berau MCA did not serve 
as a conservation area as implied in the law. In practice, marine resources 
were still extracted from within the declared marine conservation area, both by 
local and by outsider fishers (Gunawan and Visser 2012). In other words, if 
the district declared the 1.27 million ha as a marine conservation area, the 
whole of the Berau marine space would be restricted or closed to fisheries and 
other extractive activities. This officer argued that this would look like the 
government was ignoring the legal right of coastal communities to a marine-
based livelihood (interview DPK officer, Tanjung Redeb, October, 2009).  
Another problem is zoning. In composing the management plan for the 
Berau MCA, the JP in the name of the Steering Committee contracted Mula-
warman University (UNMUL) in Samarinda to produce a series of publica-
tions on the Berau MCA. One of them was on the spatial zoning and coastal 
sites plan (Berau District Government 2008). The proposed zones divided the 
Berau MCA into core zones, a buffer zone, use zone and special zone. How-
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ever, even though UNMUL staff members in their presentation stated that 
their zoning plan was based on Law No. 27/2007, I found that the terms they 
used in identifying the zones are based on the older Law No. 5/1990 on natural 
resources conservation (Konservasi Sumberdaya Alam Hayati). According to 
Law No. 27/2007 what is called a core zone (Table 2.2) should be called a 
‘conservation area’. Consequently, there would be specific no-go zones in the 
Berau Delta and around the islands, but the remaining waters would remain 
open access.  
 
Table 2.2 Differences in naming and zoning of the conservation area. 
 
 UNMUL-Joint Program 
(Berau District Govern-
ment 2008 
IPB-Joint Program (IPB 
et al. 2009) 
Principal Laws as 
points of reference 
Law No. 27/2007; Law 
No. 31/2004; Law No. 
5/1990 
Law No. 27/2007; Law 
No. 31/2004; Law No. 
32/2004 
Name Marine Conservation 
Area 
Water Conservation  
Area 
Zoning Core Zone Conservation zone  
(Kawasan Konservasi) Buffer Zone 
Use Zone  
(Zona Pemanfaatan) 
General Use zone (Ka-
wasan Pemanfaatan 
Umum) 
Special Zone (Sea Lane 
and Research and Train-
ing Use Zone) 
Sea Lane (Alur Laut) 
 National Strategic Zone 
(Kawasan Strategis  
National) 
 
Apart from the study by UNMUL, the Joint Program contracted the Bogor 
Agricultural Institute (IPB) to do a study on the Berau MCA zoning plan. The 
result of this study was presented in August 2009 in a workshop for district 
agencies’ staff. The Joint Program and IPB proposed a new boundary and zon-
ing plan for the Berau MCA. This time the boundary and zoning plan was ad-
justed to Law No. 27/2007 on the management of the coastal zone and small 
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islands, which divided the coastal and marine area of Berau into a public utili-
zation area (kawasan pemanfaatan umum), conservation area, specific national 
strategic areas, and sea lanes. This means that not all the coastal and marine 
administrative authority of Berau would be designated as a conservation area.  
The conservation area proposed by this study (Figure 2.4) includes the 
mangrove forests and reefs of Tanjung Batu, Panjang Island, Semama Island, 
Sangalaki Island, Guntung and Pagat Islands, Mangkajang Delta, the man-
grove area of Tabalar, the Malalungun sandbar, Kakaban Island, the migration 
line of whales and other big cetaceans, Maratua Island, Sambit and Blam-
bangan Islands, Bilang-Bilangan and Mataha Islands, the northern big reef, the 
mangrove area of Batu Putih and Buaya-Buaya Island, Teluk Sulaiman, Small 
Kaniungan Island and Teluk Sumbang (Berau District Government et al., 
2009).  
Figure 2.4 Zoning plan of coastal and marine area of Berau as proposed by 
Joint Program-IPB 
 
 
Source: IPB et al. 2009 
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Moreover, in this zoning plan by IPB the coastal and maritime space of 
Berau became a collective concern of district, provincial and national govern-
ments, conforming to the search for collaboration between governmental lev-
els, as expressed by the law (Law No. 27/2007). Because Maratua Island is 
one of the islands identifying the limit of Indonesia’s national waters, the dis-
trict needed to coordinate the management of this island with the central gov-
ernment. Since Maratua Island as part of the MCA is also a concern of the in-
ternational NGOs, the island belongs to the domain of all the multiple-scale 
actors involved in the coastal resource governance of Berau, creating confu-
sion and contention between MMAF, conservationists, and the district.  
Interestingly, although the Joint Program-IPB study, which was the ba-
sis for the workshop, had received inputs from different agencies, including 
DPK Berau, DPK as the technical agency appeared to be reluctant to accept 
this zoning plan, as stated by the officer of DPK Berau:  
 
We told the director of the Coastal and Marine Department of 
MMAF that we would use their (Joint Program-IPB) proposed 
boundary and zoning plan as input to our plan on developing the dis-
trict spatial planning on coastal areas and small islands. We appreci-
ate their work, but when they insisted that we should recommend 
their boundary and zoning plan as a district regulation, we could not 
do that. (Officer of DPK, Tanjung Redeb, October 2009) 
 
He objected to follow-up on the Joint Program’s proposal and to submit 
it to the district government (DPRD) to become a formal district regulation, 
because he believed that this zoning was decided upon without any participa-
tion of coastal communities, and thus without the need for public consultation 
that was mentioned in the law. When JP-IPB presented the results of their 
study, they used the word ‘to socialise’ instead of ‘public consultation’. Their 
terminology gave the impression that ‘outsiders’ (Joint Program/IPB, see next 
section) overruled and excluded local institutions. Consequently, DPK did not 
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feel like it ‘owned’ the process of the zoning. DPK, infact, had their version of 
boundary of Berau MCA that was based on Law No. 32/2004 on Regional 
Government (Figure 2.5). The contention between the international NGOs and 
the local government agency (DPK) over the boundaries of district authority to 
monitor the MCA has consequently been politicized in a power game against 
‘outsiders’ - whether national government agencies, non-Kalimantan universi-
ties, or international NGOs in a newly emerging subjectivity of the Berau dis-
trict government.  
To respond to the confusion about the status of the zones, the Joint Pro-
gram held a joint workshop in July 2010 to create synergy between the differ-
ent definitions, interpretations of institutional provisions, and monitoring au-
thority over the conservation of the Berau coastal waters. This time, its staff 
purposely did not use the term marine conservation area, but replaced it by 
water conservation area following Law No. 27/2007. In his opening speech, 
the head of DPK Berau tried to downplay the status of the MCA in the District 
Head Regulation No. 31/2005 by calling it merely an initiative, with the inten-
tion to reconsider the status of the marine conservation area as stated by the 
Joint Program (TNC/WWF).  Interestingly, the district head in his opening 
speech now played the card of the local economic and cultural-historical value 
of sea turtle eggs, thus taking sides with DPK in distancing himself from the 
MCA model of the international NGOs. He stated that sea turtle eggs have 
always been and will remain important to Berau people13 and that this should 
be one of the considerations for the provincial and central governments to col-
                                                
13 The political-economy of turtle eggs is another highly contentious issue between 
the environmental NGOs and local government. The power positions of the district 
head and turtle eggs concession holder are both very important for the outcome of 
the implementation process of the Berau marine conservation area (in contrast to 
Halim et al. 2008). This issue is dicussed in chapter three of this thesis. 
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laborate with the district in their conservation attempts (Field notes, October 
2010). 
The Joint Program persisted in keeping the 1.27 million ha as a single 
Marine Conservation Area as declared internationally. But it now left its posi-
tion of partnering only with the district by declaring that an MCA of this size 
would better become an MCA under national instead of district governmental 
authority, using the argument of habitat conservation. The Joint Program ex-
pected that the central government would intervene to solve the conflict so 
that district, provincial, and central governments would all contribute their 
share, both in terms of authority and budget responsibility, to the implementa-
tion of the Berau MCA14. 
 
Figure 2.5 Boundary of the Berau Water Conservation Area based on Law  
No. 32/2004 or “the doughnut model” as proposed by the DPK 
Berau 
 
 
Source: Al Giffari and Harianto, 2010 
                                                
14 In fact, they returned to a position closer to Law No. 32/2004 that puts greater em-
phasis on the relationship between central and regional governments, rather than the 
authority (or autonomy) of regional governments (Patlis 2008, 420). 
 
 
Water Conservation Area of Berau. 
  
Based on Law No. 32/2004 (art. 18 par. 4) on re-
gional government: 
Provincial jurisdiction to manage the marine area 
is up to 12 nautical miles; 1/3 of which is under 
di t i t j i di ti
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2.7 Collaboration and contention in decentralized MCA manage-
ment: Discussion and conclusion  
 
The Berau case not only serves as an example of legal disconnects, but also of 
power and knowledge disconnects between the principal actors in the imple-
mentation of the Berau MCA. These disconnects create confusion and conten-
tion on the ground about definitions, institutional provisions and monitoring 
practices in decentralized marine conservation area management in a search 
for synergy in the establishment of the Berau MCA.  
In the era of decentralization, the district has the authority and respon-
sibility to manage the coastal resources within 4 nautical miles. This manage-
ment is not merely about the exploitation of the coastal and marine resources, 
but also includes the development and implementation of a conservation area. 
International environmental NGOs saw this as a chance to directly partner 
with the Berau district in the expectation of improving local environmental 
management. They thus proposed a different model from recent co-
management approaches in Indonesia (Djohani 2009; Christie 2004; Erdmann 
et al. 2004) by focussing on collaborating with the district, deliberately by-
passing the central and provincial government and marginalising coastal 
communities. 
TNC-Marine, WWF-Indonesia, and local NGOs started collaboration in 
developing what they saw as a new marine conservation concept for Berau. 
After they received the district’s acknowledgement, they initiated collabora-
tion as a Joint Program with the different technical agencies in the district. 
Together they formed the Steering Committee for the Berau MCA. But, con-
trary to their structural position (Figure 2.3) the Joint Program took the coor-
dination of these different governmental stakeholders into their own hands 
because the district government did not fulfil its management obligations. 
Through this governance construction the Joint Program as a foreign body 
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tried to monitor and control the sustainable use of the marine resources. Yet, 
as non-government institutions and outsiders to the district, TNC-Marine and 
WWF-Indonesia took away from the district government the authority and 
responsibility to make the MCA management model in Berau a success. 
However, marine conservation was not a priority for the Berau gov-
ernment for several reasons. Fiscal decentralization (Aritenang 2009; Hira and 
Parfitt 2004) had forced district agencies to devise strategies to increase the 
regional income (PAD). An increase in coastal resources exploitation was seen 
as a more sustainable solution to regional economics than a decrease due to 
no-take zones and environmental regulations (Gunawan 2012), including rent-
seeking practices (Gunawan and Visser 2012; Patlis 2008). 
I have argued that the decentralized management model applied by the 
environmental NGOs in the Joint Program does not provide the often-sought 
middle ground (Acciaioli and Erb 2008; Majors 2008). Expanding Patlis’ no-
tion of legal disconnects (Patlis 2008, 411; 2005a) I also discussed disconnects 
in environmental knowledge and power between the principal individual and 
institutional actors in MCA management, based on two main areas of conten-
tion: 1) the issue of how to measure the coastal space of district authority over 
the 4 nautical miles (Law No. 32/2004) and, 2) the issue of zoning of the ma-
rine conservation area. In addition to these issues, the personnel changes in the 
different institutions further complicated collaboration. Particularly, the suc-
cession of district head in 2005 and the replacement of members of the Steer-
ing Committee and the staff of DPK created problems for the position of the 
Joint Program. The Joint Program came to be seen as an outsider that lacked 
authority and legitimation to govern the MCA in the eyes of the district. The 
personnel changes in the district fisheries agency (DPK) helped to strengthen 
the newly obtained identity of the district government as an autonomous gov-
ernment body. This new subjectivity contributed to the increase of discontent 
over the power of the Joint Program to define the boundaries of the MCA that 
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conflicted with its own interpretation of Law No. 32/2004 regarding district 
authority over 4 nautical miles. 
By 2010 it was clear that the district did not live up to its commitment 
to govern the 1.27 million ha of the MCA declared in 2005. The district head 
decided not to extend the MoU on collaboration with TNC/WWF in the JP. 
The non-local NGOs departed from their partnership with the district by pro-
posing that central and provincial level governments should share in the man-
agement through a multi-scalar governance structure for the Berau MCA. The 
district head, in a meeting about the new Law No. 27/2007, made a remarka-
ble political move away from collaboration with the external partners, the in-
ternational NGOs, the national research institute (IPB, Bogor), and the region-
al university (UNMUL, Samarinda), by making a political statement in sup-
port of the local belief in the cultural-historical and economic value of turtle 
eggs exploitation as a legitimate part of district marine conservation practice. 
These developments mark the demise of the collaboration between the interna-
tional environmental NGOs and decentralized government in the life history 
of the Berau MCA.   

   
Chapter Three 
The Battlefield of Turtle Eggs in Berau 
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Note on the cover page picture: 
One of the sea turtle eggs sellers in the province capital of Samarinda. The 
Joint Program and Natural Resource Conservation Agency (Balai Konservasi 
Sumberdaya Alam – BKSDA) believe that sea turtle eggs sold in Samarinda 
originate from Berau waters. 
?  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The marketing of turtle eggs from Berau has a long history (see table 3.1), only 
recently it was declared illegal. In this sense, the histories of sea turtle egg 
exploitation and marine conservation in Berau were closely related. Before 
1901, sea turtle eggs were used as an important resource in barter exchange, 
and they were extensively exploited. During the period of 1901-1941 the 
capture of sea turtles and the use of sea turtle eggs were limited by way of a 
system of a temporary harvesting of sea turtle eggs on Sangalaki island for 
conservation purposes (Al Giffari 2008) and by auctioning of the right to 
collect the eggs by the Dutch government. 
After the colonial era, the eggs were again extensively exploited and 
used as a gift or exchanged with other regions. From 1950 to 2000, the Berau 
district government controlled the trade of sea turtle eggs through district 
regulations and by a decree of the district head (Table 3.1). The concept 
underlying the legal tools were based upon the same organizational principle as 
the one used by the Dutch colonial officers: auctioning to local political figures 
or elite families the right to collect turtle eggs (Yayasan Penyu Berau 2012; 
Krom 1940).  The winner of the auction became the lease-holder for a period of 
a year. In Berau, the lease-holder is still called pachter1. From 1994 to 
2005/2006 the pachter of the sea turtle concession was Haji Penyu2. 
The Joint Program sought to establish a marine conservation area in the 
Berau waters that was finally established in 2005 (Chapter 2). Even though the 
conservation implemented by the Joint Program was not based on the notion of 
                                                
1 Pachter is a Dutch word meaning a lease-holder or renter. In Indonesia, the land and 
its natural resources belong to the state. Following modern state administration, the 
district has the right to decree how land and natural resources are managed. In this 
case, the district has the right to control the islands and sea turtle eggs’ exploitation 
and trade or lease that right to a private party through auction. The winner of the 
auction is thus called pachter. In Berau,  pachters not only  manage the islands where 
sea turtle eggs are found but they also manage birds’ nests caves. 
2 Meaning “the turtle haji”. Of course this is not his real name.  
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species but on ecosystem boundaries, sea turtle conservation3 was indeed on 
their agenda. Although the district government had agreed through the 
establishment of the MCA with the objective of sea turtle conservation, at the 
same time it did not abolish the auction system allowing the lease-holder of the 
sea turtle islands to continue the collection of sea turtle eggs. Sea turtle 
conservation thus became a major source of contention between the interests of 
the Joint Program and the district government.   
Especially since the decentralization of natural resources management in 
2004, the district government demanded that it could still exploit sea turtle eggs 
for the purpose of increasing district revenues (Chapter 2). The district 
government teamed up with Haji Penyu to obstruct the implementation of the 
MCA in Berau. Following the life history of the establishment of the Berau 
MCA in Chapter 2, I here provide a case study about the political battle of 
values, knowledge and discourses between the Joint Program, district 
government, and Haji Penyu on seeing sea turtle conservation as the key to 
marine conservation in Berau. I will explain how the political network of Haji 
Penyu blocked the implementation of the Berau MCA. I further argue that the 
different ontologies of knowledge about sea turtle management and marine 
conservation shape the different discourses on sea turtle and marine 
conservation used by these actors.  
Primary data were gathered during field research carried out in 2008-
2011. I conducted in-depth interviews with multiple-scale actors involved in 
the development process of the marine conservation area including national and 
regional government officials, local entrepreneurs, and NGO staff. The 
interviews focused on the management of the coastal area of Berau, the 
development process of the Berau MCA and the history of sea turtle 
management in Berau. Additionally, I also engaged in participant observation. 
This included attendance at meetings and workshops held by the Joint Program 
                                                
3 Based on the appendix of the government regulation No. 7/1999 on plant and animal 
preservation, sea turtle (both green sea turtle and hawks bill sea turtle) are part of the 
protected animal. 
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to communicate (sosialisasi) the Berau MCA program with the district. 
Secondary data to complement my field data was gathered by reviewing and 
examining a variety of scientific literature and other sources on the Berau MCA 
and sea turtle eggs exploitation from websites, newsletters, newspaper articles 
and reports produced by Joint Program. 
In the following section I will review the literature on the global-local 
interface and how the different values and knowledge shaped the discourses of 
the actors under conditions of political-administrative decentralization in 
Indonesia. The third section discusses the ecological value that became the 
basis for the knowledge of the Joint Program in framing marine conservation in 
Berau. The fourth section describes the historical and economic values shaping 
the district government’s interest in sea turtle eggs. The fifth section elaborates 
on Haji Penyu’s ideas of the management of sea turtle eggs, and continues with 
the discussion of the political network he uses to accommodate his interests. 
The final section discusses the battlefield of knowledge between the actors 
involved in sea turtle management and draws the conclusions.  
 
 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
 
Following the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia since 1998, the 
district government, particularly in a resource-rich district like Berau, 
demanded a greater role in managing their natural resources (Resosudarmo 
2004). Supported by the issuing of regional government laws in 1998 and 2004, 
the district government gained more political power in governing their 
resources (Hidayat 2005). The district government now used its power in 
producing, implementing, and employing regulations to accommodate its own 
interest (idem). Its power becomes even greater when supported by the attitude 
of local political elites who have a tendency to exhibit ‘mono-centric-loyalty’ 
to their superior or boss (ponggawa) or to other local elites, rather than to the 
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community (Hidayat 2000). The sovereign positioning of the district’s political 
elite implies that in every process of policy decision-making they tend to 
protect the interest of their economic bosses more than the interest of the 
coastal community depending on them.  
 Hence, the nationally accepted global trend in implementing marine 
conservation is not always automatically accepted or implemented by local 
government, as shown in Chapter 2 in the case of the establishment and 
implementation of the Berau Marine Conservation Area. Instead of passively 
receiving the global norm, knowledge and policy goals regarding the concepts 
of marine conservation are translated and transformed according to local 
actors’ goals, interests and strategies. In the previous chapter I have argued that 
the idea of marine conservation was introduced by global environmental NGOs 
into Berau. As a global force, this idea involved a different body of knowledge, 
motives, power, goals, and objectives from those of the local actors. In this 
chapter I would like to deepen my analysis of the interface of global and local 
knowledge and explain how global environmental knowledge (in this case 
about sea turtle conservation) is reshaped and used in different ways by the 
local political-economic elite to reach their goals. 
 I define knowledge as “something that everybody possesses, even 
though the grounds for belief and the procedures for validation of knowledge-
claims will vary” (Long 2001:189). Even though the global science-based 
environmental knowledge is produced to inform the public and the government 
about the changes and the role of humans in environmental change, this 
knowledge is produced in isolation from the everyday lives of the public and 
the government (Goldman and Turner 2011). When this global science-based 
environmental knowledge was brought into the district, it met and interacted 
with a different local knowledge. As a product of scientific knowledge, this 
global environmental knowledge is produced by scientists who usually “occupy 
a position of power and authority in selecting theoretical approaches, data and 
interpretations […]” (Kontinen 2004: 3). On the contrary, local knowledge is 
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shaped by a different ontological basis that originates from the historical 
practice and experiences of the local people. The local knowledge in this case 
finds is source in the historically based auction of the single right of access to 
harvest sea turtles eggs for economic purposes (Krom 1940) together with local 
pride and a sense of identity expressed by the sharing of the eggs with relatives 
and guests, and the cultural value of the eggs as an aphrodisiac. 
The interface of global and local knowledge creates what Tsing (2005: 
4) has labeled as friction, the “awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative 
qualities of interconnection across difference”. She challenges the notion that 
global ideas are passively accepted and adopted at the local level. Instead, she 
argues: “global forces are themselves congeries of local/global interaction” 
(Tsing 2005: 3), as the interaction will “bring two worlds into relation” (Olivier 
de Sardan 2005: 153). This means that two different bodies of knowledge and 
interests will meet or confront each other during the process of the transfer of 
certain skills.  
In the case of the Berau MCA, the implementation of political-
administrative decentralization has given more weight to the district 
government’s economic interests. Also, the local knowledge and valuation of 
sea turtle eggs are now being contested by the scientific knowledge introduced 
by the Joint Program, which contributes to turtle eggs representing highly 
contentious values. When these bodies of knowledge with different 
understandings, interests, and values meet and interact, a battlefield of 
knowledge is in the making (Long 2004). In this battlefield of knowledge, each 
of the actors involved is struggling to persuade others to accept “particular 
frames of meaning and winning them over to their point of view” (Long 2001: 
184).  
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3.3 The scientific knowledge of the Joint Program  
 
The Joint Program is a collaborative institution consisting of international, 
national and local NGOs that initiated the development and establishment of 
the marine conservation area of Berau (Chapter 2). The Joint Program’s 
initiative to develop an MCA was mainly oriented to conserve the habitat of 
crustaceans, coral reefs and sea turtles, safeguard a migration corridor for 
whales, dolphins and sea turtles, and especially to conserve the mating, 
feeding, nesting and nursing ground for the sea turtles. Evidently, these aims 
are framed by scientific ecological and marine biological values based on the 
knowledge of Joint Program members, who are mostly marine biologists. The 
first thing they see is the biodiversity of a certain area, as mentioned by one of 
the ex-project leaders of Joint Program:  
 
“Why is Berau valuable from the point of conservation? Because of 
the high [biodiversity] conservation value of the waters in front of 
Berau River. We still could find the Irrawaddy that looks like a pink 
dolphin. And also, that the Berau waters have served as the migration 
route for marine mammals. [Moreover] if we talk about the sea turtle, 
according to the Turtle Foundation, the Berau waters are the place 
for sea turtles, [because] they serve also as mating, feeding, nesting 
and nursing ground for the sea turtles. So, because of that, we have to 
conserve the area. The conservation value is high.” (Ex-project 
leader/policy coordinator of the Joint Program, Bogor, August 2010) 
 
Another Joint Program member also supports the idea of habitat conservation:  
 
“[…] The Berau [district government] declared this 1.27 
million ha as MCA because they see the marine species in the 
Berau waters. So the approach should be habitat conservation 
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instead of species conservation […].” (Ex-policy coordinator 
of JP, Tanjung Redeb, October 2010).  
 
When the Joint Program started the project in Berau, they already had held a 
discussion among their members (Chapter 2) before they started to contact 
several people from the district government. They tried to communicate 
(sosialisasi) their ideas about conservation to the district government using 
technical terms, like ‘target species’, ‘ecosystem’, and ‘habitat’. In this early 
approach, supported by the political situation favouring district authority and 
considerable international funds, the Joint Program could attract the district 
government’s interest to join the global attempt on marine conservation 
activities. Hence, in 2005, Berau district government, supported by the Joint 
Program declared a marine conservation area of 1.27 million ha that was 
thereupon formally recognized by the district head. This attempt aimed at 
securing the habitat of marine biota in the Berau coastal waters. Although they 
were not targeting sea turtle conservation in particular, most regulations issued 
by the environmentalists in relation to the MCA were on sea turtle protection to 
oppose sea turtle eggs exploitation by the district through their auctioning of 
the right to manage the sea turtle islands of Berau.  
 
 
3.4 District historical values of turtle eggs 
 
The history of turtle egg management in the past underlined the district 
legitimating the continuation of the auction system to manage turtle eggs until 
the present. This historical value also enriched the cultural value of the turtle 
eggs in the eyes of the Berau population. They are proud to present turtle eggs 
before guests or to be taken home as souvenirs from Berau. Table 3.1 shows 
the history of sea turtle eggs management in Berau. 
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Table 3.1 The history of sea turtle eggs management in Berau 
 
Period Activities  
Before 
1901—1912 
(Sultanates) 
Open access Managed by two local entrepreneurs or 
ponggawa 
1912—1934 
(Dutch 
colonial rule) 
Restricted use Forbidden to catch sea turtles; 
auctioned permit to harvest sea turtle 
eggs implemented on Sangalaki and 
Derawan islands. 
1934—1945 Auctioned Open-closed conservation scheme 
implemented by the Dutch colonial 
government on Sangalaki island. 
1945—1950 Open access Highly exploited. Sea turtle eggs 
served as a gift and object of barter. 
1950—1997  Auctioned Based on District Regulation No. 
30/1930 and District Regulation No. 
15/1983. The lease-holder had the 
responsibility to hatch 3,000 turtle 
eggs/year. 
1998 Open access for 6 months 
and nomination based on 
district head’s decree for the 
next 6 months 
The issuing of the Law No. 18/1997 on 
tax and retribution overruled District 
Regulation No. 15/1983. Nests could 
be adopted by outsiders/tourists 
through the tourism entrepreneur of 
Derawan and Sangalaki islands. 
1999—2000  Auctioned Based on a decree of the district head  
10% of the eggs were for conservation 
and nest adoption, and 25% for the 
Berau and regional markets. 
2001 Limited bidding and the 
beginning of the protection 
of Derawan and Sangalaki 
islands 
20% of the harvested eggs is for 
conservation 
2002—2005  Direct nomination of sea 
turtle eggs management for 
the islands outside of 
Sangalaki, Semama and 
Derawan islands 
Establishment of Berau MCA and the 
sea turtles becoming fully protected.  
2006 District issues a ban on the 
harvesting of sea turtle eggs 
on Bilang-bilangan, Mataha, 
Sambit and Belambangan 
islands. 
A letter of PHKA (2006) confirms that 
the harvesting ban on sea turtle eggs is 
extended to include Bilang-bilangan 
and Mataha island. This now means  
full protection of sea turtles in Berau. 
2007   The Minister of Forestry formally 
acknowledges the full protection of sea 
turtles in Berau.  
Source: Yayasan Penyu Berau 2012; Al Giffari 2008; Noor 1996, and interviews 
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Sea turtle egg collection and trade were commercialized under the reign of 
Sultan Hasanuddin of Berau (circa 1876 – 1882) who married a princess from 
Solok (Philippines). Many Bajau migrants from Solok then came to stay on the 
Derawan and other small islands in the Berau Delta. Their main livelihood was 
fishery. As fishers, they also held rights to collect sea turtle eggs. They held 
rights to exploit sea turtle eggs on the turtle islands (Sangalaki, Semama, 
Balambangan, Bilang-bilangan, Sambit, Balikukup, Mataha and Tatangga)4.  
 
“Originally, collecting the eggs seems to have been privilege of the 
Bajau’s, who therefore owed to their heads (poenggawa’s) only a 
small compensation (tjoekei) […] ...To keep their rights, they had to 
pay tribute to their boss or patron (poenggawa). When Aji Kuning 
became regent in Gunung Tabur, he issued a regulation in 1880 to 
auction the right to manage what were locally called the “sea turtle 
islands” because sea turtles were nesting on their shores. Those 
turtle islands were divided into two areas and managed by two 
entrepreneurs: poenggawa Toke who held the apanage right for the 
islands of Bilang-bilangan and Mataha; and poenggawa Taba who 
held the apanage right for the islands of Sambit, Sangalaki and 
Balambangan. These poenggawa regulated the tribute of the sea 
turtle eggs exploitation on these islands. Poenggawa Toke received 
600 florins/year and poenggawa Taba received 200 florins/year. 
Since 1912, a new regulation was issued, which mentioned that tax 
or tribute should be paid to the Sultan of Sambaliung and to the 
Sultan of Gunung Tabur, the two sultanates in Berau. The lease 
period runs from 1st May to 30st April.” (Idem)5  
                                                
4 “Van groote importantie voor de Landschapskas zijnde, is de exploitatie der 
“schildpadeilanden” ... Sangalaki, Semama, Balambangan, Bilang-Bilangan, Sambit, 
Balikoekoep, Mataha en Tatangga” (Krom, 1940, p. 84 translated from Dutch by L. 
Visser, 2013) 
5 “Oorspronkelijk schijnt het eierrapen privilege der Bajau’s te zijn geweest, die 
daartoe slechts eenige vergoeding (tjoekei) aan hun hoofden (poenggawa’s) 
verschuldigd waren. Controleur Westra maakt van e.e.a. althans melding in zijn 
memorie. [...] Eerst de rijksgroote Adji Koening, die tijdens de minderjarigheid van 
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It is important to note that a conservation regulation was already included in 
the contract between the Dutch district government and the lease-holding 
entrepreneur who was obliged to forbid any eggs collection and trade during 
the months of November and December. Also, starting in 1936, it was included 
in the contract that the lease-holder should deliver to the local government a 
total of 200 young turtles at the end of his term to be released into the sea under 
supervision of the sub-district head at Derawan Island.6 
 
Table 3.2 Revenues from turtle eggs exploitation in Berau in 1912-1940 
Year Tax revenues (florin) 
1912 s/d 1914 15.052 
1915 s/d 1917 18.250 
1927 s/d 1929 62.510 
1930 s/d 1934 70.510 
1939 10.600 
1940 11.600 
 
Source: Krom 1940 
 
There are no records on tax revenues gained from the sea turtle eggs trade after 
1940. Up to the 1960s, the revenues from sea turtle eggs were the only district 
income. With the implementation of President Soekarno’s Politik Berdikari  
                                                                                                                                       
den vorigen vorst van Goenoeg Taboer, Mohamad Siranoeddin, als waarnemend 
Sultan optrad, zou omstreeks 1880 het zamelrecht van de betaling van een soort pacht 
afhankelijk hebben gesteld. Controleur Spaan deelt in zijn memorie (1901) mede, dat 
“sinds eenigen tijd de oude toestand hersteld is en Poenggawa Toke zijn apanage, nl. 
de eilanden Bilang-Bilangan en Mataha, benevens het monopolie der op die eilanden 
gevonden schildpadeieren tegen betaling eener jaarlijksch accijns van f 600,-- heeft 
teruggekregen. Poeggawa Taba met hetzelfde monopolie de eilanden Sangalaki, 
Sambit en Balambangan tegen betaling van f 200,-- per jaar.” (Krom, 1940, p. 84 
translated from Dutch by L. Visser, 2013) 
6 “Teneinde het bij ongebreideld zoeken der eieren niet denkbeeldig gevaar voor een 
strekte achteruitgang der schildpadstand te keeren, werd in de notarieele 
pachtovereenkomst de voorwaarde opgenomen, dat gedurende de maanden November 
en December geen eieren mogen worden ingezameld.[…] Voorts is, voor het eerst in 
1936, in het contract opgenomen de verplichting voor den pachter, om aan het eind 
van het pachtjaar t.b.v. de Zelfbesturen 200 jonge schildpadden op te leveren, welke 
onder toezicht van het onderdistrictshoofd van Poelau Derawan in zee worden 
uitgezet.” (Krom, 1940, p. 85 translated from Dutch by L. Visser, 2013). 
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foreign investment did not reach Berau to be invested in the management of 
natural resources in Berau (Noor 1996: 99). During the New Order of President 
Soeharto (1965-1998) sea turtle eggs were the only natural resource in the 
district that was controlled by local people, since all other marine resources 
were controlled by the central government. The former head of DPK Berau 
confirmed this:  
 
“In those days, there was no other district income besides the income 
from taxation of turtle eggs. We could not manage the timber 
because its exploitation was controlled (‘managed’) by the central 
government, and so did birds’ nests. Sea turtle eggs were the only 
natural resource that could be managed by local people and it became 
the only source of district revenue.” (Former head of DPK 2000-
2006/2007 , Tanjung Redeb, 2nd October 2010). 
 
Using the argument that the people of Berau managed sea turtle eggs for a long 
time in history, the district government wanted to keep the control over sea 
turtle eggs exploitation and trade as an important source of district revenues 
(PAD) in the era of decentralization. Even though its contribution was not that 
high (Table 3.2) sea turtle eggs represent a marine resource that was in the 
hands of local people who paid their tribute directly to the district. In this sense, 
sea turtle eggs represent an essential element of the identity of the district, not 
only historically, but also economically. 
 
Table 3.3 Contribution from the sea turtle eggs taxation to regional tax 
revenues  
 
Year Total Regional Revenue 
from the regional tax 
(IDR) 
Contribution from the 
sea turtle egg tax (IDR) 
 
Percentage 
1995/1996 3,709,871,728.61 483,830,000.00 13.04% 
1996/1997 3,762,530,604.34 677,830,000.00 18.02% 
1997/1998 4,874,685,005.01 647,830,000.00 13.29% 
1998/1999 3,355,636,158.20 400,000,000.00 11.92% 
Source: District government data on regional revenues 1994/1995 – 1998/1999 
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The district government, also supported by Haji Penyu, argued that they were 
actually contributing to conservation by auctioning the sea turtle eggs 
concession. They called it management or pengelolaan of sea turtle eggs, 
meaning that they did not just exploit sea turtle7 by harvesting the eggs, but 
also conserve the species at the same time by limiting and controlling public 
access to the eggs. The district government, through DPK, had a budget to 
hatch sea turtle eggs, and release the young animals at sea, just like the 
regulation set during the colonial time. 
The district government released the last baby-turtle in 2004. Even 
though Berau DPK received a budget for sea turtle conservation for another 
year until 2007, it had lost its only source for the conservation of eggs after the 
full protection of sea turtles in 2006 (Chapter 2). Unfortunately, the termination 
of the sea turtle conservation by the district government was related to the 
declaration of the Berau MCA and the full protection of sea turtles in 2006. 
Before 2006, the agency would get the eggs to be hatched from the pachter and 
involve villagers in hatching the eggs and nursing the baby-turtles until they 
were ready to be released into the sea. Using the money derived from the 
retribution of the sea turtle eggs trade DPK paid the villagers who carried out 
the sea turtle hatchery an amount of IDR 10,000 (around US$ 1) per animal of 
3 months old that would then be released into the sea. To the villagers on 
Derawan Island, this activity meant quite a good income (Kompas, 2004).  
 
 
3.5 Haji Penyu’s eggs management and political network 
 
I had difficulty to collect data in Berau, especially on the production and tax 
revenues obtained by the district from the auctioning of sea turtle eggs 
management activities. I went to three government institutions to search for 
data, but they appeared to be reluctant to share their data. One female officer 
                                                
7 Primarily green turtle (Chelonia mydas). 
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from DPK told me that she did not want to share the data with me because it 
was not valid. One of her job descriptions was to collect data on fisheries 
production, and sea turtle eggs are regarded as one of the fisheries products of 
Berau. DPK had the responsibility to monitor the collection of eggs as part of 
fisheries. When she asked data on the turtle egg production from the pachter, 
he just asked her to fill in the data sheet by herself.  
Finally, I collected data through my personal network, although I know 
it is incomplete. I was fortunate to be able to interview Haji Penyu, the last and 
most powerful pachter of Berau, in October 2009 in Tanjung Redeb,.  
 
3.5.1 Haji Penyu’s egg management: exploitation plus conservation 
 
Haji Penyu is a complex person. His opinion on sea turtle management 
oscillated between pro and contra conservation. He has a vast knowledge on 
conservation issues and regulations, and the activities of the NGO’s in Berau.  
He agreed to the idea of sea turtle conservation and took his responsibility 
regarding the district regulation to protect 10 percent of the eggs he received 
from being collected. On the other hand, he said he disagreed with the 
statement that sea turtle as a species was close to extinction and, consequently, 
the need for its full protection as heralded by the marine biological experts who 
worked with NGOs, but who did not seem to be bothered about local people’s 
livelihoods and values. In his opinion, if sea turtles were fully protected 
without proper management, there would be too many animals. For him, the 
term sea turtle management meant not just the necessary conservation but also 
that the harvesting of the eggs should be allowed. 
In his opinion, the district government should manage the turtles with 
local people as the implementers. If NGOs managed the conservation area, the 
local people should also be involved in it. Thus, the local people would directly 
benefit from the conservation activities, instead of just becoming and acting as 
spectators because the conservation activities are done by the NGOs, who are 
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outsiders. Once the government, whether district or national government, 
would have decided to conserve the sea turtles, it should have to seriously 
implement the conservation program. In short, lack of clarity and inconsistency 
of the implementation of conservation regulations triggered Haji Penyu’s 
resistance to the very idea of marine conservation. He acknowledges that in 
Berau the sea turtle is fully protected, but he also acknowledges that in 
Samarinda people can still eat sea turtle eggs that he believes come from the 
Berau waters despite their protection (see Picture of the cover page of this 
chapter).  
 
3.5.2 Haji Penyu’s political network 
 
Haji Penyu had an extensive local and regional network. His younger brother 
was one of the vice-chairs of Berau parliament. His uncle had served as the 
head of Berau DPK from 2009 to 2012. Before his uncle served as the head of 
Berau DPK, this institution had been actively involved in monitoring and 
surveillance activities of the Berau waters together with other Joint Program 
members. Commenting on this change of interest, one of its officers stated:  
 
“DPK was involved in monitoring and surveillance activities. 
But when the head of DPK was replaced, we were not 
permitted anymore to join the monitoring. Joint Program kept 
asking us to join their activities, but we were reluctant to joint 
them. We are under the authority of the district government, so 
we have to obey them. Many eyes are watching us. Whatever 
we do we are always wronged (serba salah)”. (DPK officer, 
Tanjung Redeb, Berau, October 2009) 
 
The familial relationship between the head of Berau DPK, Haji Penyu, and the 
vice-chairman of local parliament appeared to hamper the implementation of 
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marine conservation related activities in Berau. They saw the MCA as an 
obstacle to their family interest in keeping the concession. One of the Joint 
Program members stated:  
 
“[Haji Penyu’s brother] has a position as a vice-chairman who 
is in charge of environmental affairs, including fisheries. As 
long as he is in that position, I do not expect that we would get 
any support [to implement] the MCA, especially for the 
budgeting. Because he is the one who has the power and 
authority to arrange the budget for these affairs. [Even though] 
in my opinion, Berau has the financial capacity to set apart a 
budget for the monitoring of the Berau waters.” (Member of 
JP, Tanjung Redeb, Berau, October 2011) 
 
In August 2005, when the green sea turtle became a fully protected species, 
Berau happened to organize its first direct election of the district head since the 
implementation of the decentralization laws. One of the candidates had a close 
relationship with the Haji Penyu family. They were in the same political party. 
Haji Penyu’s family financially supported the political campaign of this 
candidate. He won the election and became the vice-district head of Berau for 
two periods of 5 years after he also won the second direct election in Berau in 
2010. Some of my informants believed that the district government therefore 
‘owes’ the political promise to Haji Penyu’s family to defend the right to sea 
turtle eggs management for them.  
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Box 3.1 Haji Penyu’s considerations regarding turtle egg management 
 
Source: interviews 2009 
 
Haji Penyu was head of Derawan village and he was a businessman. His main business 
was the sea turtle eggs trade. With the money he collected from this business, he spread 
his wings by investing in the construction sector. The establishment of the Berau MCA 
meant that he lost his money making machine.  
He recalled that when he was small, in the 1960s, the district government already 
auctioned the right to harvest sea turtle eggs. His father was one of surveyors of the sea 
turtle islands (penjaga pulau telur penyu). In those days, the lease right (pacht) was held 
by a group of people, usually by the members of an extended family. They collectively 
paid the auctioned price of the lease. Each male head of a family would then take turns 
in collecting the eggs, rotating each 10 days. 
In 1994 Haji Penyu obtained the right to harvest sea turtle eggs in the Berau area 
and he kept this right for 13 years through his family business. He was pachter for 10 
years by repeatedly winning the auction. After those 10 years as auction winner, the 
district government appointed him for another 3 years to manage the sea turtle islands 
because of his good records in managing the pachter rights. He managed six ‘turtle 
islands’: Derawan, Balambangan, Sambit, Sangalaki, Bilang-bilangan and Mataha. He 
installed two to five persons to watch on each island, on salaries ranging between 
700,000 and 1,500,000 IDR per month per person. He also provided a radio for 
communication to each island, and two operational boats for all the islands with five 
crew-members on each boat. The eggs were harvested each day the whole year through. 
His crew would leave a couple of nests to be conserved, depending on how many nests 
they found that day. His rule was to keep one nest out of 10 undisturbed. Usually he 
would select the nests for conservation that were located far from the waterfront, which 
would remain untouched by the high tide. Sometimes he asked his workers to move the 
nest to a more secure place to ease surveillance.  
In 2001 he lost Derawan and Sangalaki Islands because of the district head 
decree on the full protection of the sea turtle on these two islands, which banned him 
from collecting the eggs in these places. In 2005 the pachter contract was terminated 
because the Berau district declared the full protection of the sea turtle. According to Haji 
Penyu this conservation activity would harm the sea turtle population in the sense that 
there would be no control on the sea turtle management from the district. 
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But, although Haji Penyu had strong political ties in the district, his political 
network did not stretch any further, and he had no voice in either the provincial 
or the national government. Finally, he more or less gave up by saying:  
 
“[Even though] my brother is at the local parliament, it’s done. 
[Meaning: the sea turtle eggs concession]. It’s been three years that I 
have not been actively involved in it anymore. I also feel bad toward 
the head of DPK. He is my uncle. If I say that I want to continue the 
concession, I will harm his program. I don’t want to do that. My 
concern is: Why in Samarinda eggs from Berau are still on the 
market, also in Sukabumi, but why not in Berau? If the [national] 
government was successful in implementing the [law] to ban illegal 
logging for the whole of Indonesia, why can they not do so in 
implementing [the regulation] on banning sea turtle 
[commoditization]?” (Haji Penyu, Tanjung Redeb, 22 October 2009) 
 
He further elaborated on his doubt about the origin of the eggs: 
 
“As the ‘manager of the eggs’ [lease holder] for many years, I could 
tell you that those sellers did not tell the truth. They could create 
any story to assure you that they get the eggs legally. Those officers 
(of BKSDA) did not check whether they were telling the truth or 
not. But, if they had really checked the origin of the eggs they 
would have learned that those eggs were from Berau. I know very 
well which island sells the eggs. There are no inhabitants on the 
island of Balambangan, but the military apparatus guards the island. 
Their men harvested the eggs and sold them.” (Haji Penyu, Tanjung 
Redeb, 22 October 2009) 
 
The head of the Tourism Agency of Berau echoed Haji Penyu’s concern at that 
time. Her reluctance originated from banning the collection of the sea turtle 
eggs in the district, despite the fact that her agency was a member of the 
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network of sector agencies for conservation in the Steering Committee. 
Referring to the turtle eggs trade in Samarinda, she said: “If others can 
consume sea turtle eggs of Berau origin, why can we - inhabitants of Berau - 
not consume those eggs?” (Head of Tourism Agency, Tanjung Redeb, 
November 2008). 
 Even though the Joint Program was convinced that sea turtle eggs from 
Berau were hard to be found in Samarinda after the sea turtle’s full protection 
was implemented in Berau, they did not deny that there was some ‘leakage’ of 
eggs supply to Samarinda, as indeed one island in Berau was not under the 
supervision of the NGOs, but under the supervision of the military. The 
national navy and army, together with the district police force take turns in 
guarding the island. One of the project leaders of the Joint Program suspected 
that those who surveyed that island also harvested the sea turtle eggs and sold 
them. Apparently, this was more or less common knowledge, since Haji Penyu 
had also raised the issue. But what he had not said was what two Joint Program 
officers, as well as the former head of DPK told me, namely that the formal 
guards appointed by the national and district governments collaborated to sell 
sea turtle eggs outside Berau with someone they referred to as ‘Haji Penyu’8.   
 
 
3.6 Turtle eggs and the battlefield of knowledge 
 
The eggs from Berau are famous for their quality that makes them expensive 
on the regional and national markets. When I was in Berau in 2010, one sea 
turtle egg was sold for about 10,000 IDR. According to a Joint Program 
member, ordinary and poorer people (masyarakat menengah ke bawah) could 
                                                
8 The Joint Program officers denied that this “Haji Penyu” was the same as the Haji 
Penyu I interviewed. Their “Haji Penyu” was involved in a different network from my 
interviewee. Moreover, when I interviewed him, he told me that sometimes, when he 
wanted and needed sea turtle eggs, he would contact someone he knew to get eggs 
from those military guards.  
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not afford to buy sea turtle eggs. Only the more affluent people could afford it: 
usually entrepreneurs or government officials. Moreover, government officials 
expected that they would get a share of the sea turtle eggs from the auction 
winner as a ‘gift’. According to the Joint Program, however, based on 
Government Regulation No. 7/1999 on plant and animal preservation, it is 
forbidden to use any part of the body of the sea turtle, including the eggs.  
 The district government argued that, based on their statistics, there were 
still many sea turtles that were laying their eggs on the shores of the small 
islands in the Berau Delta. Looking at this fact, district government believed 
that they could very well manage, in the sense of control, the number of sea 
turtle eggs for the sake of district revenues. These Joint Program members 
evidently had a different interpretation of conservation in the sense of 
managing sea turtles for the sake of their future existence. The members in the 
Joint Program feared that, if the district continued to manage the sea turtles 
their way, there would be a downward trend in the number of sea turtles 
nesting in the Berau waters over the next ten to fifteen years. The 
environmental NGOs felt that the district government did not support the 
implementation of their conservation ideas, even though when they first 
introduced them, they received full support from the district officers in the 
Steering Committee.  
 The Joint Program was especially frustrated that the district government 
did not want to share the budget for the necessary monitoring activities. Before 
the district decree on full protection was issued in 2006 (Table 3.1) the district 
government did indeed reserve some budget for these activities. The JP officer 
who was in charge of sea turtle conservation management argued that this was 
because of the interest of local parliament (DPRD). He also suspected that the 
district government of Berau would not contradict the interest of Haji Penyu 
and his family. 
 One of the Joint Program project leaders also admitted that there was a 
conflict of interests caused by the different sources of livelihood between the 
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Joint Program officers (mainly from TNC and WWF-Indonesia) and the local 
people, arguing that as a conservation agent and outsider whose work was with 
the project, his/her livelihood would not be affected by the implementation of 
habitat conservation, meaning the establishment of no-go zones and prohibition 
of marine resources exploitation. Joint Program members’ salaries do not 
depend on whether the conservation program is working or not. But for local 
people whose livelihood depends on extractive activities in the marine 
conservation area, it would be a different story. The Joint Program understands 
that when local people see that turtle eggs have a high economic value, they 
become a threat for the sustainability of the species.  
When the egg trade was declared illegal in the district (Table 3.1) DPK 
lost control over the conservation of the sea turtles. The only way known by the 
Marine and Fisheries Agency in ‘doing conservation’ was by hatching the eggs 
that they received from the pachter. So, after 2006 because of the status of sea 
turtle egg trade, if they bought eggs, it meant that they would support illegality 
according to national and international laws and regulations. Their dilemma 
was also aggravated by the demise of the legal government-pachter contractual 
relationship. Hence, DPK was not inclined to continue doing anything to 
conserve the sea turtle. Similarly, the Regional Planning Board (BAPPEDA) 
and the Tourism Agency argued that before 2006 the district was actually more 
effective in turtle conservation.  
Despite the full protection of the sea turtle, government officers of DPK, 
Regional Planning, Tourism, the pachter, and even BKSDA still believed that 
sea turtle eggs encountered at the market in Samarinda originated from Berau. 
They insisted that those eggs originated from Berau by looking at the physical 
appearance of the eggs. Because the eggs sold from the Berau coastal area were 
mainly the eggs of the green turtle. Their eggs are bigger than those of other 
species. Still, egg sellers in Samarinda insisted that those eggs came from 
Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) or sometimes from a sea turtle hatchery in 
Pontianak (West Kalimatan).  
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In the previous sections I have shown that each of the actors involved in marine 
conservation development defines the marine conservation area and activities 
related to it differently, based on different ontologies of knowledge, values, and 
discourses. 
 Related to the management of the coastal area, including the 
management of sea turtle eggs by Haji Penyu, DPK Berau is the agency 
assigned to carry out some of the regional authority in the field of marine and 
fisheries affairs. According to the government’s strategic plan most of the tasks 
are based on the elaboration of the Midterm Development Plan for the Fisheries 
and Marine Sector (DPK Berau 2006). One of their duties is the conservation 
of sea turtles, primarily the green turtle (Chelonia mydas) and hawksbill sea 
turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata), and their habitats. To carry out this task, the 
agency received a budget from the district. But after the implementation in 
2006 of the full protection decree in the district, DPK Berau did not receive any 
budget from the district any more to implement sea turtle conservation. 
Implicitly, the district government blamed the marine conservation initiated by 
the NGOs for the termination of sea turtle conservation by the district. Several 
people, both from JP and district government, were explicit about the fact that, 
despite the full protection decree of 2006, in reality sea turtle eggs were still 
being collected and sold at the regional market without proper control. 
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Table 3.4 The actors and their interests 
 
Actor Interests Regulations 
International environmental 
organizations (represented by JP) 
Species and habitat 
Conservation following 
international concerns 
International, regional 
and national 
agreements 
Central 
Government 
Ministry of Forestry Conservation for tourism Laws, ministerial 
decrees 
Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries 
Conservations for tourism and 
fisheries  
Laws, ministerial 
decrees 
District government Coastal governance for district 
economic income (PAD) 
District head decree 
and regulations 
Steering Committee  Conservation following district 
authority  
District head decree 
and regulations 
Haji Penyu Private economic benefit District regulations 
 
Source: This research 
 
In 2001 decentralization was implemented throughout Indonesia (Laws No. 
22/1999 and No. 25/1999). Based on Law No. 22/1999, the regional head was 
elected by the local parliament members9. But Law No. 32/2004 stipulates that 
from 2004 onward the district head is elected directly by the district’s 
inhabitants (Disprose 2008). It has been amply shown that decentralization 
gives more power to the local elites (Patlis 2008; Hidayat 2005; Resosudarmo 
2004; Aspinal and Fealy 2003; Hidayat 2000). The power of the district’s 
political elite is strengthened by their position in the legislative and executive 
bodies and also in some of the sector agencies. In the case of the management 
of sea turtle eggs and the development of marine conservation in Berau, we 
have seen that members of the political elite, who gain considerable benefit 
from trading sea turtle eggs, used their power to indirectly put pressure on the 
members of the Steering Committee. This resulted in a difficult position for 
DPK Berau. On the one hand, DPK Berau acknowledged that the formation of 
the Berau MCA is part of the national marine conservation program. On the 
other hand, it was also caught in the web of local politics. As a result of this 
                                                
9 The local parliament members were appointed by their parties (Rasyid 2003). 
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ambiguity, the monitoring and surveillance program designed by the 
international environmental NGOs and the members of Steering Committee 
(Chapter 2) that should have been implemented by DPK, was not effective.  
The attempt to change the policies related to the MCA and the 
conservation of sea turtles in favour of local political-economic and historical 
interests was triggered by the fact that the local political elite belonged to the 
network of Haji Penyu and his family, who had a clear interest in keeping the 
sea turtle management concession. This affected the development of the Berau 
MCA and other efforts regarding sea turtle conservation in the Berau area 
(Satria 2008). Because of this political barrier, the legal status of the MCA and 
the regulations on sea turtle conservation were approved only halfheartedly by 
the People’s Representative Council (DPRD). This means that DPRD in 
principal approved on the MCA and turtle conservation politically, but they did 
not act upon it. Every time a public workshop or seminar about coastal issues 
was held in district, the management of sea turtle eggs created friction.  
 Haji Penyu’s family network controlled the discourse on conservation in 
the district government to the effect that its participation in the Joint Program 
restricted the JP discourse on the MCA to a discourse only on sea turtle 
conservation. In the end, by 2008 the district government withdrew its support 
from the implementation of a marine conservation area in Berau.  
Sea turtle eggs keep being encountered on the regional market. After the 
implementation of the conservation regulation on the green turtle in 2006, the 
eggs trade had gone underground beyond the control of both the global 
environmental NGOs and the district government. This is an unexpected 
outcome of the narrow, specialist application of the marine biological and 
ecological valuation of the sea turtle. The regulation that the international 
environmental NGOs co-produced with the district government to promote and 
to implement conservation has proven to be ineffective in banning the sea turtle 
eggs trade. Institutionally JP did not have the juridical tool, while the 
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government who did have the tool did not make use of it to take any action to 
enforce the banning of sea turtle eggs trade. 
Haji Penyu used the knowledge on conservation he received from his 
interaction with outsiders, particularly JP to legitimize his historically and 
culturally embedded knowledge on sea turtle eggs management. He offered a 
solution how to control the flow of the sea turtle eggs because he knew how to 
prove whether the eggs were marketed from Berau or coming from elsewhere, 
but his idea was not acceptable to the district government.  
 It is in the nature of the knowledge encounter that each actor struggles in 
over-powering others to accept certain knowledge. In the Berau case neither the 
global environmental NGOs (JP) nor the district government, nor the most 
influential private entrepreneur appeared to be interested in coming to the 
other’s side in the project of establishing and managing the MCA including sea 
turtles. The friction between global and local interests emerged from different 
ontologies of knowledge generating contested and conflicting values in 
interpreting and implementing marine conservation and sea turtle management. 
Bolstered by decentralization the political elite in the district used their newly 
obtained power to support local political-economic interests, exemplified by 
their attempt to retain the practice of auctioning the right to exploit sea turtles 
and market the eggs for the sake of the district revenues. 
 
   
Chapter Four 
Friction between Local and Global Regulatory 
Networks over Shrimp Aquaculture 
This chapter is based on the publication of: Kusumawati, R., S.R. Bush and 
L.E. Visser 2012. Can Patron be bypassed? Frictions between Local and Global 
Regulatory Networks over Shrimp aquaculture in East Kalimantan. Society and 
Natural Resources 26 (8): 898–911   
84 Chapter Four 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note on the cover page picture: 
 
This picture shows one of the big ponggawa, or a shrimp businessman, in 
Tarakan. I took this picture when accompanying him on a field trip to check on 
the condition and production of his shrimp ponds.  
Frictions between Global and Local Regulatory  
Networks over Shrimp Aquaculture 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
International concern over the environmental impact of shrimp aquaculture in 
tropical countries has created a new ‘battlefield of quality’ (Marsden 2004) in 
which shrimp farmers are increasingly forced to demonstrate their capacity to 
sustainably manage their ponds (Vandergeest 2007). But as shown by Béné 
(2005) and Konefal and Hatanaka (2011) standards are not passively created, 
adopted or implemented. Instead, the global norms, knowledge and policy 
goals producing these standards are translated, and as such transformed, into 
local knowledge and practices according to local stakeholder goals and 
strategies. Such negotiated processes create what Tsing (2005) has labelled 
‘friction’; zones of awkward engagement in local-global interconnections that 
define agency, interaction and practice.   
Faced with increasing pressure from international civil society, 
international consumers and retailers for quality assurance, the Indonesian 
government and industry have begun employing market-based standards as a 
means of demonstrating improved production safety and quality – including 
sustainable production (Hatanaka 2010). Understanding how state, civil 
society, and market actors engage through what Vandergeest (2007) labels 
environmental regulatory networks, helps to identify the kinds of frictions that 
emerge from the interaction between often contrasting global and local, as well 
as state, market and community norms, logics and practices. Instead of 
focusing on the direct responses of producers to these networks, as already 
covered in literature, I here focus on the composition and function of different 
regulatory networks over shrimp production and, more specifically, on the 
frictions that emerge from a lack of interaction between externally introduced 
regulatory networks and local patron or ponggawa-controlled artisanal trade 
networks. 
The analysis centres on the interplay between three environmental 
regulatory networks in Tarakan, East Kalimantan that together influence the 
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extent to which external-led forms of governance influence producers. First, a 
regulatory network based on good aquaculture practice (GAP) standards led by 
the central government. Second, a WWF-private sector partnership linked to 
the WWF Shrimp Aquaculture Dialogues and Seafood Savers network in 
Indonesia. And third, the regulatory influence of social relations in artisanal 
shrimp trade networks. In this chapter, artisanal trade networks are made up of 
interactions based on patron-client relationships that regulate practices of actors 
involved in shrimp production and trade (Ruddle 2011). The term artisanal 
specifically defines social relations that are ‘handcrafted’ according to the local 
cultural and social dynamics in which these actors are located. In this culturally 
embedded network ponggawa exercise patronage as either pond owners or as 
middlemen-traders. Linking Tsing’s notion of friction to a network analysis of 
value chains and commodity flows (Bolwig et al. 2010; Gibbon 2008), I 
examine how state and NGO-market led networks have systematically ignored 
ponggawa and the networks they control, as well as the implications this has 
for the implementation of state and market led production standards. 
 In the following sections I review the literature on friction, the role of 
production standards, and their impact on producers in regions such as 
Southeast Asia. The third section describes the shrimp trade networks in the 
northern part of East Kalimantan before analysing the frictions evident between 
the three different regulatory networks. Finally, I discuss the implications of 
the resulting frictions before drawing the main conclusions. 
 
 
4.2 Understanding regulatory networks 
Standards and certification are increasingly important tools for translating retail 
and consumer concerns over food quality, as well as mechanisms for quality 
assurance in global markets. Whereas quality was once limited to tangible 
characteristics of a product, it is now extended to include methods of 
production and their impact on environmental quality (Bingen and Busch 
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2007). Standards and their verification through certification have transformed 
the global agrifood system by defining a moral economy that regulates “people 
and things that do not conform to the accepted definitions of good and bad” 
(Busch 2000: 274). This moral dimension of standards and certification means 
that initiatives that were once seen as mechanisms to promote safe foods are 
now used to govern social and environmental food qualities (Oosterveer 2007; 
Raynolds et al. 2007). The concern is that in doing so they have also become 
mechanisms of marginalization for developing world producers. Hatanaka 
(2010) demonstrates multiple dimensions to this concern based on her work in 
Indonesia: knowledge and practices of farmers are often ignored; there is an 
unequal division of labour and responsibility leading to producer distrust of 
northern consumers; and third party relations that mediate consumers and 
producers often confound any mutual understanding or moral obligation.  
 How regulation through standards and certification is transferred into 
production practices therefore begs further consideration of the moral or ethical 
dimensions of environmental governance and, in particular, the link to 
development and equity (Bush et al. 2012; Bingen and Busch 2007).  As Li  
(2007) points out, technocratic governance mechanisms like standards and 
certification often aspire to educate desires and configure habits, aspirations 
and beliefs, but in practice lead to a superficial regulation of the ‘conduct of 
conduct’. Seen as such, standards force actors to change their behaviour 
without any understanding or agreement on why change might be necessary. 
The implementation of standards and the process of certification are therefore 
likely to continue to face the problems outlined by Hatanaka (2010) if there is 
not a more meaningful understanding of the conditions which determine how 
they are translated into local practice. 
 Tsing (2005) argues that instead of seeing local communities as 
powerless minorities who have simply accommodated themselves to global 
forces such as production standards, it is more productive to see these forces as 
dialectical local-global interactions. As these interactions proceed they produce 
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friction within global regulatory networks. Instead of global actors exerting 
absolute power, they engage in awkward, unequal, and unstable 
interconnections with local networks and their constituent actors. Using this 
lens enables me to move beyond seeing producers as subjects of regulation and 
instead examine how power is reframed by different regulatory networks which 
give new meaning to on-going interaction in, for example, global shrimp 
markets.  
The interaction between state, NGO-market led and artisanal trade 
regulatory networks becomes an object of research that opens up the conditions 
through which standards are transferred to the local from ‘above’. Key sites of 
regulation that shape the practice of production and flows of inputs and outputs 
in regulatory networks can be identified using a networked commodity chain 
approach (Leslie and Reimer 1999). The first two networks have received 
considerable academic attention. Research on decentralization of the 
Indonesian government over the last decade, instigated as part of a wider 
reform to public management (Turner 2006; Haris (ed.) 2005) has shown the 
challenges of incorporating multiple levels of government into a new 
framework for regulating environmental and food safety aspects of production 
and processing. Research on networks of public and private actors promoting 
standards and third party certification have explored one of the main frontiers 
of global environmental governance (Ponte 2008; Bingen and Busch 2007; 
Oosterveer 2007) of which the WWF-private sector partnership in East 
Kalimantan is an example. Together these bodies of work have elaborated on 
how state and market networks have facilitated the translation of production 
standards as well as the resistance of producers to change their practices (Anh 
et al. 2011; Belton et al. 2011; Hatanaka 2010; Konefal and Hatanaka 2011; 
Ponte 2008; Vandergeest 2007). However, less attention has been given to the 
interaction of state and NGO-led regulatory networks with what I identify as a 
third regulatory network: the artisanal trade network characterized by patron-
client relationships.  
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By focusing on the role of pond owners-traders or ponggawa in this 
third network and their interaction with state and WWF-led networks, I open 
up what Bush and Oosterveer (2007) refer to as the ‘black box’ of value chain 
regulation. I expand on the cultural position of ponggawa in patron-client 
relationships (Levang 2002; Acciaioli 2000) as well as their role in facilitating 
regulation of shrimp production. Their central position in the shrimp value 
chain, controlling not only vertical flows of commodity and finances, but also 
many of the conditions under which production and trade practices are decided, 
places them as centrally important actors. Returning to Tsing’s notion of 
friction, I focus on how ponggawa interact with actors in the other two 
regulatory networks to draw attention to how their interconnectivity influences 
implementation of production standards. 
 
 
4.3 Site selection and methodological approach 
 
Fieldwork was carried out from 2009 to 2011 in Tarakan, the main regional 
processing and export district for farmed shrimp in the northern part of East 
Kalimantan. Tarakan has developed as a major centre for processing companies 
thanks to its existing infrastructure for international trade (Ilman et al. 2009) 
and because of the value of the surrounding demersal fishery, which has 
attracted Japanese investors. Farmed shrimp are primarily produced in islets 
scattered along the estuary of Sesayap River that extends beyond Tarakan to 
include Bulungan, Tanah Tidung and Nunukan districts.  It is precisely the 
location of shrimp ponds in these remote islets, where good quality of coastal 
waters invites entrepreneurs to open large ponds, which has given the shrimp 
from northern East Kalimantan a strong reputation for high quality among 
Japanese importers.  
  The emergence of production standards and third party certification 
greatly extends existing trans-boundary influences on Tarakan to include 
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national and international sites and actors (Visser and Adhuri 2010). To bridge 
this local-global divide a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) was adopted 
to compliment Tsing’s (2005) ethnography of global connection. Primary data 
was collected through observation, semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
with actors working in production and trade, as well as in regulation, policy 
and training. This included eight pond owners, three middlemen, three 
government functionaries of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MAF) office in 
Tarakan, three of same department in East Kalimantan province and four at the 
national level. In addition, four employees of international NGOs were 
interviewed. Observations were made during several visits to shrimp ponds, 
hatcheries, nurseries, and processing companies. Also, meetings and seminars 
on sustainable shrimp production were attended in both Indonesia and Europe. 
This data was complemented with information from secondary sources 
including governmental documents, NGO reports and newspaper articles.  
 
 
4.4 The shrimp chain in the northern part of East Kalimantan 
 
The shrimp chain extending from the Sesayap estuary to international markets 
through Tarakan is comprised of a range of production and trade relations 
between producers, ponggawa, and other actors within governmental, WWF, 
and artisanal regulatory networks (Figure 4.1). The chain can be divided into 
pre-production, production and post-production; all of which are targets for 
regulation. 
The main actors in the pre-production phase include brood stock 
collectors and hatcheries. Currently 70% of shrimp seed is imported from other 
areas in Indonesia such as Surabaya, Balikpapan, Ujung Pandang and Lampung 
(MAF 2009). The district government of Tarakan generates tax from this trade, 
which constitutes an important source of public revenue. The remaining 30% of 
shrimp seed is provided by 17 hatcheries in Tarakan (ibid.) who buy brood 
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stock directly from coastal mini-trawlers who catch them as by-catch in the 
waters around Tarakan.  
 
Figure 4.1 Intersecting regulatory networks in Tarakan 
 
Source: This research 
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The size of shrimp ponds (tambak) in the Sesayap estuary is 5 - 25 
hectares/pond (Illman et al. 2009: 12). The inaccessibility and isolation of the 
ponds in surrounding districts means that pond owners live predominantly in 
Tarakan. Many of these absentee shrimp farmers hire a care-taker from their 
family or patronage network to whom they delegate the surveillance and day-
to-day management of their ponds.  Pond owners thus act as a patron1 
(ponggawa) to these clients2 (sawi) through a patronage network of mutual 
dependencies that originated from Buginese and Makassarese practices in 
South Sulawesi (Acciaioli 2000; Pelras 2000). In Sulawesi the title of 
ponggawa was traditionally reserved for noblemen, but in East Kalimantan the 
title is now given to individuals who have acquired considerable economic 
power (and often also political power, like in Chapter 2) as owners of shrimp 
ponds or as middlemen-traders. 
As described by Pelras (2000) clients in shrimp farming are regarded as 
partners more than wage labourers. There are three benefit sharing models 
practiced in Tarakan that reflect this partnership arrangement. The first is bagi 
hasil or sharecropping of between 10 to 50 per cent of net yield harvested. The 
share of the client-caretakers is calculated as net profit after harvest minus the 
cost of shrimp seed, pesticides and fertilizers, as well as accommodation. The 
percentage shared is based on an unwritten agreement between pond owners 
and their partners. The second model is based on a flat monthly salary, where 
the cost of accommodation is covered by the pond owners. This model is 
usually applied to clients-workers in less productive ponds. The third model 
combines the previous two, with the exception that caretakers receive a 
monthly salary in addition to their share. In all three cases clients are able to 
generate further income from harvesting other aquatic products from the ponds, 
including white shrimp and mud crabs – an income that often exceeds what 
they receive under their shrimp farming partnership arrangements.  
                                                
1 Local terms include: bapak – literally father; and bos. 
2 Local terms include: anak-anak – literally children; and orang yang kerja – workers. 
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 The relationship between ponggawa and processing companies exhibits 
characteristics of clientelism. The value of the harvest is based on farm gate 
prices of shrimp offered by the companies that in turn is based on export prices, 
and there appears to be little variation between traders and processing 
companies. However, in order to attract and convince ponggawa, both as pond 
owners and middlemen-traders to sell their product to them, the companies 
have set up a commission system that provides a price incentive to ponggawa 
above local market prices. The commissions vary between companies and are 
not indicated on the receipt; characterizing what one pond owner called his 
‘secret with the company’. The profit of ponggawa is therefore increased 
through a prearranged margin that does not form a part of the share of small 
pond owners or dependents. 
Despite the seemingly exploitative economic conduct of ponggawa as 
patrons, they also provide a source of risk mitigation for a wide group of actors 
involved in shrimp production. To fully understand the mutual dependencies of 
actors in this patronage network it is necessary to recognise that ponggawa 
have two distinct social-economic positions: as pond-owners and as 
middleman-traders. In both roles the ponggawa reduce the risk associated with 
shrimp production as well as providing capital to “… buy a boat, an engine, 
fishing gear, to develop a tambak or to advance the operating costs for a 
tambak” (Levang 2002: 21). The increased risk for dependent pond owners and 
caretakers then is minimised through their access to financial capital provided 
by their bosses or ponggawa. 
In this way, the entire value chain in the region is determined by 
multiple interdependencies of ponggawa, making them a key actor of the 
artisanal regulatory network. They represent a vital, but underestimated and 
often poorly understood element in the shrimp value chain, which determines 
the conditions under which formal state and environmental NGO regulatory 
networks can influence production practices. 
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4.5 Environmental regulatory networks in northern East Kalimantan 
 
I now turn to an analysis of practices of state and WWF-led environment 
regulatory networks and their relationship with artisanal trade practices within 
the value chain. In this section I also outline the interaction between these 
networks and analyse the multiple intersecting, converging and conflicting 
motives of their constituent actors.  
 
4.5.1 Government regulation of fish chain 
 
The Indonesian government has been active in regulating food safety and 
environmental quality through the development of voluntary standards and 
legislation (Figure 1) paying considerable attention to regulating the practices 
of processing companies. Only recently has the central government tried to 
regulate producers through the introduction of farm-level good aquaculture 
practice standards (GAP). But while the government has been effective as a 
producer of regulations, it has been less effective in their enforcement. 
 In an attempt to regulate producers, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries (MMAF) developed GAP standards alongside a National Residue 
Control Plan (NRCP) based on European Union import requirements. Even 
though these two programs are already operational they have not yet been 
extended to eastern Indonesia, including Tarakan. MMAF officers from Jakarta 
stated that they lack qualified laboratory tools and operators, and that technical 
inputs required to run this system are very expensive. They added that 
regulation of processors had proven to be more effective than monitoring 
producers because of private sector support to a national HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point) plan and the fact that a national health 
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certificate is a mandatory requirement for these companies to export to 
lucrative markets such as the USA and the EU3.  
 In January 2010, the central government introduced the national GAP 
standards to Tarakan in an attempt to prevent the spread of white spot disease 
and the environmental impact of organic waste flows from ponds. The result of 
an initial audit was that, despite high hopes for more sustainable shrimp 
production in Tarakan, most of the farms earmarked for certification required 
considerable technical and managerial improvement. Three main issues for 
compliance were identified: the shape and size of ponds, the area of mangrove 
around the pond, and poor sanitation practices. The government subsequently 
requested farmers to reshape and resize their ponds or tambak to conform to the 
standards. However, most pond owners appear to be reluctant to accept these 
regulations because of the cost of transforming their large extensive ponds into 
semi-intensive smaller units of only 2 ha/pond. But perhaps more importantly, 
they do not accept the standards because they fundamentally disagree with the 
top-down intervention methods that prescribe a system which does not comply 
with production and trade practices in Tarakan4. 
Even though the central government recognizes the existence of the 
patron-client system, they have excluded ponggawa from attempts to set 
standards and regulate production and trade. Instead, the central government 
sees them as ‘problematic’ actors who confound their attempts to create 
transparent and traceable commodity flows. The strategy is therefore to bypass 
them. However, this ignores the central role of these powerful ponggawa in the 
process of commodity transfer between export companies and dependent pond 
owners and pond caretakers. 
                                                
3 HACCP is a quality assurance system for fisheries products issued by the FAO 
Codex Alemanterius Commission. In Indonesia, this system has been adopted into the 
Program Manajemen Mutu Terpadu (Integrated Quality Management Program) 
(Santoso 2010). 
4 Interview with the leader of an informal tambak organisation in Tarakan, 2010. 
Translation of standards into local practices will be expanded upon in chapter five. 
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4.5.2 WWF regulatory network 
 
In April 2008, WWF Indonesia, Mustika Minanusa Aurora (MMA, one of the 
biggest cold storages in Tarakan) and the Environment and Natural Resources 
Agency of Tarakan signed an MoU on mangrove rehabilitation. MMA, assisted 
by WWF, set a goal to plant 150 ha of mangrove over a period of five years. 
WWF in turn has used the arrangement to introduce their better management 
practices (BMPs) to farmers who sell to MMA. The BMPs are designed to 
reduce the environmental impacts of shrimp farming, including the use of 
chemicals and artificial feed, cutting mangroves, and the over-exploitation of 
brood stock. WWF advertises their BMPs as having been developed through a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue, involving shrimp farmers, government, cold 
storage, shrimp collectors, hatcheries, university, and subsequent farm trials. 
 WWF’s BMPs model is based on international principles for sustainable 
shrimp farming published by NACA in 2006, which were in turn translated into 
a BMP manual for feed and non-aerated shrimp aquaculture in Aceh before 
being brought to Tarakan. The first related activity was the development of 
BMPs pilot sites in partnership with MMA and two pond owners. In August 
2009, WWF organised a first round of public consultation to introduce the 
BMPs in five districts. In January 2010, a second round of public consultation 
with the Marine and Fisheries agencies of five districts, farmers, and a local 
shrimp farmer’s organization were held to present the standards and gather 
feedback. Additional inputs were collected by WWF through subsequent 
interviews until December 2010. The result would be a draft set of non-fed and 
non-aerated BMPs for northern East Kalimantan.  
 The five MAF offices supported the WWF-led BMPs because the 
district governments did not have any regulations to regulate shrimp farming 
practices. Before the arrival of WWF, the only choice for district governments 
to improve the quality of shrimp farming practices in order to meet 
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international demands on food quality and safety was through the voluntary 
application of national standards. But as stated by the Head of MAF-Tarakan, 
the BMPs were regarded as a better offer because they directly addressed the 
“environmental problems that have been caused by the mismanagement of 
shrimp ponds” (observation during public consultation over draft BMPs 
Tarakan, Januari, 2010). 
However, farmers held a different opinion. Most of those interviewed 
questioned the applicability of standards that they believed would become the 
basis for external regulation in Tarakan. As one farmer stated:  
 
“If you show these standards to farmers, they will laugh at 
them. We never do this kind of thing. If you want us to 
practice these standards, you have to show us how to do it, 
not just tell us what we should do and what we should not do. 
If you can show us that your way is better in increasing the 
production, or at least to make the production stable, I am 
sure that farmers here will follow you voluntarily” (Shrimp 
farmer, Tarakan, January 2010). 
 
Farmers direct their attention primarily to increasing shrimp production. But, at 
the same time, they clearly acknowledge that environmental degradation is one 
of the causes of declining pond productivity. They are not aware of what leads 
to poor productivity, or how to solve the problem. Since the WWF BMPs are 
not (yet) subject to third party certification, and as a result not recognised in 
international markets, they do not provide any incentive for pond owners to 
comply. Therefore, the main incentive to participate in the BMP program is the 
hope of improving the environmental health of the shrimp pond and thuse 
resurrecting productivity.  
Even though WWF acknowledges the importance of ponggawa as pond 
owners – by including them in the meetings, interviewing them and 
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collaborating with them in farm pilot project – they have not included them or 
the influence the hold over production practices in the development of the BMP 
standards. Instead these are based on international principles which emphasize 
reducing the negative impacts of shrimp farming on the environment through 
the improvement of technical farm level practices. Indeed, by stressing on farm 
practices they fail to see shrimp farming and trade as a one coherent production 
system.  
 
4.5.3 Artisanal trade regulatory networks  
 
Shrimp trade relations in East Kalimantan constitute a regulatory network 
because of the role of ponggawa in shaping the production choices that farmers 
make. Fig. 1 illustrates the central position of ponggawa in controlling 
production and trade, both as pond owners and as middlemen-traders.  
As the owners of a large number of ponds ponggawa are able to control 
an extensive area of production through the daily supervision of their 
caretakers. This network is strategic for both ponggawa and their dependents. 
Most of their clients do not have adequate capital to autonomously produce 
shrimp and therefore rely on ponggawa to assist with financial and material 
capitals, which make ponggawa major decision makers related to where to buy 
shrimp seed, pond management, and where to sell the shrimp.  Under a 
sharecropping or monthly salary arrangement, caretakers also make use of this 
patronage relationship when they are in need of any emergency funding, which 
in turn underlies the loyalty of the caretakers to ponggawa.  
As middlemen-traders, ponggawa also play an important role in 
facilitating the flow of shrimp, setting price based on a mix of quasi-credit 
relations, or debt-tied pricing mechanisms, rather than market prices (Gunawan 
2012; Ruddle 2011; Bush 2004; Platteau and Abraham 1987).  In addition, they 
may control a number of smaller pond-owners from whom they purchase 
shrimp. As in the case of ponggawa as pond owners, their role as middlemen-
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traders also means they have an obligation to provide shrimp seed and other 
inputs for aquaculture. In return the shrimp farmers are obliged to sell their 
shrimp to ponggawa. In some cases, ponggawa-pond owners have less shrimp 
production and may sell their shrimp to other ponggawa middlemen-traders, 
which becomes an alternative commodity transfer in artisanal trade networks 
(Gunawan 2012).  
The relationships that ponggawa establish with their clients allow for 
efficient trade which is based not only on an economic logic, but also on strong 
cohesion and loyalty between different levels of their network (Levang 2002). 
To maintain this loyalty and at the same time also to secure their production 
and trade relations, ponggawa offer additional benefits such as buying a house 
for their most reliable and respected caretakers, sending their children to 
school, providing access to medical treatment, covering expenses for special 
occasions, and even providing a pension fund (Timmer 2011). 
Given that ponggawa as pond owners and middleman-traders have 
enough capital to work independently of processing companies they are free to 
sell their shrimp to whom they wish. In order to ensure a reliable supply of 
shrimp, the processing companies create liaisons with selected ponggawa who 
become valuable associates who can take on a distributive role and absorb a 
large degree of the financial risk. This gives those ponggawa an especially 
important position given the large distances across which shrimp are traded in 
the Tarakan region. If processing companies were to deal directly with farmers 
they would have to provide credit for stocking. Based on experience, 
companies see this as too risky – often farmers do not pay the money back and 
there is little recourse to collect the debt owed. This also emphasizes the purely 
business interest of the companies, with no investment in social leverage as a 
guarantee to financial security. In comparison, ponggawa are embedded in the 
familial and social relationships of the clients who provide substantial security 
to their business activities. As companies cannot - and apparently do not - want 
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to fulfil this role, ponggawa play an extremely important enabling role in the 
shrimp value chain. 
 In addition to being a key player in financing shrimp farmers and acting 
as middlemen, ponggawa also play an important role in controlling and 
translating flows of knowledge in the industry. This was demonstrated during a 
public consultation over draft BMPs facilitated by WWF in January 2010. They 
recommended that farmers in Tarakan organize a farmer group to promote 
successful shrimp farming in response to the success of farmers ‘clusters’ in 
Aceh (FAO et al. 2006). In response to this suggestion, the head of the shrimp 
farmers organization in Tarakan argued that instead of forming externally 
constructed groups of farmers to promote compliance with standards, farmers 
groups should be based on what he referred to as ‘natural networks’ led by 
ponggawa. According to him, this would be the best way to organize farmers 
since ponggawa determine the logic, norms and organizational structure of 
shrimp aquaculture production and trade in Tarakan. By-passing this network 
and their translation of government and WWF-BMPs regulations would 
therefore undermine any attempt to promote more a coherent set of locally 
embedded best practices for sustainable shrimp aquaculture production and a 
more transparent traceability system in northeast Kalimantan. 
 Central government and WWF see actors of the artisanal network 
primarily as a target rather than as a partner in the development, monitoring 
and enforcement of their standards. Interestingly, processing companies already 
use ponggawa for informal quality control by translating standards of 
government and WWF into a simpler dual classification of ‘export quality’ and 
‘non-export quality’ shrimp. To ponggawa, these terms and conditions are 
more effective to control shrimp production. Even if ponggawa may be 
considered as exploitative and rent seeking (Platteau and Abraham 1987) their 
central role in shrimp production and trade simply cannot be ignored. Instead, 
any attempt to regulate local production and trade practices should seek to 
engage these central actors. 
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4.6 Emergent frictions between regulatory networks 
 
Despite recognizing their position in both production and trade in Tarakan, 
both the government and WWF have chosen not to engage with ponggawa for 
different reasons. The government’s position is that they compromise 
traceability in the value chain and should be by-passed, while WWF’s focus on 
farm level BMPs instead of the surrounding influences over production, has led 
to a form of ‘technocratic blindness’ that removes ponggawa from view. The 
overall result is that ponggawa have been excluded in discussions around 
production standards and, as such, from any forum in which their role might be 
better understood. By ignoring their important position, the external-led 
regulatory networks assume they are able to avoid any potential friction. 
Whereas this research clearly shows that frictions emerge precisely because of 
misrecognition of the role of ponggawa in the artisanal trade network, and 
therefore in the real-life encounters between three regulatory networks. Should 
they then not be recognised and become more closely involved in both state 
and NGO-market led regulatory networks? Given their role in controlling flows 
of information and setting incentives for change, their inclusion would appear 
to be an important step forward. 
 As reflected in the work of Li (2007), the exclusion of actors from 
external standard setting processes often means that ‘target actors’ remain 
unaware of why their conduct is being regulated. This condition is only 
compounded when wider political-economic relations are also excluded from 
diagnosis and prescription by external experts. Not only is this likely to 
produce ineffective interventions, but it also threatens to contribute to the 
marginalisation of local actors and environments. Ignoring the central role of 
ponggawa and excluding them from the formulation of standards demonstrates 
that a hard boundary still exists between global-national networks and local 
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networks. At first sight this boundary might imply non-engagement and 
therefore the absence of friction. However, given that both the government and 
WWF recognize their attitude to avoid ponggawa also constitutes a form of 
‘awkward engagement’ and can by itself be considered a form of friction. 
Whereas those actors involved in artisanal trade networks recognize ponggawa 
as having a meaningful role in the transfer of commodity and knowledge, the 
central government and WWF see ponggawa as a hindrance to standard 
development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement. In this sense, we 
argue that in addition to Vandergeest’s (2007) observation that certification and 
standards tend to exclude farmers’ practices and knowledge, this form of 
regulation also excludes the practices and knowledge of a wider set of actors 
joined through interdependent relations of production. 
Attempts to transfer external solutions to Tarakan illustrate the 
difficulties ignoring ponggawa’s role can bring. For example, the introduction 
of an organisational model from Aceh based on geographical location and 
water source has proved problematic in Tarakan because shrimp ponds in same 
location and sharing the same water source are often owned by different 
ponggawa. By failing to recognise the social structure of ownership WWF has 
ignored the political-economic conditions of their target actors and created an 
imposed set of assumptions that has led to a direct friction with existing 
regulatory relations. In doing so WWF has fed into what Konefal and Hatanaka 
(2011) and Béne (2005) refer to as the depoliticization of standard development 
by focusing on the technical and scientific basis of production rather than the 
societal conditions that allow for production decisions to be made. WWF might 
then be well informed to take the recommendation of the shrimp farmer 
association more seriously to organize farmer groups based on ponggawa 
networks rather than on externally derived plans and assumptions. But as long 
as they remain focused on the technical upgrading at the farm level it is 
unlikely they will change their strategy. 
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The goal of global certification networks is to standardize differences in 
farmer practices (Busch 2000) and to improve (albeit externally defined) 
“deficiencies that need to be rectified” (Li 2007: 7). The government’s issue 
with chemical use and WWF’s focus on mangrove degradation are relevant 
because they respond to market concerns of food safety and (environmental) 
sustainability. While the need to rectify these issues have a demonstrated 
scientific basis they are perceived by local actors as being led by external 
values, norms and logics. This research has drawn attention to the disjuncture 
between external and local actors’ knowledge, by showing that a focus on on-
farm decision making (Hatanaka 2010) does not include the necessary attention 
to the role of ponggawa in controlling flows of knowledge between producers, 
international markets and the other regulatory networks. Failure to recognize 
this role means that attempts by government and WWF to introduce new 
knowledge through the development and implementation of standards will 
continue to face resistance. As long as the dependant farmers and caretakers, 
who make primary on-farm decisions about production, trust the ponggawa’s 
knowledge more than that from external networks, changes will be slow at best. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
While ponggawa play a centrally important role in the process of commodity 
and information transfer, they are systematically ignored by national and global 
environmental regulatory networks. The exclusion of these actors holds 
implications for the development and implementation of production standards, 
and ultimately certification as a means of environmental governance. Instead of 
creating zones of awkward but creative engagement, the agency and practice 
inherent in artisanal trade networks has been excluded. The results of this study 
therefore support wider claims that the development of production standards 
through externally-led regulation in the absence of targeted group involvement 
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is unlikely to lead to meaningful and lasting change. This does not mean that 
any particular actor knows best, but rather questions whether and how 
processes of standardization should aspire to regulate diversity in production. 
Ultimately, engagement with local knowledge and practices of not only 
producers but also patrons-traders may create space for more realistic 
definitions of both problems and solutions. 
Taking into consideration actors like ponggawa beyond the farm level 
appears to be highly relevant for an effective process of standardization and 
certification. If the threat of ineffectively implementing certification is the 
further marginalization of local actors and environments then improved 
processes of implementation need to be engendered including interactions 
between global, national and local regulatory networks. Shrimp farmers sit at 
the nexus of these networks, but they are primarily embedded in interdependent 
relations with powerful pond owners and/or middlemen-traders. The central 
position of the ponggawa in the multi-scalar transfer of knowledge to farmers, 
as well as in setting the conditions that allow for changing production practices 
makes them an essential node in what constitutes a poorly understood ‘third’ 
regulatory network. The on-going success of governments and NGO-led 
initiatives for sustainable shrimp production is therefore dependent on whether 
they continue to relegate this third network to a site of resistance, or 
alternatively include ponggawa to facilitate improved local engagement. But as 
long as the government and WWF are locked in this technocratic approach to 
improving the practices of shrimp farming, there is little prospect for change. 
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Chapter Five 
Co-producing Better Management Standards  
For Shrimp Aquaculture 
This chapter is the basis of a paper co-authored with Simon Bush. The paper is 
submitted to Food Policy on February 8th, 2014. 
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Note on the cover page picture: 
The picture shows one of WWF-Indonesia pilot ponds in Tarakan. This pilot 
pond was developed in collaboration with one of the pond owners under the 
MMA’s network. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I have described how external networks do not comply 
with powerful local networks that govern the production and trade practice of 
Tarakan where I indicated that the success of the initiation of the Better 
Management Practices (BMPs) depends on how the government and WWF 
networks include the third network lead by the ponggawa. In this chapter I 
analyse the role of WWF in leading a multi-stakeholder process of BMPs 
design and implementation in the northern part of East Kalimantan.  
Better management practices (BMPs) for shrimp farming are designed 
to standardize on-farm practices and reduce the economic risk associated with 
disease and environmental degradation. Similar to third party certification 
standards, BMPs set out a range of technical indicators that producers can use 
as targets for improvement in their production (Vandergeest, 2007; Padiyar 
2012; Anh et al. 2011). However, unlike private certification standards, such as 
those of the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC), Global Aquaculture 
Alliance (GAA) or Naturland organic, BMPs are in most cases not formally 
monitored by either governments or third party auditors. Instead, governments 
and NGOs alike use them to disseminate technical practices to producers in a 
more structured and formalized fashion in order to standardize production 
inputs and practices. 
BMPs are based on the principles for sustainable shrimp farming 
developed by a consortium of international agencies (The Consortium 2006), 
and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), which 
includes sections on aquaculture (FAO 1995). However, before being put into 
practice they are also adapted to suit the local contexts in which they are 
applied – for example, to match the specific demands of different extensive and 
semi-intensive production systems (Anh et al. 2012; Padiyar 2012). For 
example, in geographically diverse countries such as Indonesia, national level 
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BMPs are adapted to the diversity of production systems found in different 
regions or provinces. In doing so, national governments and NGOs alike aim to 
translate a generic set of global concerns into local contexts with the intention 
of increasing the likelihood of adoption and subsequent performance of shrimp 
aquaculture. 
In practice, however, the process of translating BMPs into local shrimp 
farming contexts has proven problematic. Despite state and producer 
involvement in local translation, BMPs have been viewed with suspicion by 
governments and farmers as an attempt to supplant state regulation, and render 
social and political conflicts surrounding shrimp farming as technical problems 
with technical solutions (Vandergeest and Unno 2012; Ha and Bush 2010; 
Islam 2010; Li 2007). Béne (2005: 611) has argued that the perceived threat 
posed by BMPs is that advocates are able to “depoliticis[e] the problem of 
shrimp farming and refram[e] it into a neutral, bio-physical problem, where 
only technical - and not structural or political - solutions are required”. BMPs 
are also seen as being part of a wider system of non-state regulation by setting 
producers on the path towards more stringent private standards that facilitate 
access to international markets, such as ASC or GAA (Ha et al. 2012). The role 
of BMPs in addressing technical problems of shrimp aquaculture therefore 
appears to be dependent on the capacity of those facilitating their translation 
into local settings to negotiate or co-produce locally specific standards that 
reflect the knowledge and interests of global and local actors (Konefal and 
Hatanaka 2010; Long 2001). 
In this chapter I question to what extent are BMPs able to capture and 
mitigate both technical and social challenges of production, and the extent to 
which BMPs (de)politicize social and environmental issues around shrimp 
aquaculture by mitigating divisions and conflicts between local actors? This 
question is addressed by analysing the transfer of knowledge embodied in 
global principles to local actors and environments, the composition and content 
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of multi-stakeholder meetings, and the degree to which the final BMPs are 
incorporated the practices of local producers. 
I examine the process of translation in three parts. First, the translation 
by WWF of the international principal of the consortium into BMPs in Aceh, in 
partnership with other NGOs operating there after the 2004 tsunami (ADB et 
al. 2007). Second, how WWF introduced the Aceh BMPs to two districts of 
East Kalimantan - Tarakan and Bulungan - by developing a series of multi-
stakeholder meetings and subsequently a farm-level pilot programme with a 
group of pond owners supplying to Mustika Minanusa Aurora (MMA) which is 
one of the largest processing companies in the region. Finally, I analyse the 
negotiations that occurred over the BMP standards, and the socio-technical 
outcomes and wider consequences of WWF’s engagement with shrimp 
aquaculture in northeast Kalimantan. 
 
 
5.2 Co-producing standards 
 
Like private standards, BMPs involve a variety of actors in the definition, 
implementation and regulation of primary production processes. BMPs draw 
together NGOs, industry and intergovernmental organizations in what 
Vandergeest (2007) refers to as environmental regulatory networks. The active 
formation of these networks has recently been taken up in studies of multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) (Ponte in press; Cheyns 2011) that focus on 
questions of exclusion and the subjective nature of defining standards as 
consensus-based regulations.  
Research on aquaculture standards have focused on a range of questions 
related to the extent of expert and industry capture during their definition, the 
poor representation of producers from developing countries (Belton et al. 2010; 
Anh et al. 2011), and the effects of transferring globally derived knowledge 
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into national and local settings (Béne 2005; Konefal and Hatanaka 2011). A 
common theme running through these studies is how NGO-state-industry 
networks translate global norms, knowledge and policy goals into local 
knowledge and practices, with questions focusing on the inclusion/exclusion of 
actors, consensus seeking in local settings, and the extent to which these 
networks lead to changes in production practices. 
Translation can be understood as a process of knowledge co-production, 
emphasizing the creative friction that emerges between the interaction of 
different knowledge, each with their own grounds for belief, procedures for 
validation (Tsing 2005; Jasanoff 2004; Long 2001). In the process of defining 
standards and the environmental regulatory networks that implement and 
enforce them, co-production is not linked to any single event, but is instead 
seen as an outcome of networked places and processes stretching beyond the 
local and linking to global places and historical events (Goldman 2010). Set 
within formal processes of standard design through MSIs, co-production also 
draws attention to how content is decided upon, as well as who is able to 
contribute to that content.  
Co-production is seen in two distinct ways. From a managerial 
perspective it implies a collaborative process of stakeholder engagement 
designed to “address a defined problem and build an integrated system-oriented 
understanding of [a] problem” (Armitage et al. 2011: 996). Based on the 
notions of resource co-management, this perspective opens up the possibility to 
actively steer a process of co-production which results in a shared 
understanding of environmental problems that in turn results in conformity and 
effective management.  
However, from a critical perspective, and reminiscent of Cooke and 
Kothari’s (2001) ‘tyranny of participation’, co-production can also reveal the 
difference between the quasi-inclusion of actors and their meaningful 
collaboration that leads to ownership and empowerment of regulatory 
processes. In this sense, the uniformed and formalized knowledge codified in 
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BMPs is representative of the relations of power that negotiate the inclusion of 
different knowledges (Ponte and Cheyns 2013; Konefal and Hatanaka 2011). 
The conditions of including the knowledge and interests of actors in the final 
standards are therefore as fundamentally political as the conditions of exclusion 
(Cheyns 2011). The final standards are then representative of the aims, 
perceptions, values, interests and relationships of actors with the technical and 
also political capacity to contribute. 
Co-production can also be observed through producer practices, which 
represent the outcomes of the discursive practice inherent in standard definition 
and implementation. In the case of BMPs, exploring practices and their 
outcome helps to uncover how co-production continues beyond standard 
definition to standard implementation. We argue that by understanding these 
practices and their material outcomes, it is possible to understand how 
responsive standard setters are to producer innovation or localization. 
Following on from what Tsing (2005) labels friction, this analysis explores the 
difference between discursive and material practice by focusing on the 
“awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across 
difference” (Tsing 2005: 4). In the case of BMPs, we focus on the creative 
qualities of friction expressed in producer practices, while also reflecting on the 
willingness of the standard setters to re-negotiate the content of standards and, 
therefore, the collective knowledge they embody. I thus move beyond studies 
on the formalized standard setting processes in networks and MSIs, to explore 
the possibility of incorporating alternative practices and knowledge in standard 
formation and revision.  
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5.3 Site selection and methodological approach 
 
The methodology adopted for this study is a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 
1995) investigating the context within which decisions over standards for 
shrimp production in Tarakan were made, how different actors influenced these 
decisions, and how the different kinds of knowledge that constitute these 
standards have been communicated across space (Falzon 2009). This 
methodology is also complimentary to Tsing’s (2005) claim that frictions 
become evident when studied through what she calls ethnography of global 
connections.  
 
Figure 5.1 Map of districts involved in the WWF BMP programme in East 
Kalimantan 
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Field work was carried out from 2009 to 2011 in Tarakan, the main 
regional processing and export district for farmed shrimp in the north of East 
Kalimantan, supplemented with additional interviews in 2012 and 2013. 
Tarakan has developed as a major centre for shrimp processing companies 
thanks to its existing infrastructure and geographical position for international 
trade (Ilman et al. 2009), and because of the value of the surrounding demersal 
fishery, both of which has attracted investment from Malaysian, Taiwanese and 
Japanese investors. Farmed shrimp are primarily produced in the Sesayap Delta 
of Tarakan, Bulungan, Kabupaten Tanah Tidung and Nunukan districts (Figure 
5.1). It is precisely the location of shrimp ponds in these remote islands that 
have given the shrimp from the north coast of East Kalimantan the reputation 
of the high quality desired by Japanese shrimp importers, and subsequently 
created the market for entrepreneurs to invest in extensive ponds of up to 
100ha. 
Primary data was collected through in-depth interviews with actors 
working in shrimp production and trade, as well as those working in regulation, 
policy and extension. In Tarakan this included eight pond owners, three 
middlemen, and three cold storage (processing factory) owners. Three 
government functionaries of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MAF) office in 
Tarakan were also interviewed, as well as three officials from the same 
department at the provincial level of East Kalimantan1, and four at the national 
level. In addition, three Indonesia-based NGOs were interviewed both in 
Tarakan and Jakarta. Observations were also made during several visits to 
shrimp ponds, hatcheries, nurseries, and processing companies, as well as at 
                                                
1 When I started and during the data collection, Tarakan and Bulungan were part of East Kalimantan 
province. When I was in the middle of writing this thesis, Tarakan and Bulungan became part of newly 
established North Kalimantan province. Hence, in this thesis, I will still refer those districts as part of 
East Kalimantan.   
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meetings and seminars on sustainable shrimp production in both Indonesia and 
Europe – for example, when I was a participant at the WWF shrimp 
aquaculture dialogue meeting in Jakarta in March 2010. Secondary data was 
gathered by reviewing and examining data on both shrimp farming and better 
management practices from websites, newsletters, reports and newspaper 
articles. 
 
 
5.4 Building the BMP network 
?
5.4.1 From principles to standards 
 
The first BMPs in Indonesia were developed through a collaboration of 
international and national NGOs, development institutions and national 
government for Aceh as part of the of a wider reconstruction program for 
shrimp aquaculture after the 2004 tsunami (ADB et al. 2007). Many 
international agencies offered assistance for the rehabilitation of coastal 
regions, including the aquaculture sector that was one of the sources of 
livelihood of the inhabitants. However, as Rimmer et al. (2012) argue, many of 
the agencies involved did not have adequate technical capacity to rehabilitate 
shrimp ponds and their supporting infrastructure. The development of BMPs 
was therefore seen as a means of providing guidelines based on the 
international principles for sustainable shrimp aquaculture, for these 
organisations to either reduce the risk of poor reconstruction or develop 
technically improved shrimp ponds. 
Although made difficult by the disintegration of community and farming 
structures following the tsunami, the standards have been criticised for not 
taking into consideration the local perspectives on reconstruction, and for 
reproducing previous practices instead of new, potentially more sustainable 
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farming approaches; a pattern noted by McGregor (2007) in other initiatives for 
rebuilding the region.  
The BMPs implemented in Aceh represent the first step of translating 
the international principles into the Indonesian context, and WWF-Indonesia 
saw them as an opportunity to create locally specific standards for other 
regions in country. As stated by a staff member of WWF-Indonesia, the 
international collaboration that went into the development of the BMPs in Aceh 
provided considerable credibility within Indonesia. WWF-Indonesia planned to 
invest further in the development of other locally specific BMPs through the 
“development of pilot projects enriched with literature studies” (Interview 
WWF staff, Jakarta, February 2013). WWF-Indonesia then entered a new 
phase of technical translation of the BMPs aimed at advocating environmental 
improvement by district governments. Part of their wider advocacy strategy – 
including BMPs for 11 other aquaculture species – the translation process 
intended to address a widely perceived lack of capacity for environmental 
policy and management at the district level (Smith et al. 2003; Satria and 
Matsuda 2004). 
The process of translating BMPs into new local contexts in Indonesia is 
therefore not insulated from networks of global experts. It is instead part of 
WWFs wider strategy to facilitate different organizations to put their 
experience and expertise into the promotion of responsible aquaculture 
production. However, unlike the development of the BMPs in Aceh, WWF-
Indonesia argued that the new round of BMP translation should focus directly 
on local government, industry and shrimp producers. Nonetheless, the 
association of WWF-Indonesia with the global WWF network meant that the 
BMPs they facilitated were also designed to assist shrimp producers in 
Indonesia to move towards international third-party certification, such as the 
ASC shrimp standards developed through the WWF-facilitated shrimp 
aquaculture dialogue (ShAD). Also in the case of Sesayap Delta, these 
localised BMPs remain closely linked to the wider ShAD process and, 
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according to WWF-Indonesia, play a strategic role in preparing producers to be 
ready for ASC certification. They can therefore be seen as a bridge between the 
knowledge of producers and that of the experts within the global environmental 
regulatory networks of which they are a part. 
 
5.4.2 Building on business - WWF and MMA  
 
The decision of WWF to start working in the Sesayap Delta, with vastly 
different production systems to Aceh (Table 1) was led by MMA; the largest 
processing and exporting company operating in that region. MMA was already 
actively developing their own environmental program, in part because of a 
newly found environmental concern of the company’s owner, but also in 
response to a demand for ‘green’ shrimp from their main Japanese buyer. The 
general manager explained the incorporation of environmental issues in their 
business strategy by arguing: “If we want our product to hit the market, we 
need a story [that can promote the product]. If our customers believe that our 
products are environmental friendly, organic, and pose no harm to the 
environment, [I believe] there would be a price increase to our products” 
(Interview, Tarakan, February 2009).  
 
Table 5.1 Main technical differences of production systems between Aceh and 
East Kalimantan  
 
Pond 
character
istics  
Aceh  
(Source: Zainun et al. 2007) 
East Kalimantan  
(Source: Ilman et 
al. 2009) 
Size 2 – 5 ha/pond 5 – 25 ha/pond 
Type Mainly traditional, but also semi-
intensive and intensive ponds 
Traditional, 
extensive ponds 
Stocking 
of shrimp 
fry 
1,000—20,000/ha (traditional) 
20,000—60,000/ha (semi-intensive) 
100,000—600,000/ha (intensive) 
10,000—
20,000/ha 
Feed Natural growth of algae for traditional 
ponds; algae, rice bran, pellets for semi-
intensive; for intensive farming system, 
feed is given as recommended. 
Natural growth of 
algae. No feed 
added. 
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The demand for green products at the Japanese market in order to support their 
‘green shrimp’ label was originally focused on reforestation in Kalimantan. 
The first phase of collaboration focused on an ‘environmental responsibility 
program’ which contributed US$ 1 per box of shrimp sold to fund a 
reforestation programme in Kutai Kartanegara district of East Kalimantan. 
Recognising a mismatch between inland reforestation and their claim of ‘green 
shrimp’, MMA then proposed that the buyer shift its funding to mangrove 
rehabilitation in Tarakan and surrounding region. The resulting ‘Forest of Life’ 
project started in 2006 providing the Japanese buyer and MMA the chance to 
claim mangrove reforestation as a marketable quality of their shrimp. Using the 
claim of a ‘green made farm’ on their packaging with further explanation that 
the shrimp were sourced from extensive systems that are ‘close to the natural 
environment’, they established what they perceived as a Japanese consumer 
driven scheme for mangrove rehabilitation. 
The ‘green made farm’ label was successful in establishing a flow of 
funding. However, after some poor technical results with their reforestation 
programme MMA requested the assistance of WWF to provide assistance on 
mangrove planting. In doing so WWF also became a key partner, providing 
legitimacy to the environmental claims of the company in return for 
establishing their own network in Tarakan. They were given office space at the 
MMA factory and access to the companies’ suppliers, as well as a basis from 
which to develop relations with the district government. In April 2008, WWF 
Indonesia, MMA, and Tarakan Environmental agency  (Badan Lingkungan 
Hidup - BLH) signed an MoU stating that MMA, with assistance from WWF, 
had a responsibility to plant 150 ha of mangrove in five years. For WWF the 
document represented a formalization of their collaboration with MMA, the 
enrolment of the government into their activities, and it provided a statement of 
political support for introducing their BMP program. 
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5.4.3 Translation into a local setting 
 
The collaboration with MMA provided a platform for WWF to access and 
enrol local actors into the process of translating the Aceh BMPs to the local 
context of Tarakan. WWF supported at least three ‘public’ meetings to 
introduce the concept of BMP, their experience from Aceh, and ultimately to 
develop a new set of BMPs for East Kalimantan. At the first consultation, held 
in August 2009, WWF invited government agencies from different sectors: the 
Marine and Fisheries Agency (MFA), Forestry Agency, and Environmental 
Agency from five districts: Tarakan, Bulungan, Tanah Tidung, Nunukan and 
Berau. The aim of the meeting was to enrol the five district governments in the 
process of developing BMPs suitable for East Kalimantan by introducing the 
BMPs from Aceh.  
In the second meeting held in January 2010, WWF reduced the number 
of government departments invited and brought in a selected group of local 
industry representatives. MFA was invited to chair the meeting and provide 
technical input into to the standards. The meeting was scheduled in Tarakan at 
the MFA office; other departments who attended the first meeting, such as the 
environmental and forestry agencies, were excluded. WWF also invited 
representatives from fishers and shrimp producers organizations who were 
selected on the basis of their perceived ability to ‘speak’ in public. They were 
also key suppliers to MMA, who was the only one of seven export processors 
in Tarakan to be invited. On justifying this exclusive selection policy, the 
WWF officer reflected on close personal ties with MMA: “[WWF] involves 
MMA in the BMP development because we have worked with them since the 
beginning.  I would feel uncomfortable if we invited other cold storages to our 
project” (WWF field staff, Tarakan, January, 2010). 
The exclusive and targeted selection of participants was reflected in the 
content and discussion of the meeting, as well as the subsequent strategy for 
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trialling the draft-BMPs. The head of MFA stated in her opening address that 
MFA gave full support to WWF-Indonesia in the development of BMPs for 
Tarakan. She also argued that the BMPs provided a clear solution to the decline 
of shrimp production caused by producer mismanagement. According to her, 
BMPs also provided a solution to the government in their support of shrimp 
producers to improve the quality of farming systems in the Tarakan area.  
However, the praise given by the head of MFA also revealed a subtext 
against which the BMPs were being introduced. In follow-up interviews MFA 
stated that a ‘third party’ like WWF-Indonesia was needed to intervene in the 
management of shrimp farming across the northern part of East Kalimantan. 
While local government recognized key issues associated with producer 
practices, mangrove clearance and overfishing of broodstock from surrounding 
waters, it was unable to unilaterally control these activities. The exclusion of 
other government departments also avoided a potential institutional clash 
between the forestry agency and other technical agencies around the illegality 
of farming on forest land in some coastal areas.  MFA attempts to draw in the 
provincial governor had failed because formally the head of a province has no 
jurisdiction in district affairs and the relative isolation of Tarakan – on the 
border of Kalimantan-Indonesia and Borneo-Malaysia (Visser and Adhuri 
2007). For the government, the ‘local adaptation’ of  BMPs by a select group 
of actors was an indication of the underlying friction over coastal resources. 
The selection of pond owners by WWF also reflects the complexity of 
pond ownership and decision-making over shrimp farming in the region. In the 
previous Chapter 4 I have shown that there is a clear distinction between 
producers who are in practice caretakers, and (absentee) pond owners or 
ponggawa who attend meetings like the one organized by WWF. WWF 
expected pond owners to be resource persons, providing technical knowledge 
to the formation of the standards and so legitimizing BMPs in the wider shrimp 
farming community. But, in fact the ‘participants’ selected were more 
representative of the patronage networks of ponggawa that control ownership 
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of the shrimp industry, than they represented the technical knowledge on 
farming (which resides with their pond caretakers). The pond owners fulfilled 
their public ‘speaking’ role as hoped for by the WWF, but they were better at 
expressing their opinions (bisa bicara) than at sharing grounded technical 
knowledge of shrimp farming. 
The political positioning of MFA and the selection of pond owners 
rather than pond caretakers to represent producer interests affected the outcome 
of the meeting. Instead of presenting the Aceh BMPs, receiving input, and 
translating them into best practices for shrimp farming in Tarakan, WWF was 
met with resistance. During the meeting the pond owners refuted the 
knowledge of WWF because they perceived proposed changes to the 
infrastructure of the their ponds as too capital intensive and fundamentally 
different from the techniques they used on their farms and, perhaps most 
importantly, unrelated to the immediate problems they were facing in terms of 
decreasing productivity. This was captured by one pond owner who stated 
during the meeting: “If you show these standards to producers, they will shake 
their heads.” He went on to argue that producers and pond owners alike: “ 
[N]ever think about what good [pond] construction is like. We only know how 
to stock, maintain shrimp, and harvest them. That’s it. If shrimp disease 
spreads, we would like to know how to deal with it and the cure” (Pond owner, 
Tarakan, January, 2010). Although the advice from WWF to change the design 
of the ponds was grounded on expert knowledge, it immediately created 
friction because of its abrupt introduction and radical shift from current 
practices. 
Recognizing the resistance from the pond owners in the formal 
meetings, WWF changed their strategy to enrol them into the BMP process 
through interviews and demonstrations. The interviews were designed to 
collect the experiences and opinions of pond owners and the actual producers, 
their caretakers, on issues related to production. The inclusion of workers was 
an important step given their absence at the formal meetings. However, the 
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selection of pond owners remained narrow, as again only those supplying to 
MMA were invited. It was only in 2012, after the BMPs for Tarakan were 
issued, that this strategy was revised and new pilot farms in Tarakan were built 
to demonstrate the new set of BMPs to non-MMA related pond owners (WWF 
2012).  
In the next section I turn to the experiences of pond owners prior to 
2012 who were involved in the pilot project run by WWF and MMA to test the 
applicability of the Aceh BMPs in northern part of East Kalimantan, while at 
the same time they contributed to the design of the Tarakan BMPs.  
 
 
5.5 Translating BMPs into practice 
 
Field-testing by WWF in partnership with MMA offered an opportunity to test 
the Aceh BMPs, and translate them to the local conditions of Tarakan.WWF 
hoped to thus avoid the politicized debate of the meetings and overcome the 
pond owners’ critique that the BMPs were of no relevance to the challenges 
they faced. The goal was to develop a shared or co-produced set of BMPs that 
balanced the expert knowledge embodied in the Aceh BMPs and the empirical 
knowledge of the producers. In this section, I present my observations of 
WWF’s testing of three specific BMPs from Aceh, the feedback WWF 
received from the pond owners and the pond caretakers, and the reasoning 
behind their rejection, acceptance, and the ways in which the standards 
accommodated the wider interests of shrimp production in the coastal 
environment of Tarakan.  
 
5.5.1 Pond location and mangrove rehabilitation  
 
The location of ponds is a fundamental parameter in both the international 
principles for sustainable shrimp farming and in the Aceh BMP standards. The 
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standards require local government to establish rules for the construction of 
ponds in and adjacent to coastal mangrove forest. The original manual 
developed for the Aceh BMPs stipulated a minimum buffer zone of 150 meters 
along the seaward facing edges of ponds (ADB et al. 2007). In the Tarakan 
case this seaward buffer was maintained, but also reflected the location of 
ponds in the Sesayap Delta. This implied an additional requirement for ponds 
to maintain a 50-meter buffer along river facing edges of the ponds and the re-
establishment of mangrove in and directly around the ponds in order to 
increase the environmental carrying capacity of the extensive shrimp 
aquaculture system (WWF-Indonesia 2011). To comply with this adjusted 
BMP standard, the pond owners involved in the pond trial were asked to plant 
mangrove trees along the dyke and the raised, shallow central areas inside the 
ponds.  
The scientific justification for planting mangrove in and around the 
ponds is to increase the micronutrient load of the ponds, which in turn 
increases the production of bacteria and plankton upon which shrimp in 
extensive systems feed (Gatune et al. 2012; Alongi et al. 1999). Other benefits 
include the provision of cryptic habitat for shrimp, increased shade cover to 
prevent algal blooms and nutrient cycling (Paez-Osuna 2001; Primavera 1997; 
Robertson and Phillips 1995).  These benefits are scientifically supported and 
listed on the MMA website developed in partnership with WWF 
(http://www.shrimp.co.id/eng/index.php, accessed on 15 November 2013). 
However, despite the scientific motivation for implementing these measures 
pond owners expressed technical concerns about increasing the mangrove 
cover of the ponds. 
The pond owners did not accept the rehabilitation of the mangroves, 
arguing that the ecology of the ponds would be disturbed and the productivity 
of the ponds would decline. But instead of rejecting the proposal outright, they 
proposed an alternative approach for planting mangroves on the dykes and 
inside the ponds at a wider spacing. Instead of the one to two meters spacing 
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between trees they successfully negotiated a 10 meter gap between trees. Their 
rationale for doing so was to protect the production of plankton, the main 
source of food in extensive shrimp systems, which requires adequate sunlight 
to for photosynthesis. A secondary concern was that if mangroves become too 
dense dangerous wildlife would encroach on the ‘forested’ pond. 
Although technically framed, the pond owners’ concerns were 
underscored by the wider politics of access and ownership to coastal land in 
northeast Kalimantan. Under national law, coastal production forest (Kawasan 
Budidaya Kehutanan) is owned by the state through the Ministry of Forestry 
who issues user permits (Ilman et al. 2009). However, the administrative 
decentralization of the Indonesian state has reduced the enforcement of 
national forest regulation (Smith et al 2003). Once a forest is cleared, usufruct 
rights are granted by village leaders with customary rights over the forested 
land. Pond owners then need a letter from the sub-district head to acknowledge 
this permission before making a formal request (often in retrospect) to clear the 
forest and develop a pond. This formal permission from MFA is often not 
sought because it enables MFA to levy a tax over production (Surat Ijin Usaha 
Perikanan or SIUP). As a result access rights remain ambiguous; as long as the 
producers do not convert the land back to forest, they are able to maintain their 
customary access agreement and avoid any legal enforcement (and tax 
payment). 
The case demonstrates that, although technically framed, resistance by 
producers to the BMP standard for pond location and mangrove rehabilitation 
is part of a wider conflict around access and use of coastal land. Planting trees 
in and around their ponds changes the status of that land and disqualifies them 
from continuing shrimp aquaculture. The final version of the BMPs for 
Tarakan and Bulungan (2011) maintained that mangrove needs to be planted 
around the dike, inside the ponds and around the water gate.  But unlike the 
standards in Aceh they do not specify the exact distance between trees – 
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leaving this up to the farmers. The standards therefore provide room for 
interpretation by producers, feeding into a wider politics of the land.  
 
5.5.2 Extensive aquaculture practices  
 
The BMP standards also set out guidelines on the design and construction of 
ponds to create a productive farming system that reduces the incidence of 
disease and promotes biodiversity. Both the meetings and the pilot program 
gave considerable attention to the characteristics of the extensive pond system 
found in the Tarakan region, namely open tidal water flows, variable pond 
sizes and shapes, and low density in seed stocking (WWF Indonesia, 2011: 1; 
Figure 5.2). However, despite the focus on these local conditions, nearly all 
changes to pond design (Figure 5.3) and management were met with resistance. 
 
Figure 5.2 Different pond sizes and shapes in Sesayap Delta
 
 
The first concern of the pond owners focused on the economic rationality for 
large pond sizes. Capital costs for pond construction are based on distance from 
Tarakan and cost per square meter, making little difference for the size of pond 
being built. However, a different pond infrastructure is more costly. One of the 
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biggest capital costs is the construction of the gate through which water is 
exchanged and shrimp recruited into the pond. Each gate has one or two 
caretakers who live at the gate and manage the pond. Dividing larger ponds 
into smaller ponds requires further capital investment and operational cost. But 
perhaps more importantly, the smaller pond size allows for a higher intensity of 
production. The existing extensive system is based on limited stocking of 
shrimp supplemented with wild shrimp recruited through water exchange 
(Illam et al. 2009). Smaller ponds would mean that farmers move from a 
relatively less to a more intensive form of production, which increases capital 
outlay and operational costs, as well as production risk. 
Figure 5.3 Pond design as recommended by BMP for Tarakan and Bulungan  
 
 
Source: WWF 2011 
 
The WWF proposal for pond management were based on smaller size of 
ponds; including drying and liming the soil to reduce soil acidity, fertilizing the 
pond and managing water input (WWF Indonesia 2011). These are well 
established measures for more intensive forms of production aimed at 
mitigating the incidence of disease by reducing the incidence of virus carrying 
organisms, reducing excessive nutrient loads and reducing the acidity of pond 
soil – all of which are major factors in reducing the overall productivity of 
ponds (Tho et al 2011; Walker and Mohan 2009). However, pond owners state 
that none of these measures are feasible in their extensive systems. Contrary to 
the BMPs they argue that drying their ponds will trigger a higher level of 
2 1 
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acidity by drawing pyrite out of the soil. WWF countered that this can be 
overcome by washing, turning and liming the soil. However, this process 
becomes difficult because of the difficulty of ensuring that the whole pond is 
dry (Illman, et al. 2009). Other farmers do not empty their ponds at any point in 
the production cycle, instead keeping water in the canals in the pond during 
harvesting to maintain the stock of wild and juvenile shrimp. The extensive 
production systems are also low cost, requiring minimal maintenance and 
input. The wider experience of shrimp aquaculture indicates that implementing 
BMPs measures on pond design and management would lead to higher 
stocking densities, feed and ultimately labour. Although incurring greater costs 
in the short term, these measures are expected to improve the overall efficiency 
of production in the long term. However, the pond caretakers in Tarakan see a 
range of risks associated with implementing the BMPs and increasing the 
intensity of production. First, the measures trialled in the pilot ponds by WWF 
failed – survival rates and yield per hectare were significantly lower and the 
quality of shrimp poorer (Table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.2. Targets and state of MMA-WWF trial ponds  
 
 Observed average Targets 
Survival rate < 20% 30% 
Yield/ha < 75 kg 100 kg 
Average shrimp size 40 g 40 g 
Quality of shrimp Variable Stable 
 
Source: http://www.shrimp.co.id/eng/index.php accessed on March 2012 
 
Second, increasing the intensity of production is recognised by 
producers as increasing the risk of disease. This is supported by literature that 
open extensive systems have a higher incidence of viruses such as White Spot 
Syndrome Virus (WSSV) but with a lower virulence than in intensive systems 
(Dieu 2010). The pond owners in Tarakan are therefore faced with the prospect 
of following the BMPs under conditions of uncertainty and with a potentially 
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higher degree of risk. They are invited to redesign their ponds and change pond 
management practices with little assurance that these practices would increase 
productivity. In this sense, the BMPs standards on pond management in 
Tarakan were not really co-produced, nor was there any movement towards a 
negotiated set of standards until the risk and uncertainty around the measures 
being proposed would be incorporated into the locally adapted BMPs.  
 
 
5.6 Reflections on co-produced BMPs 
 
BMPs are designed to combine global experiences on better management in 
shrimp farming, consultation with the local stakeholders, and field experience 
of those initiating the translation process (Padiyar et al. 2012). But like any 
globally derived standards they are not introduced and translated in a social 
vacuum. The translation of the standards is a function and outcome of social 
relations between global actors embedded in expert networks and local actors 
embedded in politicized places and environments. Reflecting on the findings in 
the literature (Foley and Hébert 2013; Roth and Dressler 2012) my study shows 
that the particularities of place demand a transformation and translation of the 
globally conceived standards. In the Tarakan case, adaptations were necessary 
on three levels: translation of the standards to fit the technical and social 
realities of the coastal lands in Tarakan, the design of multi-stakeholder 
meetings, and the BMPs pilot program at ponds with pond caretakers and the 
pond owners. 
The International Principles were published with the expectation that 
public and/or the private sector actors would use them to develop a national 
policy for BMPs. The attempt to develop BMPs can therefore not be separated 
from the wider advocacy strategies of WWF as an international environmental 
NGO, especially given their role in the development of the BMPs for Aceh, the 
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International Principles for Sustainable Shrimp Farming and the Shrimp 
Aquaculture Dialogue. Even though the adoption of the global standards should 
be suitable to the social, economic, and environmental conditions of the 
targeted area, the translation from principles to standards has led to some 
diversification in the content of the BMPs. However, most BMPs are closely 
related in content (Mohan et al. 2010). In this sense, BMPs are co-produced in 
a network dominated by global expert actors with interests and agendas that 
transcend those of producers embedded in local places (Cheyns 2011; Anh et 
al. 2010; Belton et al. 2010; Fransen and Kolk 2007). 
The multi-stakeholder meetings in Tarakan were designed to enrol local 
actors and manage a system-oriented collaborative process of defining and 
codifying problems associated with shrimp farming into local BMPs. However, 
these meetings were unable to create a shared understanding of how 
aquaculture practices in extensive systems lead to environmental problems that 
in turn lead decreases the productivity of ponds, because those invited were not 
the ones who were the actual pond caretakers who had the technical 
knowledge. Instead WWF selected a few pond owners to the meetings who 
were involved with the cold storage, thus politicizing the meetings in two 
different ways. First, the close relationship of WWF with MMA that was 
instrumental for WWF to gain access to Tarakan, also restricted the 
involvement of other processors and producers who were not included in that 
network. Although no stipulation was placed on WWF by MMA, the 
relationship imposed a perceived obligation set by a ‘pre-existing social 
arrangement’ (McCarthy 2002) to restrict the program to those involved in 
MMA’s supply chain. Second, the active exclusion of pond owners and 
government actors in the second meeting avoided debate on the legal ambiguity 
of land use. Instead of creating consensus, the composition and content of the 
meetings fed into a politics of regulation and control over the environment by 
reinforcing global expert knowledge (Cheyns 2011; Ponte and Cheyns 2013). 
The difficulties WWF faced in fostering consensus over the content of the 
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BMPs reflected the relations of power within Tarakan that determine who is 
heard and who is not in the governance of the shrimp industry. 
The politicization of BMP during the meetings transferred over to the 
pond-level pilot programme. The counter arguments of producers to BMPs for 
pond design, location and management were largely technical, but underscored 
by the politics of access and control over land and the distribution of economic 
risk to pond caretakers and owners rather than regulators. However, the pilot 
program did offer to them an opportunity to enter into a technical dialogue with 
WWF over the design of the BMPs that was not possible during the meetings. 
The co-produced BMPs also represent the fine division between a technical 
outcome and the reification of contested political relations of aquaculture 
production. For example, WWF acknowledged that the aquaculture practices in 
the Tarakan region have emerged in response to the local challenges of 
production. However, with the goal of increasing the productivity of ponds, or 
at least mitigating current declines, they sought to adapt these practices to 
increase the relative intensity of production by proposing smaller pond sizes 
and mangrove plantation. But by not stipulating the distance on mangrove 
replantation around and inside the pond, WWF tried to minimize the issue of 
land ownership by rendering issues of the legal status of ‘forested’ land into 
technical terms. 
Comparing the meetings and the pilot program questions the extent to 
which the co-production of knowledge is built on a collective dialogue, or 
simply remains a ‘transactional’ form of co-production: I’ll trade you this for 
that (Needham 2008). It is not only the inclusion/exclusion from a process of 
co-production but also the quality of knowledge contributed. Who is included 
how and when, then become important questions to determine why and how 
those participating contribute to the BMP process at different moments and 
events. The pond owners at the meetings enabled WWF to develop a 
meaningful dialogue and buy-in to the BMP process because they are the 
primary decision-makers. However, the technical focus of the meetings forced 
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them to comment on production practices that are better captured by the 
experiential knowledge of pond caretakers. In contrast, the on-the-spot pilot 
program provided pond caretakers with the occasion to give technical input that 
reflects a transactional form of co-production, but they are not responsible for 
subsequent decisions over major changes in infrastructure or investment in the 
ponds. 
The co-production of BMP standards has therefore placed WWF in a 
precarious position. Although their original intention of managing a process of 
consensus forming, co-production evolved into a process of political 
reification, WWF has been successful in accessing complex local social 
networks responsible for shrimp farming in Tarakan. However, BMPs appear 
to be not only a tool to negotiate the technical dimensions of shrimp 
aquaculture, but they also create an extended ‘site’ of advocacy (De Vos and 
Bush 2011). WWF is now involved in the on-going development of pilot 
shrimp farming that involves the district government of Tarakan. By expanding 
its network WWF can gradually extend its influence by acting as a conduit for 
international principles and debates around shrimp aquaculture to pond owners 
and agencies that have until now not been included in discussions around 
sustainability (Kusumawati et al. 2013). Despite the apparent failure of the 
multi-stakeholder process and farm trials in reaching a consensus-based set of 
BMPs, the embeddedness of WWF in these local networks will enable on-
going engagement and advocacy for conservation and sustainable production. 
But their success will rely on their ability to balance the technical and political 
dimensions of the implementation of the BMPs. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This case study identifies a range of sites and events led by WWF-Indonesia, 
where the Tarakan BMPs were co-produced with processors, government and 
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shrimp producers. The goal of translating BMPs into the local context was to 
ensure both technical relevance and a higher rate of adoption and impact. The 
resistance WWF faced in both the meetings and the pilot program indicates that 
the formulation of BMPs is far from a linear process of translation. Instead the 
activities implemented by WWF represent a problematic process of co-
production, through which attempts were made to incorporate and represent 
empirical technical knowledge in the adaptation of the standards to local 
conditions. 
This chapter shows that through a process of co-production, BMP 
standards are not merely about how to negotiate and include the technical 
aspects of local production; they also represent and perpetuate existing social 
relations of production and politics of environmental control and degradation.  
BMPs thus contribute to the politicization rather than depoliticization (Béne 
2005) of social and environmental issues around shrimp farming. Recognizing 
the political role of BMPs also reflects on the precarious role of global NGOs 
such as WWF in leading the process of co-production.  They need to seriously 
engage with networks embedded in complex local political economies to co-
produce locally relevant and effective standards. Close involvement in local 
networks may well lead to the formulation of relevant standards that will end 
up having a higher rate of adoption. However, the impacts of these co-
produced standards may be compromised by how inclusive or exclusive the 
process of co-production is, and the degree to which they justify existing 
aquaculture practices and resource access.  
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A house for a shrimp pond caretakers in the field.   
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6.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the process and dynamics of the interface of global and 
local actors concerning coastal governance by way of network formation and 
the co-production, negotiation, and contestation of environmental knowledge. 
As part of the Wageningen funded RESCOPAR program on the resilience of 
coastal populations and aquatic resources in Indonesia and Vietnam, case 
studies were carried out in two different conservation settings in East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia. The first case study in Berau Delta addresses the design 
and implementation of a marine conservation area by global environmental 
non-governmental organizations, in collaboration with decentralized 
government agencies and local entrepreneurs. The second case study in 
Sesayap Delta concerns the development and implementation of better 
management standards for shrimp aquaculture.  
The Berau Delta case study examines the formation of global-local 
environmental collaboration over a period of five years (2004-2010), focusing 
on the interactions of multi-scale actors and knowledge through the 
implementation of sea turtle management in the Berau MCA. The thesis 
explores and explains how collaboration shapes different actors’ perceptions 
and perspectives on marine conservation and resources extraction in the context 
of decentralized marine governance. The results show that the political-
economic and cultural-historical role of local entrepreneurs and political elites 
(ponggawa) are particularly important in shaping knowledge and power 
disconnects, apart from producing legal disconnects (Patlis 2008) between 
global and local actors (Chapter 2).  
I further investigate how actors with different types of knowledge 
interact in sea turtle management in the Berau MCA. By focusing on the role of 
local political-economic forces that shape the discourse on marine 
conservation, the results provide a deeper understanding Tsing’s (2005) 
concept of friction. Friction emerges when the values, knowledge and 
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discourses of global NGOs, local power brokers (patrons or ponggawa) and 
local government coalesce. By not adequately resolving the differences 
between the interests, values, and knowledge of these actors, the complex 
planning and implementation of MCAs is undermined and new uncertainties 
are created over the future governance of coastal resources (Chapter 3).  
The Sesayap Delta case study illustrates the relative influence of private 
and public actors who contribute to different but related environmental 
regulatory networks around shrimp production. The results show how these 
different networks interact and influence the reach and impact of global 
environmental governance introduced through standards for better management 
practices (BMPs) by WWF. While it appears that local economic elites are 
again the determining factor in affecting the interactions of the environmental 
regulatory networks, Chapter 4 demonstrates that ‘external’ networks led by 
global NGOs and the central government largely ignore the local economic 
elites and the networks in which they are embedded.  
The final case study, also on BMPs in the Sesayap Delta (Chapter 5), 
shows how actors with different types of knowledge interact in co-producing 
and negotiate best management practices (BMPs) in the extensive shrimp 
aquaculture practice of the Tarakan area in the northern part of East 
Kalimantan. Focusing on the process of co-production of knowledge in 
developing the BMPs, the results examine whether co-production is simply a 
matter of translation of international principles or an arena to negotiate the 
balance between the technical and the social conditions of production. The 
results indicate that, contrary to the findings of others (Béne 2005), BMPs 
contribute and even reinforce the politicization of social and environmental 
issues around shrimp aquaculture. The meetings organized by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature and the pilot project at pond level with producers following 
the development of the BMPs standards, further strengthen the patron-client 
dependencies of the shrimp aquaculture practices, as well as the politics of 
control over the natural resources.  
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In this final chapter, I bring together the main findings from the four 
empirical chapters and use them to illuminate and reflect upon the key research 
questions of this thesis. First, I examine how global actors form networks in 
order to secure the process of global environmental knowledge transfer. I 
follow this through by examining how these networks of actors produce 
disconnects and frictions around power and knowledge that lead to 
misconceptions of global actors in understanding the role of local economic 
elites in controlling the local networks. Second, I investigate how the actors co-
produce environmental knowledge in defining and practicing sustainable 
coastal resource governance, given that the global and local actors own 
different ontologies of knowledge and values. 
The following section summarizes the main findings of the chapters to 
answer the questions presented above. In section 6.3 I discuss the contribution 
of this research to the literature on coastal governance and, more specifically, 
on the key concepts used in the thesis, including global-local interaction, 
knowledge translation, negotiation and co-production in the context of 
conservation initiatives. I continue by indicating what actions and room for 
negotiation are needed from all actors involved for a more effective 
conservation of coastal resources. I end this last chapter by presenting the 
future research agenda.  
 
 
6.2 Main findings of the thesis 
 
The findings of this thesis highlight the unequal interplay of the different 
networks that has consequences for how the coastal resources are governed, 
and the dilemma of knowledge co-production in the global-local interface in 
improving the governance of natural resources and a sustainable coastal 
environment. By integrating the results from the Berau Delta and Sayasap 
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Delta cases we now turn to an integrated discussion of the two core themes of 
network formation and the knowledge interface. 
 
6.2.1 Network formation as a tool to govern the coastal resources 
 
The focus of Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 is the attempts of the global 
environmental NGOs, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) to govern the use of natural resources in collaboration 
with local actors. The development and implementation of these networks take 
place in the context of a decade of political-administrative decentralization in 
Indonesia. This setting provides the global actors with a better opportunity to 
collaborate directly, either with the district government or with the private 
sector, by bypassing the central and provincial governments. The global 
environmental NGOs are aware of the existence and actions of key local actors, 
particularly the economic elites or ponggawa, but they find their patron-client 
relationships often too complex and time consuming to understand. Out of need 
for simplicity they therefore tend to ignore or downplay the potential of these 
local actors to influence the implementation and outcomes of global 
conservation attempts.  
The life history of the development and implementation of the Berau 
MCA clearly shows that the collaboration model applied by the environmental 
NGOs has failed to produce an all-inclusive governance approach to the 
conservation and sustainable use of coastal resources. At the outset, the Berau 
MCA was to be based on a decentralized co-management model featuring 
strong collaboration with the district government agencies, bypassing the 
central and provincial government. By forming a Steering Committee the 
global environmental NGOs tried to actively include the district government 
agencies (Chapter 2). However, this collaboration had certain limitations. 
Ideally, the Steering Committee should equally represent all the actors 
involved. Yet, in practice, these actors form two competing networks, namely 
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the global-local NGO network (the Joint Program) and the district sectoral 
network, which were frequently at odds with each other, resulting in poor 
performance of the Steering Committee. The Joint Program is often seen as an 
outsider by the actors involved in the district network and a potential threat to 
the local actors’ authority and responsibility to monitor and control the use of 
natural resources of the coastal waters of Berau.  
However, the legal framework in governing the marine conservation 
area is sector oriented and full of disconnects in definitions, administrative and 
institutional provisions, enforcement, monitoring and sanctions (Patlis 2008). 
Once I realized how legal disconnects were further compounded by 
institutional and value disconnects, I appreciated the scale of the problem and 
was able to explain the continuous confusion and contention of the actors in the 
Steering Committee in all governance aspects of marine conservation. Despite 
the NGO model for decentralized global-local collaboration, the actors 
involved struggled to find a middle ground in defining and implementing the 
decentralized MCA activities. Frictions appeared to be mainly caused by the 
fact that the approach of the global NGOs ignored two important local 
conditions. First, the differences in political-economic power between local 
actors, like the district government agencies and private entrepreneurs and the 
different cultural-historical values and meanings that strongly influenced their 
ways of perceiving marine conservation. The second problem was the 
constantly shifting authority that occurred both within the networks of the local 
and the global actors, as well as between them throughout the five-year process 
of development and implementation of the MCA.  
The Sesayap Delta study on the shrimp value chain highlights the 
emergence of better management standards for shrimp aquaculture. This case 
study is not centred on the history of network formation; instead I underline the 
interplay of three different environmental regulatory networks in the 
development process of BMPs. In an attempt to introduce sustainable 
production, WWF collaborates with the network of the seafood processing 
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companies in the region, thereby initiating the formation of an environmental 
regulatory network (Chapter 4). This environmental regulatory network 
interacts with the State and the existing artisanal trade networks. By focusing 
on the role of the economic elites (ponggawa) in the artisanal trade networks 
and their interaction with state and NGOs networks, I bring to light the ‘black 
box’ of the value chain regulation (Bush and Oosterveer 2007). The value 
chain of shrimp aquaculture and trade in the region is determined by the 
multiple interdependencies of ponggawa as pond owners and/or traders. 
However, their key position as the actor who controls the flow of commodities 
and knowledge in the artisanal trade network is often underestimated and 
misunderstood by the state and NGOs networks.  
Consequently, the failure to recognize the role of ponggawa has 
significant implication for the implementation of any conservation initiative. 
Given that all actors involved in environmental regulatory networks are 
connected via awkward, unequal and often unstable interactions, I underline the 
potential frictions and misunderstandings that emerge from this type of 
interaction. Like in the previous case, the lack of recognition and equal 
interaction between external regulatory networks and local economic elites lies 
at the root of the problem. Instead of seeing the ponggawa as a potential to 
strengthen the process of standards development, the state and NGO networks 
see them as an obstacle to not only the development of the standards, but also 
to their implementation, monitoring and enforcement. Extending Vandergeest’s 
(2007) notion of the exclusion of farmers’ practices and knowledge in 
standards development, I find that the exclusion of the practices and knowledge 
of actors such as local elites or ponggawa from the development of BMP 
standards is problematic in this form of governance introduced by the global 
environmental NGOs. 
What lessons can we draw from this more inclusive approach to the 
empirical study of conservation initiatives? The global environmental NGOs 
embraced the new decentralized model in marine conservation. Together with 
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the local actors, especially government agencies and entrepreneurs, the global 
environmental NGOs set up a collaboration platform and formed 
environmental regulatory networks to govern the use of the coastal resources. 
The actors involved in these networks range from the global to the local and 
include district government institutions, the private sector, as well as 
aquaculture producers. However, despite the inclusive approach applied by the 
global environmental NGOs in setting the conservation agenda (Goldman and 
Turner 2011; Peet et al. 2011; Vaccaro et al. 2013), there seems to be a serious 
omission in their understanding and acknowledging the multiple patron-client 
relationships that characterize the networks of local elites in governing the 
coastal resources. These patron-client ties are crucial for our understanding of 
the local networks and are key to the regulation of the conduct of local actors. 
Therefore, in order to develop networks and forms of collaboration that are 
acceptable to local actors, they must take seriously into account, and be 
consistent with, local political-economic and cultural-historical conditions and 
perceptions.  
 
6.2.2 The global-local knowledge interface 
 
The second focus of the thesis highlights the internal dynamics of the process 
of global-local knowledge interface. In this process each actor translates and 
negotiates the different types of knowledge to meet his interests and goals. This 
process is thick with friction and the struggle of actors to overpower others to 
accept knowledge that is different from their own knowledge and experience. 
Moreover, global environmental knowledge does not come to an empty space 
when it is transferred to the local. Hence the translation and negotiation 
processes are entangled with the historical and empirical knowledge and the 
political-economic objectives of the local actors. 
My study of the implementation of the Berau MCA highlights the 
battlefield of knowledge over turtle eggs management (Chapter 3). I apply the 
concept of friction (Tsing 2005) to explain how each global or local actor 
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involved in the Berau MCA governance contests the interpretation and 
implementation of the MCA and, particularly, sea turtle management. Friction 
is widespread and divergent, as the actors appear to be bent on prioritising their 
own values and interests, which leads to a stalemate rather than a collective 
move towards conservation. Their struggle to impose their views and 
knowledge on others leaves little room for compromise. 
The fact that the Berau MCA is endorsed by both district government 
and central government authorities gives the Joint Program its legitimacy and 
authority to implement conservation activities. In response to global 
environmental concerns the global environmental NGOs (TNC and WWF) 
apply a conservation model to the Berau MCA that is predominantly based on 
scientific knowledge. When it comes to its implementation, this science based 
knowledge clashes with local realities and is  contested by the local knowledge 
proponents. In contrast to global environmental knowledge, local knowledge is 
based on historical practices and social-cultural experiences and values held by 
the local elites.  
Local knowledge on the exploitation and conservation of sea turtle eggs 
is a case in point. In Berau the management of sea turtle eggs is based on the 
rich history of sea turtle eggs harvesting and trade under an auctioned licencing 
(pachter) system. The auction holder, still locally called pachter (Dutch), buys 
a government licence to collect and trade the turtle eggs. As this is a source of a 
lucrative income for those who are able to secure such permits, since the pre-
colonial times the auctioning of pachter licence has been thick with intrigue 
and back door manoeuvres. This continues to be the case in today’s Indonesia. 
Because of its low volume - high value status, sea turtle eggs are a strategic 
asset for local elites, whether private (ponggawa) or governmental and military. 
As a result, there is constant friction between the environmental NGOs and the 
local economic elites who are interlinked with the political elites, who struggle 
to turn the battle of knowledge about the MCA into a debate about acceptable 
parameters for the continued collection and trade in turtle eggs.  
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My study of BMP standard development shows the process of 
knowledge co-production from a different angle (Chapter 5). BMPs were co-
produced through three distinct processes: the translation of the global principal 
in shrimp farming to the local context, the transfer of knowledge through 
meetings and a pilot program, and the negotiation process that occurred in 
BMP development. In general, standards for best management practices are 
prepared to provide a guideline to reduce the negative impact of production 
activities on the environment. The standards in BMPs are developed through 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) that incorporate the different knowledge of 
the actors involved and are linked to global networks and production processes. 
BMPs are designed to allow the translation process to fit into specific locations. 
In this MSI process the co-production of knowledge is taking place. WWF-
Indonesia as key global actor in the network provides the opportunity to design 
locally suitable standards together with the local actors, like the locally based 
shrimp processing company and the producers attached to it. Scientists and 
global NGOs expect that such global-local networking produce hybrid 
knowledge (Jasanoff 2004) shared by WWF-Indonesia and other actors. 
However, it is problematic if it is assumed that standards are produced under 
conditions of a local social vacuum. The social relationships and the political 
capacity to contribute to the development of standards influence the co-
production of these standards.  
The implementation and development of BMPs for shrimp aquaculture 
in the Tarakan and Bulungan region of Sesayap Delta are a case in point. They 
are the collective product of translation and adoption of global knowledge and 
experiences in interaction with the knowledge, experience, and social-
economic conditions of the pond owners and local elites (ponggawa), and 
others in the shrimp production chain. However, the translation of BMPs into 
the local context is not separate from the networks of global experts whose 
interests and agendas are set well beyond those of the local producers. Through 
this process of co-production of knowledge, the formulation of the BMPs in 
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Sesayap is more than just about negotiation and inclusion of the technical 
aspects of the local production. As shown in this case study, the local actors 
seem to counteract the standards proposed by WWF. The translation process, 
indeed, is not a linear process when it faces the economic and political interests 
and goals of local elites. In this sense, the process of co-production also 
perpetuates the existing social relations of production and consequently the 
politics of environmental control and degradation.  
What lesson can we draw from this global-local knowledge interface? 
Both cases illustrate that despite being initiated by global environmental NGOs 
the knowledge interface takes place in the local context. This local context 
comprises complex political-economic networks of elites who have their own 
knowledge and interests in governing their coastal natural resources. Those 
introducing global scientific knowledge to coastal resources governance in 
present-day Indonesia should be cognizant that decentralization grants more 
power to local networks of political-economic elites and their dependents to 
decide on an effective model for sustainable governance of the coastal 
resources. Consequently, in order to co-produce locally relevant and effective 
knowledge to govern the conservation and use of coastal resources, the global 
actors need to grant more space to the historical and empirical knowledge - and 
the values and perceptions of conservation it produces - in actively engaging 
with the complex networks of local actors.  
 
 
6.3 Contribution of the research to science 
 
This thesis combines anthropological and political ecological approaches 
(Brosius 1999; Robbins 2004; Peet et al. 2011) to obtain a better understanding 
of the global-local interface in the context of coastal governance and 
knowledge transfer and co-production in East Kalimantan. Integrating these 
approaches allows me to move beyond the debate on a mere politics of access 
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and control over natural resources. It gives us a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the global governance networks and their interactions when they 
are embedded into local political-economic contexts that are marked by 
specific social, cultural-historical, and political-economic relations.  
I have shown throughout this thesis that the role of the local elite, 
whether as an individual or as a group, weighs heavily on the outcomes of 
global conservation attempts. In line with political ecology, as outlined in 
Chapter 1, I have demonstrated that global environmental NGOs collaborate 
and build networks with the local actors to discursively and materially 
transform the local knowledge and practices in governing their natural 
resources (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Although it is often stated that global 
environmental NGOs should become more responsive to local social, 
historical, and political conditions (Peet et al., 2011; Peluso 2012), there still 
are few empirical studies that provide the field-based qualitative data on new 
decentralized NGO approaches to conservation. This thesis does so in shedding 
light on two cases in Indonesia. This thesis also contributes new knowledge on 
the outcomes of the interaction between global and local networks. By 
examining the interface between global conservation initiatives and the 
political-economy of local actors, particularly the multiple patron-client 
networks of local elites, the thesis shows how such local networks challenge 
the scientific premises, prescriptions, and collaborative models introduced by 
global actors such as TNC and WWF. 
Secondly, this study underlines the importance of a multi-sited empirical 
research to better understand the local political and economic contexts and 
conditions and to seriously study the historical and cultural views of local 
actors that inform their positions at the interface with the global 
environmentalists. Combining insights into the local actors’ historical, political 
and economic motives with a multi-sited ethnographic approach also helps to 
escape the trap of essentializing the global and the local as if they were real 
places. Indeed, one of the major contributions of this thesis is the explanation 
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of the interplay between and within the networks and its relation to the more 
integrative processes of the global-local networks interface, without reifying or 
losing sight of the complexity that underpins this interface. Developing and 
retaining such a balanced perspective is a rare occurrence in the literature and 
therefore I see this as a valuable contribution.  
Thirdly, while the literature on political ecology is predominantly about 
the dominance of powerful actors (e.g. the state, corporations) vis-à-vis 
comparatively weaker local actors (Peluso 2012; Peet el al. 2011; Robbins 
2004), this thesis shows that “locals” are not always weak.  In fact, they are 
often powerful as well. I have been able to show how powerful local 
entrepreneurs (ponggawa) have a crucial role and impact, and transform the 
discourse on sustainable environmental governance differently from global 
environmental NGOs, national government agencies, private industries, and 
even the district government. I illustrate this with real-life examples of what 
different perceptions of conservation entail, how actors construct different 
interpretations, launch counter-discourses, and steer the implementation of 
conservation so it is least disruptive to their interests and goals. This is a 
political-ecology in action, and an important contribution to science as most 
studies on this topic treat political ecology in an ‘after-the-fact’ fashion. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to a growing literature about the impact of 
decentralization on conservation and resource management (Aspinal and 
Fealey 2003; Bene 2005; Wadley 2005; Barr et al 2006; Satria et al. 2006; 
Acciaioli 2008; Gunawan 2012) providing ethnographic data about actual 
processes of the development of marine conservation and better management 
standards. What is new is my focus on the global-local knowledge transfer and 
the actual co-production processes in this global-local interface. My research 
confirms earlier evidence of the process of the knowledge interface (Long 
2001) that each actor brings different knowledge, interests, resources and 
networks to the table. But this thesis is the first to show empirical data of 
processes of environmental knowledge transfer regarding coastal conservation. 
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Global environmental knowledge transfer and co-production should not be seen 
as a one-way process. More specifically, the global NGOs, despite genuine 
efforts to design inclusive process of engagement with local actors, often end 
up reinforcing simplifications and shortcuts – as the reality they face is 
complex and the activities must be implemented within a specific timeline. 
This could potentially be understood as global NGOs gaining the upper hand 
by imposing such simplifications (Li 2007). However, this thesis shows such 
simplified conservation designs, which prioritize the global actors’ science-
based knowledge and tight schedules, do not prevail. Instead, I show that 
coastal resource conservation is an arena where science-based concepts are 
contested by social conditions generated by specific local economic interests 
and cultural-historical values. This contestation effectively puts a check on the 
agendas of global NGOs and the resultant friction becomes a venue for 
negotiation and co-production of knowledge. This is by no means a smooth 
process as local elites, while often collectively opposed to conservation 
prescriptions introduced by the global actors, frequently also battle among 
themselves as a result of their different power positions and patronage 
networks.  
 
 
6.4 Contribution of the research to policy-making 
 
This thesis also makes important contributions to policy making regarding 
coastal governance and the involvement of multi-level actors like global 
environmental NGOs, district government agencies, and local political-
economic leaders (ponggawa). It shows the ineffectiveness of a top-down 
approach in governing marine conservation and implementing standards for 
best management practices in shrimp farming. 
Although the global environmental NGOs claim they now apply a new 
conservation approach by directly linking up to decentralized governments and 
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local entrepreneurs in setting the marine conservation agenda and in 
implementing BMP standards, this thesis shows that in fact the implementation 
of this new approach is not significantly different from the past. The 
conservation activities introduced by NGO networks and described as being co-
produced with local actors and their networks are actually developed well 
before the intervention even starts in the target area. In fact, the decentralized 
collaboration model for conservation disguises re-centralization of local coastal 
resources governance. 
The global and national actors often ignore the local social, economic 
and political conditions, which results in indifference or outright resistance 
from the local actors who label them as ‘foreigners’. In order to make their 
intervention more effective and sustainable, it is important that the 
environmental NGOs find ways to accommodate the diversity of social, 
political, and economic interests of the local elites. This entails a fundamental 
change in the way in which they approach and engage with local elites, 
collectively called ponggawa, like district government, local industry, 
entrepreneurs and pond owners. Rather than arriving with preconceived ideas 
and readymade concepts, the international actors need to focus on enabling an 
interactive process which includes the elites and envisages specific roles for all 
concerned with clear incentives and disincentives to move towards a commonly 
agreed upon goal. It also suggests that global actors acknowledge the value and 
meaning of local knowledge and provide the necessary space and time to 
debate and negotiate its relevance and utility. The negotiation of the values of 
local and of global knowledge is the basis for a form of locally sustainable 
governance that fits local conditions. Only then this can contribute to global 
environmental governance.  
Finally, Indonesia’s political-economy has significantly changed over 
the last decade. Much political and economic power has shifted away from 
central government and become rooted in the provinces and districts, 
enhancing the status of local political-economic elites. In order to be 
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successful, any conservation initiative needs to take serious note, engage in a 
debate, and incorporate the local political-economic interests into the 
conservation collaboration activities. At the same time, the local actors, e.g. 
district government and local political-economic leaders (ponggawa), need to 
move beyond the short-sighted material interests of local resource extraction 
and trade, to appreciate the efforts of environmental NGOs and value the 
potential benefits that may follow from a greater engagement with a more 
sustainable way of governing the coastal resources.  
 
 
6.5 A future research agenda 
 
This thesis analysed the global-local interface in the context of implementing 
marine conservation and better management standards for shrimp aquaculture 
in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. The thesis finds that these processes lead to 
friction and knowledge co-production that in effect mean negotiation and 
translation of the global agenda and its adjustment to the local context. This 
knowledge interaction has been shown to be exceedingly dynamic, variable, 
case specific, and critical for understanding conservation and development 
outcomes.  
I have sought to examine this process in as much detail as I could. 
However, among the many questions that still require further analysis, I see 
two issues of particular importance and of personal interest to me. First, it is 
important to look more closely into the question of decentralization and its 
links with sustainable development and conservation. Decentralization has 
been high on the scientific agenda in the first half of the 2000s, but since then it 
has become of less interest because of the prevailing view that it has failed in 
environmental terms. Is this indeed the case, and if so why? How does the 
assumed failure link up with the theme of local political ecology networks? 
What is the role and space for NGOs to step into this political mix, and what 
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are the best ways to devise steps towards better natural resource governance? 
Finally, the understanding of local political ecology needs further refinement as 
well. So far, political ecology analyses have tended to be descriptive, limiting 
themselves to identifying the winners and losers and providing general 
explanations about the underlying causes. More research is needed to go 
beyond the descriptiveness and more into the specifics of what can be done to 
advance better natural resource governance. 
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Coastal and marine resources that are the basis for local livelihoods and economies 
are increasingly becoming part of global networks accessing commodities available 
for exploration and exploitation, as well as global concerns for environmental 
degradation. The decentralization process in Indonesia is potentially an opportunity to 
improve the governance of the use of coastal natural resources as district government 
agencies have more flexibility to design policies that better respond to local needs. 
However, at the same time, it provides more space for the political-economic interests 
of local elites. The central state governance of coastal resources remains lacking and 
has not been effective in halting the environment degradation. Global environmental 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) see this ineffectiveness as an opportunity to 
intervene directly at the district level, bypassing the central state, to improve the 
governance of coastal resources through collaborative conservation initiatives.  NGOs 
such as The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and the World Wide Fund for nature (WWF) 
take the lead in introducing and organizing conservation activities in target areas. In 
doing so, they build networks of global and local actors as a means to anchor the 
global knowledge to local socio-economic and political settings.  
Using ethnographic case studies of two of these target areas in East Kalimantan 
province, Indonesia, this thesis investigates how these relationships are constituted by 
examining the global-local interface associated with the attempts to influence the 
governance of coastal natural resources.  
The general objective of this thesis is to explore, describe and analyse the 
social dynamics of the global-local interface in governing the conservation of coastal 
and marine resources in decentralized Indonesia. This thesis brings together two case 
studies about two different conservation attempts initiated by environmental NGO 
networks on collaboration with local actors and their networks. The first case study is 
about the development and implementation of Berau Marine Conservation Area 
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(MCA) that is based on scientific concepts of conservation. The second case study 
focuses on the emergence and the development of standards for better management 
practices (BMPs) in shrimp aquaculture in the Sesayap Delta (Tarakan and Bulungan 
region) in the northern part of East Kalimantan province. In both case studies, a multi-
local and multi-level ethnography approach was used to organise primary data 
collection and field observations.  
This thesis provides empirical data on the actual processes of interaction 
between global and local actors by showing an in-depth picture of the collaboration, 
friction and cultural-historical, social, and political-economic contestation of the value 
and meaning of conservation from the perspectives of the district governmental 
agencies, the district head, local entrepreneurs and industry, and the different 
ontologies of their knowledge and the knowledge of the global environmental actors. 
Concentrating on the dynamics of this global-local interface this thesis adds to 
existing literature because it helps us to understand why global environmental 
networks often face contention and even fail to be effective in their attempts to 
implement regulations or standards for a more sustainable use of coastal resources. 
These observations are possible by combining the political ecology approach for 
context analysis with environmental anthropology which provides ethnographic detail 
on global-local interaction (Tsing 2005). 
Chapter two presents the life history of the Berau MCA establishment between 
2005 and 2010. This chapter investigates the establishment of environmental 
collaboration between Berau district government agencies and TNC /WWF. The 
global environmental NGOs insist the current conservation efforts are a radical 
departure from top-down practices of the past. They explain that extensive efforts 
have been made to apply a new concept of partnership with decentralised district 
government that is inclusive and collaborative. However, despite good intensions and 
planning, this decentral type of collaboration has not resulted in a common 
understanding of marine conservation needs and appropriate governance. TNC and 
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WWF did develop a Joint Program as a district-based MCA collaboration body 
intended to facilitate discussion and compromise. However, faced with the 
complications resulting from different actor interests and motivations, they sought to 
simplify the issues taking over the authority and responsibility of the district 
government to monitor and control the use of coastal resources. Research findings 
show that as a result of this kind of re-centralisation not only a legal disconnect (Patlis 
2008) followed, but also social, historical, and political-economic disconnects. This 
gradually translated into increased confusion and spurred contention between the 
actors involved in defining, regulating and monitoring the marine conservation area.  
The study of Berau MCA implementation highlights the situation where what 
seems to be a well-intentioned collaboration between networks of global and local 
actors turns into a battlefield of perceptions and different environmental knowledge 
systems held by the different actors. This is further illustrated in Chapter three which 
shows how global knowledge on conservation implementation clashes with the local 
realities, and is contested by the local actors whose knowledge is grounded in local 
historical practices and social-cultural experience. The case in point is the fact that 
despite the implementation of Berau MCA, the district government continues to 
endorse the long-standing auction of the access rights (concessions) to harvest and 
trade the sea turtle eggs seen as an important source of district revenue. Because of 
their high economic value, sea turtle eggs are a strategic asset which local elites, both 
in the government and private sector (ponggawa), are not prepared to relinquish. In 
addition, they view the sea turtle eggs collection as their historically established right. 
These differences in economic interests and ontologies of knowledge result in 
contested interpretations of what marine conservation should be and what place 
within it, if any, the sea turtle protection should have.  
Chapter four explores the interaction of three environment regulatory networks 
in the context of formation of the standards for better management practices (BMPs) 
for shrimp aquaculture in the Sesayap Delta. This chapter examines how in the 
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process of developing such standards, the state and NGOs networks have 
systematically ignored the local political-economic elites (ponggawa) who control the 
artisanal trade networks and their activities on the ground. Both the State and NGOs 
see ponggawa as a target rather than a partner to develop, monitor and implement the 
BMP standards. Local actors are evidently not merely  subjects to or passive 
recipients of interventions by the global environmental and State-led regulatory 
networks. Instead, they are important actors by themselves who control not only the 
vertical flow of commodity and finance, but also influence the conditions of 
production and trade.?In the process of standardization and certification of production, 
it is therefore critical to include these local actors in the networks for standardization. 
Shrimp farmers in East Kalimantan are part of the global trade system through their 
linkages to national and artisanal regulatory networks as they are embedded in 
interdependency relationships with powerful pond owners and/or middlemen-traders 
(ponggawa). Therefore, patron-client ties within the artisanal trade networks are key 
to understand how to better regulate the production and trade through the shrimp 
value chain. 
Chapter five explores the interaction of different ontologies of knowledge  in 
the development of BMPs for shrimp aquaculture initiated by WWF-Indonesia. In 
general these standards are intended to reduce the negative environmental impact of 
shrimp production activities in the coastal regions. These standards are developed 
trough multi-stakeholder process that brings together different actors involved in the 
global trade networks and their knowledge. BMP standards for shrimp aquaculture are 
rather loosely formulated to allow space for adjustment to specific local contexts. 
Through the process of co-production in seeking to develop these standards in East 
Kalimantan, WWF-Indonesia created the opportunity for local participation. The 
expected result was hybrid conservation knowledge co-produced by WWF-Indonesia 
and local stakeholders that would be acceptable to all. In practice, however, the 
standards developed for the Sesayap Delta in East Kalimantan were still dominated by 
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demands for environmental sustainability in shrimp farming practices based on the 
global scientific knowledge, and left little room for local perspectives. Interestingly, 
this case shows that formulation of BMP standards is more than just about negotiation 
and inclusion of the local technical aspects of shrimp production and trade. It also 
perpetuates the social-political relations of production and environmental control and 
degradation. 
Chapter six synthesizes this thesis by bringing together the findings from the 
empirical chapters. A major finding here is that in the process of collaboration and 
network formation the global environmental NGOs tend to ignore the multiple patron-
client relationships that characterize the networks of local elites in governing the 
coastal resources. Moreover, decentralization grants the local elites’ networks more 
power to decide upon the management of their natural resources. This inevitably 
affects the process of translation and negotiation of the global environmental 
knowledge in the process of knowledge co-production with the local actors. This 
research contributes to existing literature on global-local interaction, particularly the 
translation, negotiation and co-production of knowledge in the context of 
conservation initiatives when they are embedded into decentralized local political-
economic context. 
This thesis offers policy recommendations to improve the coastal governance, 
paying particular attention to creating enabling conditions for effective involvement 
of multi-level actors such as global environmental NGOs, district government 
agencies, and local political-economic leaders (ponggawa). First, the global actors 
need to change the way they approach and engage the local elites to better understand 
their diversity and find appropriate ways to accommodate their social, political, and 
economic interest. Second, the global actors need to provide space and time for local 
and global knowledge to engage in debate and negotiation to find more effective ways 
towards sustainable resource governance. Finally, the local political-economic leaders 
need to be more open and receptive to the opportunities for interaction with the global 
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actors. This may not only result in better solutions for coastal resource governance, 
but may also be financially viable.  
For the future research agenda, it is important in my view to look more closely 
into the question of decentralization. How does this link up with the theme of local 
political ecology networks? What is the role and space for NGOs to step into this 
political mix and what are the best ways to devise steps towards better natural 
resource governance? Further, more research is needed to go beyond the 
descriptiveness local political ecology and delve into the specifics of what pragmatic 
steps can be taken to advance better natural resource governance. 
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Sumberdaya pesisir dan laut merupakan sumber mata pencaharian utama dan 
mewarnai kegiatan ekonomi masyarakat pesisir. Pengelolaan sumberdaya 
pesisir dan laut juga telah menjadi salah satu perhatian dunia baik oleh mereka 
yang ingin mengeksplorasi dan mengeksploitasi maupun oleh mereka yang 
mempermasalahkan peningkatan kerusakan lingkungan yang terjadi di wilayah 
pesisir.  
Penerapan desentralisasi di Indonesia membuka kesempatan bagi 
perbaikan tata kelola sumberdaya pesisir oleh pemerintah daerah. 
Desentralisasi memberikan kesempatan pada pemerintah daerah untuk 
merencanakan kebijakan penglolaan kawasan pesisir yang lebih bisa menjawab 
kebutuhan masyarakat lokal. Namun, di saat yang sama, dengan dalih 
peningkatan pendapatan asli daerah (PAD), desentralisasi memberikan 
kesempatan bagi pemerintah daerah untuk mengadopsi kepentingan para elit 
ekonomi lokal daripada mengadopsi kepentingan masyarakat secara luas. 
Sedangkan bagi pemerintah pusat sendiri, perbaikan tata kelola sumber daya 
pesisir belum menjadi perhatian utama sehingga pemerintah pusat dianggap 
kurang tanggap dalam menanggulangi kerusakan lingkungan yang terjadi di 
wilayah pesisir.  
Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat tingkat international (LSM 
internasional) yang bergerak di bidang lingkungan melihat hal ini sebagai suatu 
kesempatan untuk melakukan intervensi terhadap kegiatan pengelolaan 
kawasan pesisir di tingkat daerah. LSM internasional menjalin kerja sama 
langsung dengan pemerintah daerah untuk meningkatkan pengelolaan kawasan 
pesisir. LSM internasional seperti The Nature Conservancy (TNC) dan World 
Wide Fund for nature (WWF) memelopori kegiatan konservasi dengan 
mengenalkan dan merencanakan berbagai kegiatan konservasi di berbagai 
wilayah di Indonesia. TNC dan WWF membangun jejaring dengan aktor lokal 
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sebagai salah satu cara untuk memasukkan konsep pengetahuan global tentang 
konservasi ke dalam konsep ekonomi-politik masyarakat dan pemerintah lokal.  
Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk melihat hubungan antara aktor lokal dan 
aktor global dalam proses tata kelola pemanfaatan sumberdaya alam pesisir di 
wilayah Kalimantan Timur. Melalui deskripsi dan analisis dua studi kasus, tesis 
ini menjabarkan proses tatap muka antara aktor global dan pengetahuan global 
mereka dengan aktor lokal dan pengetahuan lokal ketika aktor global berusaha 
untuk mengintervensi proses tata kelola pemanfaatan sumber daya alam pesisir 
di tingkat lokal.  
Secara umum, tesis ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan dan 
menganalisa dinamika-dinamika sosial yang terjadi ketika aktor dan 
pengetahuan global bertatapmuka dengan aktor dan pengetahuan lokal dalam 
proses penatakelolaan sumberdaya pesisir lewat kegiatan konservasi di masa 
desentralisasi di Indonesia. Di dalam tesis ini saya akan memaparkan dua studi 
kasus tentang kegiatan konservasi yang dilakukan oleh jejaring LSM yang 
bergerak di bidang lingkungan. LSM tersebut berkolaborasi dengan aktor dan 
jejaring lokal. Studi kasus yang pertama menjelaskan tentang pengembangan 
dan penerapan Kawasan Konservasi Laut Daerah Berau (KKLD Berau) yang di 
kembangkan berdasarkan pada konsep ilmiah sebuah kawasan konservasi. 
Studi kasus kedua membahas tentang pengembangan konsep budidaya udang 
yang baik di Delta Sesayap (Tarakan dan Bulungan) di pesisir utara 
Kalimantan Timur. Di dalam kedua studi kasus ini pendekatan etnografi multi-
lokal dan multi-level digunakan dalam proses pengumpulan data utama dan 
kegiatan observasi di lapangan.  
Tesis ini mendeskripsikan tentang proses interaksi antara aktor global 
dan aktor lokal. Proses interaksi ini terjadi ketika setiap aktor yang terlibat di 
dalam proses pengembangan kegiatan konservasi tesebut menilai dan 
memaknai konservasi sesuai dengan pengetahuan yang mereka miliki. Interaksi 
ini tidak saja berakhir pada kegiatan kolaborasi antara aktor global dengan 
aktor lokal, namun juga melahirkan friksi dan pertentangan yang berakar pada 
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nilai sejarah budaya, sosial ekonomi dan politik antara aktor global dan aktor 
lokal. Di dalam tesis ini, saya juga mendeskripsikan perbedaan ontologi antara 
pengetahuan global dan pengetahuan lokal yang berkaitan dengan pengelolaan 
lingkungan yang dibawa oleh masing-masing aktor. Tesis ini memperkaya 
literatur yang mengulas tentang dinamika tatap muka antara global dan lokal 
karena di dalam tesis ini dipaparkan secara mendetil tentang proses tatap muka 
antara global dan lokal dan menjelaskan mengapa jejaring LSM lingkungan 
global seringkali dipahami secara salah dan bahkan gagal dalam usaha mereka 
untuk menerapkan aturan-aturan atau standard dalam pengelolaan sumberdaya 
pesisir yang berkelanjutan. Pengamatan yang dilakukan dalam penelitian ini 
menggabungkan pendekatan ekologi-politik untuk analisa konteks, dan 
antropologi lingkungan untuk detil entografis interaksi antara global dan lokal 
(Tsing 2005).    
Dalam Bab Kedua, saya memaparkan sejarah perkembangan KKLD 
Berau antara tahun 2005 hingga tahun 2010. Bab ini menganalisa tentang 
proses kolaborasi antara Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Berau dengan 
TNC/WWF dalam mengembangkan dan menerapkan KKLD Berau. 
TNC/WWF sebagai LSM lingkungan internasional beranggapan bahwa 
pendekatan pengelolaan kawasan konservasi yang sedang dilakukan sekarang 
merupakan warisan lama yang bersifat top-down. TNC/WWF mengklaim 
bahwa mereka telah banyak mengembangkan kawasan konservasi dengan 
pendekatan baru melalui kolaborasi dengan pemerintah daerah. Namun, 
meskipun konsep baru ini telah direncanakan dengan baik, kolaborasi langsung 
dengan pemerintah daerah ini belum bisa menghasilkan satu pemahaman yang 
sama tentang kebutuhan akan pengelolaan kawasan konservasi di  suatu 
kawasan pesisir. Dalam rangka pengembangan KKLD Berau, TNC dan WWF 
membetuk Joint Program sebagai sebuah institusi kolaboratif yang mewadahi 
berbagai kepentingan berbeda antara pemerintah daerah dan LSM. Namun,  
dalam usahanya tersebut, TNC dan WWF menghadapi berbagai kerumitan 
yang ditimbulkan oleh perbedaan kepentingan dan motivasi dari para aktor 
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yang terlibat dalam proses pengembangan dan pengelolaan KKLD Berau. 
Untuk menyederhanakan kerumitan tata kelola kawasan pesisir ini, TNC dan 
WWF mengambil alih kewenangan dan tanggung jawab pemerintah daerah 
untuk mengawasi dan mengontrol pemanfaatan sumber daya alam pesisir.  
Hasil temuan penelitian ini memperlihatkan bahwa bentuk tata kelola yang 
bersifat re-sentralisasi ini tidak saja mencerminkan sebuah ‘legal disconnect’ 
(Patlis 2008), namun juga memperlihatkan bahwa konsep tata kelola kawasan 
pesisir yang ditawarkan oleh TNC dan WWF ini juga terputus dari kondisi 
sosial, sejarah dan politik ekonomi masyarakat lokal. Hal ini mengakibatkan 
meningkatkan kebingungan dan menimbulkan ketegangan diantara para aktor 
yang terlibat dalam mendfiniskan, mengatur dan mengawasai kawasan 
konservasi laut.  
Penelitian tentang penerapan KKLD Berau menjelaskan tentang sebuah 
kondisi dimana kolaborasi yang direncanakan dengan baik di dalam jejaring 
aktor global dan lokal berubah menjadi sebuah medan pertempuran persepsi 
dan sistem pengetahuan tentang lingkungan diantara para aktor. Saya 
memaparkan hal ini dengan lebih mendalam di Bab Tiga. Bab ini juga akan 
menjelaskan bagaimana pengetahuan global tentang penerapan konservasi 
tidak sejalan dengan realitas yang ada di masyarakat lokal dan bahwa 
pengetahuan global tersebut berlawanan dengan pengetahuan yang dimiliki 
oleh aktor lokal yang berdasarkan pada praktek historis lokal dan pengalaman 
sosial budaya mereka.  Yang menarik adalah bahwa, meskipun KKLD telah 
diterapkan di Berau, pemerintah daerah tetap mendukung sistem lelang hak 
pengelolaan pulau penghasil telur penyu (konsesi) yang memang telah 
dijalankan sejak jaman nenek moyang mereka. Lelang hak pengelolaan pulau 
penghasil telur penyu ini menjadi salah satu sumber pemasukan daerah yang 
cukup penting. Karena nilai ekonominya yang tinggi, telur penyu menjadi 
sebuah aset strategis bagi para elit lokal, baik mereka yang berada di 
pemerintahan maupun mereka yang di sektor swasta (ponggawa). Hal ini 
membuat mereka enggan  melepaskan sistem pengelolaan pulau-pulau 
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penghasil telur penyu yang telah mereka kenal dan kerjakan sejak jaman nenek 
moyang mereka. Berbagai perbedaan yang berakar pada kepentingan ekonomi 
dan ontologi pengetahuan menyebabkan perbedaan interpretasi bagaimana 
pengelolaan sebuah kawasan konservasi laut dan bagaimana pengelolaan 
perlindungan penyu dilakukan.  
Dalam Bab Empat, saya menjelaskan tentang interaksi tiga jejaring 
peraturan tentang lingkungan dalam konteks penyusunan cara bertambak udang 
yang baik – Better Management Practices (BMPs) untuk tambak udang di 
wilayah Delta Sesayap. Bab ini membahas tentang bagaimana jejaring yang 
diinisiasi oleh pemerintah pusat dan jejaring yang diinisiasi oleh LSM telah 
secara sistematis mengesampingkan peran ekonomi-politik ponggawa yang 
mengontrol jejaring perdagangan yang ada di dalam sistem sosial ekonomi 
masyarakat lokal. Baik pemerintah pusat dan LSM melihat ponggawa sebagai 
target dalam proses penyusunan, pengawasan dan implementasi standard BMPs 
daripada sebagai mitra dalam kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut. Bab ini memberikan 
gambaran bahwa aktor lokal bukan hanya merupakan subjek atau penerima 
pasif sebuah intervensi aturan lingkungan yang dilakukan oleh global maupun 
oleh pemerintah pusat. Aktor lokal memiliki peran penting, bukan saja dalam 
mengontrol aliran vertikal suatu komoditi dan keuangan, namun juga berperan 
penting dalam mempengaruhi kondisi kegiatan produksi dan perdagangan. 
Sehingga sangatlah penting untuk melibatkan aktor lokal sebagai salah satu 
aktor penting dalam jejaring aktor dalam proses penyusunan sebuah standard 
dan sertifikasi sebuah produk. Di Kalimantan Timur, keterikatan petambak 
udang secara ekonomi dan sosial dengan ponggawa tidak bisa dilepaskan dari 
sistem perdagangan global dalam rantai komoditi. Oleh karenanya, hubungan 
patron-client yang berada dalam jejaring perdagangan di tingkat lokal 
merupakan kunci untuk memahami bagaimana cara untuk mengatur kegiatan 
produksi dan perdagangan udang lewat rantai komoditi udang.  
Di dalam Bab Lima, saya memaparkan tentang interaksi berbagai 
ontologi pengetahuan yang berbeda dalam proses penyusunan BMPs tambak 
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udang yang diinisiasi oleh WWF-Indonesia. Secara umum, standard ditujukan 
untuk mengurangi dampak negatif dari kegiatan bertambak udang di wilayah 
pesisir. Standard ini disusun lewat beberapa proses diskusi yang melibatkan 
berbagai pemangku kepentingan yang terlibat dalam jejaring perdagangan 
global dengan berbagai pengetahuan mereka yang berbeda. Melalui proses co-
production, WWF-Indonesia memberikan kesempatan kepada para pemangku 
kepentingan lokal untuk terlibat langsung dalam proses penyusunan BMPs. 
Proses ini bertujuan untuk menghasilkan BMPs yang bisa mengakomodasi 
kepentingan dan kondisi lingkungan dan sosial lokal. diharapkan nantinya, 
BMPs yang tersusun akan sesuai untuk diterapkan di wilayah Delta Sesayap. 
WWF-Indonesia mengharapkan melalui proses ini akan dihasilkan suatu 
pengetahuan yang merupakan hasil gabungan antara pengetahuan yang dimiliki 
oleh WWF-Indonesia dan pengetahuan yang dimiliki oleh para pemangku 
kepentingan lokal sehingga bisa diterima dan diterapkan oleh semua aktor. 
Namun, pada kenyataannya, standard yang disusun untuk wilayah Delta 
Sesayap masih didominasi dengan tuntutan atas pengelolaan lingkungan yang 
berkelanjutan dalam proses produksi udang yang didasarkan pada pengetahuan 
ilmiah global. Yang menarik dari kasus ini adalah bahwa proses penyusunan 
standard BMPs bukan saja menggambarkan suatu proses negosiasi dan cara-
cara untuk memasukkan aspek teknis lokal dari sebuah proses produksi dan 
perdagangan udang ke dalam sebuah standard yang bersifat global. Proses 
penyusunan standard ini juga mengungkapkan hubungan suatu kondisi sosial-
politik masyarakat lokal dalam sebuah proses produksi dan kontrol terhadap 
lingkungan. 
Bab keenam merangkum tesis ini dengan memaparkan temuan-temuan 
dari bab-bab sebelumnya. Temuan utama tesis ini adalah bahwa dalam sebuah 
proses kolaborasi dan pembentukan jejaring, LSM lingkungan internasional 
memiliki kecenderungan untuk mengesampingkan hubungan patron-client 
yang beragam yang dimiliki oleh jejaring elit lokal dalam kegiatan tata kelola 
wilayah pesisir. Terlebih lagi, penerapan desentralisasi memberikan 
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kewenangan lebih kepada jejaring elit lokal dalam memutuskan pengelolaan 
sumber daya alam di tingkat lokal. Tidak bisa dihindari bahwa hal ini 
mempengaruhi proses penerjemahan dan negosiasi pengetahuan lingkungan 
global dalam proses co-production pengetahuan antara aktor global dan aktor 
lokal. Penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi pada penelitian sejenis tentang 
interaksi antara global dan lokal, terutama dalam hal bagaimana para aktor 
menerjemahkan, bernegosiasi, dan terlibat dalam proses co-production 
pengetahuan dalam konteks pemrakarsaan kegiataan konservasi lingkungan di 
dalam era desentralisasi.  
Beberapa rekomendasi dari tesis ini diharapkan bisa memberikan 
sumbangan bagi peningkatan tata kelola kawasan pesisir, terutama untuk lebih 
mengefektifkan keterlibatan aktor – baik itu LSM lingkungan internasional dan 
nasional, pemerintah daerah dan juga pemimpin elit lokal (ponggawa). 
Rekomendasi yang pertama adalah bahwa aktor global perlu mengubah 
pendekatan dan cara yang mereka gunakan dalam mengikutsertakan elit lokal 
dalam program-program kerja mereka sehingga diharapkan nantinya akan bisa 
ditemukan cara-cara yang tepat untuk mengakomodasi kepentingan-
kepentingan sosial, politis dan ekonomi elit lokal. Rekomendasi yang kedua 
adalah bahwa aktor global perlu menyediakan ruang dan waktu yang lebih 
untuk memberi kesempatan bagi proses interaksi antara  pengetahuan lokal dan 
global. Diharapkan nantinya akan bisa ditemukan cara-cara yang lebih efektif 
dalam pengelolaan sumberdaya alam yang berkelanjutan. Rekomendasi yang 
terakhir ditujukan bagi pemerintah daerah dan elit lokal supaya mereka bisa 
lebih terbuka terhadap kesempatan-kesempatan untuk berinteraksi dengan aktor 
global. Sehingga nantinya, akan bisa ditemukan solusi-solusi untuk 
peningkatan tata kelola kawasan pesisir yang lebih baik dan berkelanjutan.  
Pelaksanaan desentralisasi di Indonesia perlu dikaji lebih lanjut, 
terutama yang berkaitan dengan jejaring ekologi politik masyarakat lokal. Apa 
saja peran dan kesempatan bagi LSM untuk masuk ke dalam kancah politik 
lokal? Bagaimana renca-rencana yang disusun oleh LSM untuk memperbaiki 
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tata kelola sumberdaya alam? Lebih jauh lagi, perlu penelitian lebih lanjut 
untuk membahas lebih lanjut ekologi politik lokal untuk menggali lebih dalam 
langkah-langkah pragmatis dalam meningkatkan tata kelola sumberdaya alam 
yang berkelanjutan.  
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Name of the learning activity Department/Institute  Year ECTS* 
A) Project related competences 
RDS advanced research seminars WUR 2007, 2010, 
2011 
2 
RESCOPAR research seminars and 
workshops 
RESCOPAR 2007, 2009, 
2010, 2011 
4 
MARE Conference IV (participant) WUR/UvA 2007 1 
Competencies for integrated agricultural 
research 
CERES 2007 1 
Governance, Livelihood and Resourcess 
(RDS 30806)  
WUR 2011 6 
 
B) General research related competences 
Introduction course WASS   
CERES Orientation program CERES 2007 5 
CERES Presentation Tutorials CERES 2007 5.5 
Technique for Writing and Presenting a 
Scientific Paper 
WGS 2010 1.2 
FNP Summer School ‘Participatory forest 
management as practice and performance’ 
WASS 2011 3 
 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
‘The politics of marine conservation area 
in Berau’ 
International MARE 
Conference V 
2009 2 
‘Shrimp farming and the conservation 
networks’ 
International Coastal 
Zone Aquaculture, 
RESCOPAR, Can Tho 
2010 2 
The governance of shrimp production and 
trade: case study on shrimp farming and 
trade in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, 
Indonesia’ 
IIFET 2010 Montpellier 2010 2 
‘Collaboration or contention: disentangling 
the dynamics of social actors in the Berau 
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International Seminar on 
3rd Southeast Asia 
Update, Leiden 
University 
2011 1 
‘Shrimp farming and strandardization of 
production: the case of East Kalimantan’ 
 
International MARE 
Conference VI 
2011 2 
Total    37.7 
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